Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAPAZ1220
2009-08-21 20:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

BOLIVIANS PRESS FOR END TO ADDITIONAL USAID

Tags:  PREL PGOV EAID KDEM PINR BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #1220/01 2332041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 212041Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1510
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 9151
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6546
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0508
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7718
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4764
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 5098
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6376
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 7383
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2141
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1845
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001220 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID KDEM PINR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIANS PRESS FOR END TO ADDITIONAL USAID
PROGRAMS

REF: A. LA PAZ 1111

B. LA PAZ 1062

C. LA PAZ 1043

D. LA PAZ 1027

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John Creamer, reasons 1.4b,d

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001220

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID KDEM PINR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIANS PRESS FOR END TO ADDITIONAL USAID
PROGRAMS

REF: A. LA PAZ 1111

B. LA PAZ 1062

C. LA PAZ 1043

D. LA PAZ 1027

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John Creamer, reasons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: Despite recent assurances from Bolivian
Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca that the GOB directive to
suspend USAID democracy programs should not apply to our
public administration and conflict resolution programs
(reftels),Bolivian Planning Minister Noel Aguirre wrote our
acting USAID country director August 17 to request
termination of those programs as well. Charge met with
Deputy Foreign Minister Hugo Fernandez to seek clarification
and underscore our deep concern, while USAID has reached out
to sympathetic ministries and affected beneficiaries to
apprise them of the GOB's intentions. Fernandez agreed with
the Charge in principle to "suspend," rather than "close,"
these USAID activities pending discussion within the
bilateral framework process. Charge will meet with FM
Choquehuanca August 24 to confirm this arrangement. End
summary.


2. (C) Following up on then-Charge Creagan's July 29 meeting
with FM Choquehuanca, in which Choquehuanca readily agreed
that USAID public administration projects should not be
included in the GOB suspension, USAID officials met with
Planning Ministry and other counterparts August 10 to review
our programs and plans in more detail. In that meeting,
USAID officials emphasized that our programs are developed in
close consultation with the GOB, in support of the GOB
National Development Plan, reported that democracy programs
had been effectively suspended in accordance with the GOB's
request, but indicated that activities under USAID's public
administration and conflict mitigation portfolios would
continue. USAID also reiterated the agreement reached with
Ministers Choquehuanca and Aguirre that the suspensions and
the broader issue of aid would be addressed in the next round
of bilateral talks.


3. (C) The August 10 technical-level meeting went well, and
it seemed that our efforts to manage the GOB initiative were
holding. On August 17, however, Minister Aguirre sent a

second letter reiterating the July 9 instruction to end
democracy programs and making explicit that this directive
applies to public administration and conflict resolution
programs as well. The language of this letter was stronger
than the first, and more definitive than Aguirre's own
initial presentation to USAID, in which he took pains to
explain that the action was a "suspension" only. The August
17 letter refers to closure of the programs and demands
written evidence that these closures have taken place.


4. (C) The Charge sought urgent meetings with Deputy FM
Fernandez and FM Choquehuanca (out of the country until
August 24) to seek an explanation for this reversal and
underscore the great damage these actions could do to ongoing
bilateral talks. Meanwhile, recognizing that neither GOB
directive had yet been made public, USAID has been reaching
out to affected program beneficiaries and partner ministries
(one of whom had requested additional program assistance just
days earlier) to let them know of the latest Aguirre letter
and subtly encourage them to weigh in on the matter before
the decision becomes irreversible.


5. (C) In his August 20 meeting with the Charge, Acting FM
Fernandez agreed that the tone of Aguirre's letter was
aggressive, but suggested that the Planning Minister's line
had been hardened because of the lengthy delays in getting to
a second round of bilateral talks. Aguirre was also facing
increased pressure from senior GOB leaders and social groups
to take action, Fernandez observed. The Charge accepted that
scheduling of the talks have been delayed longer than we had
hoped, but emphasized that such unilateral actions threaten
to poison the atmosphere of the talks -- something we very

much want to avoid. The Charge also noted that, once
terminated, the affected USAID programs would be extremely
difficult to restart.


6. (C) Reiterating the Bolivian government's interest in
transforming assistance (to make it state-to-state or
otherwise under GOB direction),Fernandez finally allowed
that "suspending" the affected USAID activities until
bilateral talks can take up the issue could be an acceptable
alternative to immediate closure. He pledged to consult with
other ministries and government officials, and indicated that
FM Choquehuanca should be prepared to provide a more
definitive position when he meets the Charge August 24. The
Charge and Fernandez agreed that if we move forward with this
compromise, both sides should meet soon on a technical level
(USAID and GOB counterparts) to ensure a smooth and
transparent suspension of activities.


7. (C) Comment: Fernandez may be right in attributing the
timing of these actions to GOB frustration with the pace of
bilateral talks, but these directives likely also reflect
pressure from hardliners who would like to derail the
process. At this point, agreement on temporary suspension
of these programs appears to be the best we can manage,
avoiding GOB demands for immediate closure and perhaps giving
time for internal lobbying to have some effect. It is even
possible that the Bolivian government could welcome back some
of these affected programs, which have the support of many
government agencies, if the bilateral process could produce
some kind of a new assistance framework (however short of the
current GOB proposal).
CREAMER