Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAPAZ1046
2009-07-17 18:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

SPECIAL ADVISOR ECHAVESTE VISITS BOLIVIA

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR ECON SNAR EAID EINV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0019
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #1046/01 1981820
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171820Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1269
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001046 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR ECON SNAR EAID EINV
ETRD, MCAP, BL
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISOR ECHAVESTE VISITS BOLIVIA

REF: 06 LA PAZ 3107

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James Creagan for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001046

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR ECON SNAR EAID EINV
ETRD, MCAP, BL
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISOR ECHAVESTE VISITS BOLIVIA

REF: 06 LA PAZ 3107

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James Creagan for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Maria Echaveste, Special Advisor to the
Secretary, traveled to Bolivia June 27-28 to meet with GOB
officials including President Evo Morales, Presidency
Minister Juan Ramon Quintana, and Government Minister Alfredo
Rada to convey the Secretary,s commitment to improving
bilateral relations and to frame the President,s pending
decision on the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) in a
domestic, political context. In every meeting, Echaveste
underscored the administration,s support for inclusive
actions by President Morales, noting her own work for social
justice in the United States. Echaveste explained that many
in Congress opposed the restoration of ATPA benefits at this
time and that Congress, views would play an important part
in the President,s decision. She urged GOB officials to
focus on our broader rapprochement efforts, not just on the
ATPA decision. GOB officials pushed for restoration of ATPA
benefits and warned of significant harm to bilateral
relations if this did not happen. As expected, GOB officials
raised a series of past grievances against the United States.
At the same time, they expressed admiration and high
expectations for President Obama. End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Special Advisor Meets with President, Foreign Minister
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2. (C) Advisor Echaveste and Charge James Creagan met with
President Morales and Foreign Minister Choquehuanca on the
morning of June 28. Morales greeted Echaveste warmly and
professed his belief in the possibility of partnering with
President Obama, but then ticked off several complaints about

the USG, past and present, that made relations more
difficult.


3. (C) Morales recounted how former Ambassador Manuel Rocha
had accused him of being a narcotrafficker and a terrorist,
and how he had asked the Bolivian people not to vote for
Morales in 2002. He said the USG violated Bolivian
sovereignty by taking its surface to air missiles away in
2005 not long before he was elected (reftel). Today, he
said, the USG is castigating Bolivia for no reason by
threatening to permanently remove ATPA benefits. Despite a
detailed discussion by Echaveste of the difficulties
surrounding reinstatement of ATPA benefits, Morales opined
that he was confident that President Obama could make the
determination necessary to restart ATPA immediately if he so
desired. Regarding the extradition of former President
Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada, Morales seemed to dismiss
the legal process, saying "the U.S. helped him escape from
Bolivia" and that "if the U.S. asked us to extradite someone,
it would be done in a day." Morales affirmed his desire to
fight narcotraffickers and said the USG could help by
providing equipment, including by approving the transfer of
helicopters outfitted with U.S. equipment. Last, Morales
accused CNN of labeling him as a narcoterrorist. While
saying that he knew President Obama was not connected with
CNN, he advised that "your government could be influential"
in stopping such talk. Morales did not offer concrete
solutions for restoring confidence in bilateral relations.
In an offhand comment, Morales did say that USAID has done
things in Bolivia to be applauded.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ATPA Critical for Moving Forward
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) Echaveste and Charge met with Vice Minister for
External Commercial Relations Pablo Guzman on June 27.
Guzman said that despite recent press reports stating the
contrary, the GOB very much wants ATPA renewed immediately.
He noted that ATPA suspension is hurting families, and "they
didn,t expel Ambassador Goldberg, we (the GOB) did." He
said in El Alto alone, 6,000 families had been affected and
that there had been a 50 percent drop in textile exports. He
conceded that arrangements with the government of Venezuela
to buy ATPA products were temporary and had not been fully
successful. He criticized the Venezuelans as "bureaucrats,
not businessmen."


5. (C) Guzman listened attentively as Echaveste discussed the
challenges to renewing ATPA benefits. Echaveste explained
that whether or not ATPA was restored now, the legislation
would expire at the end of 2009, making it at best a
temporary measure. She proposed instead focusing on future
economic agreements that would be more permanent. Guzman
agreed on the need for a more permanent agreement and
advocated for immediate discussions on this front. However,
he stressed that such discussions did not obviate the need
for immediate reinstatement of ATPA benefits. Calling
himself "a realist," Guzman estimated there was a "70 to 80
percent chance" relations would suffer a "significant"
setback if ATPA benefits were not restored, and "we would
return to tit-for-tat relations." He added: "If Ecuador has
ATPA, why not Bolivia?"

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Quintana: USG Constant "Aggression"
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6. (C) After meeting with Vice Minister Guzman, Echaveste and
Charge met with Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana.
While professing his desire to see an improvement in
relations, Quintana said the only way to establish a "spirit
of confidence" would be to settle past accounts of USG
political interference in Bolivia. With this, he listed a
number of unfounded, perceived grievances including the CIA
and DEA's "lack of respect for local laws," the Embassy's
Military Group,s "take over" of 35 Bolivian surface to air
(MANPAD) missiles just before Evo Morales came into power,
and USAID's continued undermining of the Morales
administration by supporting the opposition. He said that
"if I relate other incidents, you,ll feel ashamed." He
complained that for the past three years, the GOB has had to
spend much of its time "defending itself from this
aggression."


7. (C) Quintana became most animated about the charge against
USAID, saying "they work unstintingly to hurt our standing
among the people, even meeting with 'pseudo-indigenous'
leaders to plot against us." Quintana's attack of
USAID-funded NGOs offered Echaveste the opportunity to note
that a robust civil society, including a diversity of views,
is a key element of a democracy. She added that the USG
promotes the strengthening of civil society across the world.
Quintana also rattled off the names of seven members of the
"Goni" regime working for USAID contractors and accused USAID
of making "clandestine efforts" to bring down the government.
With this he raised the question, "Is it better for our
relations that USAID exist here, or leave?" He suggested we
define new rules for economic development that would not
involve USAID, proposing "we leave USAID in the freezer."


8. (C) Echaveste tried to focus on measures to move the
bilateral relationship forward, but Minister Quintana said
the only way to move forward would be to "rectify the harm
done in the past by the USG." By doing so, he replied, we
would finally "change the rules of the game." He said he
welcomed the partnership of President Obama, because like
President Morales Obama had also "risen up from below and in
so doing now represents the hopes of millions." When
Echaveste tried to move the conversation toward a discussion
of concrete steps to foster a better relationship, Quintana
diverted back to a diatribe on USAID's failures.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Llorenti: Goni Extradition
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -


9. (C) Echaveste met with Vice Minister for Social Movements
Sacha Llorenti on June 28 to discuss judicial issues.
Llorenti discussed several outstanding judicial cases,
focusing primarily on the GOB's request to have former
President Sanchez de Lozada extradited from the United
States. Llorenti noted that the Bolivian Congress voted to
strip Goni of his immunity in 2004, and since then both the
Attorney General (equivalent) and the Supreme Court have
indicted him. While admitting that the GOB had not formally
submitted an extradition request until November 2008,
Llorenti complained about what he perceives as a delay in
processing the case.


10. (C) Llorenti also detailed accusations against Goni's
former Defense Minister Carlos Sanchez Berzain, who has been
granted political asylum in the United States and whose
extradition request is also pending. (Note: Extradition
requests for Goni, Sanchez Berzain, and a third minister
Berindoague were submitted jointly in November 2008. End
note.) After conceding that "our democracy could be
stronger," Llorenti maintained nonetheless that Sanchez
Berzain's crimes needed to be aired in a court, and that it
should be Bolivia's Supreme Court. "Give our democracy a
chance to show its strength," he concluded.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rada: Counternarcotics Policy
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (C) Last, Echaveste and Charge met with Government
Minister Alfredo Rada to discuss counternarcotics
cooperation. Rada stressed the GOB,s commitment to counter
drug efforts, noting that this is one of the most important
challenges for President Morales. He said a policy of "coca


zero" is untenable in a country where coca is part of the
culture, but stated their commitment to a policy of "cocaine
zero." He outlined the GOB,s approach in terms of
"revaluing the coca leaf", limiting cultivation in designated
areas, and eradicating coca in prohibited areas, especially
national parks. He noted the GOB,s increasing efforts in
the Yungas region, and said they need adequate helicopters
for high altitude. (Note: We have just approved the transfer
of four UH-1H helicopters from Brazil to Bolivia, though Rada
noted these will be used in the Chapare, as these are not
adequate for high altitude.)


12. (C) Rada acknowledged the importance of international
cooperation, but maintained that the GOB intends to
nationalize the drug fight -- whereby the GOB defines
strategies, methods, and objectives. Echaveste noted that
while she "understood the GOB,s desire to nationalize the
drug fight, it is important for donors to not just give
resources, but to be able to participate to make sure their
investment leads to results." A discussion of accountability
led Rada to complain about the "lack of transparency" in U.S.
counternarcotics assistance (even though U.S. funds support
Bolivian efforts directly.)


13. (C) Without providing any detail, Rada noted the GOB,s
efforts to revitalize dormant agreements with neighbors
including Brazil (BRABO agreement),Argentina (ARBO),and
Paraguay (BOLPA). Rada promised to send the Embassy more
detailed information about these partnerships. When asked
about how the GOB planned to replace the intelligence gap
left by DEA, Rada responded that they have their own
mechanisms for collecting intelligence and exchanging
information with neighboring countries. He also mentioned
Interpol. Rada dismissed DEA,s value by noting recent lab
seizures and saying that according to Bolivian officers, they
did 90 percent of the work, while DEA did only 10 percent.

- - - -
Comment
- - - -


14. (C) In all meetings, GOB representatives, including
President Morales, seemed genuine in their appreciation for
President Obama and their desire to improve the bilateral
relationship. However, in none of the meetings did any GOB
representative offer what they could do to contribute.
Instead, they focused on their grievances against the United
States and what we should do to improve the relationship.
After complaining about the conditionality of U.S.
assistance, GOB officials threatened that things could
deteriorate further if, for example, the President made a
negative decision on ATPA. The GOB,s strategy appears to be
a win-win for them: either they get what they want from us or
they manipulate our decisions to justify, as President
Morales said, that "once an empire, always an empire." End
comment.
CREAGAN