Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAPAZ1359
2009-09-30 13:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

BOLIVIAN OPPOSITION MOSTLY RESIGNED TO MORALES

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR SNAR KDEM BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001359 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SNAR KDEM BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN OPPOSITION MOSTLY RESIGNED TO MORALES
VICTORY, SUPPORTS U.S. POSTURE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. John Creamer, reasons 1.4b,d

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001359

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SNAR KDEM BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN OPPOSITION MOSTLY RESIGNED TO MORALES
VICTORY, SUPPORTS U.S. POSTURE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. John Creamer, reasons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: Meetings September 23-24 with leading
Bolivian opposition figures in Santa Cruz underscored their
subdued mood two months ahead of presidential and
parliamentary elections. Almost all believe that President
Morales will be easily re-elected to a second term and that
his MAS party will emerge stronger than ever. Some, such as
leading opposition candidate Manfred Reyes Villa, sought --
unconvincingly -- to persuade us that discontent with the
current government (whose approval ratings remain at 60
percent or higher) would translate into opposition gains, but
these voices were in the minority. Reyes Villa, fellow
opposition figures and Santa Cruz business leaders strongly
endorsed the U.S. government's restraint in engaging the GOB
despite frequent provocations, observing that public conflict
between the U.S. and Bolivia serves only the interests of MAS
hardliners. End Summary.


2. (C) On the margins of the annual trade fair "Expocruz" in
Santa Cruz (the unofficial capital of Bolivia's political
opposition),Polcouns met September 23-24 with opposition and
business leaders and confirmed that most have resigned
themselves to a second Morales term. With the exception of
presidential candidate Reyes Villa, none predicted victory in
December elections, acknowledging -- sometimes bitterly --
Morales's formidable advantages in a resilient economy, broad
popular support, and the powers of incumbency. Several
suggested that the opposition would manage to maintain
control of the Senate, but even this is uncertain. Recent
polling indicates that the MAS is likely to win a Senate
majority.


3. (C) Opposition senate candidate (and former presidential
candidate, having withdrawn in favor of Reyes Villa) German
Antelo was sharply critical of the opposition's failure to
unite, as well as of divisions and extremism among his own
Santa Cruz supporters. Reyes Villa expressed frustration
that he has been unable to convince the second-ranking
opposition presidential candidate (Samuel Doria Medina) to

step aside, implicitly acknowledging his candidacy's long
odds and undercutting his own confident assertions of
victory. A national opinion survey published September 28
put Reyes Villa's support at just 20 percent, compared to 54
percent for Morales and 11 percent for Doria Medina.


4. (C) Reyes Villa predicted a hard-fought election contest
and a ruthless, no-holds-barred campaign by Morales.
Reviewing his forthcoming visit to the United States (set for
September 30),Reyes Villa indicated that he would be seeking
to enlist the services of an American political strategist,
someone "along the lines of Dick Morris" (if not Morris
himself),to help combat the expected MAS onslaught.


5. (C) Reyes Villa said he planned to pursue with the OAS
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights the case of his
running mate, jailed former Pando governor Leopoldo
Fernandez. This would be done to highlight Fernandez's
status as a "political prisoner," rather than out of any
expectation of OAS action in his case. Indeed, Reyes Villa
observed that Fernandez is more valuable to his campaign in
prison (as a symbol of alleged GOB abuse) than he would be on
the hustings. Although clearly interested in presenting
himself as an ally of the United States, Reyes Villa
indicated that he recognized the political dangers of any
U.S. involvement in the campaign. He agreed that the U.S.
has been wise not to respond publicly to GOB provocations,
especially in advance of elections, arguing that such
conflict is exactly what the MAS seeks and thrives upon.


6. (C) Santa Cruz Cardinal Julio Terrazas, an outspoken
critic of the government, echoed Reyes Villa's observations
about the advisability of discretion in the face of GOB
attacks. Terrazas urged the U.S. to continue USAID programs
despite the government's apparent opposition, observing that
such humanitarian assistance is urgently needed in Bolivia.
He expressed understanding for the U.S. decision on ATPDEA
withdrawal, but said the action has hit some low-income
groups the hardest. Terrazas reported that he and his
parishes have noted a marked increase in drug production and

trafficking in his archdiocese, expressing distress at what
he described as the growing social costs of the trade.


7. (C) Comment: With polls continuing to point to a solid MAS
victory in December, the reality of their grim situation is
increasingly evident to Bolivian opposition leaders, even as
they are beginning to gear up for their campaigns. Although
unable to field a serious challenger to Morales or overcome
their own internal divisions, the opposition appears to
recognize that no external power will reverse their fortunes,
and that any efforts to draw the United States into the
campaign (so far the exclusive tactic of the MAS) are likely
to backfire.
CREAMER