Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAHORE95
2009-05-18 10:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lahore
Cable title:  

MODERATE ISLAMIC LEADERS IN PUNJAB LOOK TO U.S. FOR GUIDANCE

Tags:  PGOV PTER PK 
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 ------------------67E5B8 181037Z /38 

 
O R 181046Z MAY 09
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4030
INFO CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
AMCONSUL KARACHI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
AMCONSUL LAHORE
C O N F I D E N T I A L LAHORE 000095 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/5/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: MODERATE ISLAMIC LEADERS IN PUNJAB LOOK TO U.S. FOR GUIDANCE
AND MONEY

CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan Hunt, Principal Officer, Consulate Lahore,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAHORE 000095


E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/5/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: MODERATE ISLAMIC LEADERS IN PUNJAB LOOK TO U.S. FOR GUIDANCE
AND MONEY

CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan Hunt, Principal Officer, Consulate Lahore,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: Although historically divided by sometimes violent
sectarian differences, Punjab's Islamic religious leaders have found
common cause in recent years in pressing for a moderate alternative to
the Taliban-style Islam increasing in Pakistan's Pashtun areas. While
infiltration by well-funded radical madrassas and clerics has occurred,
particularly in southern and western areas of the province, the
province's premier religious institutions and clerics from all sects
-- Brailvi, Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Shi'a -- are in general agreement
to oppose Taliban-style Islam and are open to engagement with and eager
for funding from the United States. In a religious environment in which
the ability to distribute patronage in the form of "charity" is directly
tied to influence, moderate clerics are slowly but steadily losing ground
to their oftentimes better funded radical counterparts. End Summary.

Brailvi Communities


2. (C) Punjab's Brailvi community can be broadly divided into
two categories: the Ulema -- who serve in mosques as prayer leaders
and sermon givers -- and the Pirs -- Sufi spiritual leaders often
believed to have mystic powers who generally dispense advice, guidance,
and charity through the province's extensive network of shrines. While
extreme sectarian chauvenism based on religious dogma and tradition can
and does exist among certain segments of the Brailvi Ulema, even these
most extreme sectarians have no tradition of forcible imposition of their
narrowly construed religious beliefs/traditions on others in society and
rarely engage in violence -- Sunni Tehrik being the notable exception.
Among the Brailvi Pirs, sectarian and religious bigotry is virtually
unknown, and many Pirs have followers from multiple sects and even in a
few cases from other religions. The general philosophy of the Pirs is to
promote harmonious existence among diverse communities through focusing
on spiritual enlightenment and community service. Where Pirs have
engaged in violence, it has generally been intra-familial strife over
which heir was to inherit the mantel of authority (and finances) after a
Pir's death.


3. (C) The Brailvi Ulema are well organized in the religious

movement Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat, which has a clear elected leadership
and hierarchy structure. This social organization (which also has aims
of eventually becoming a viable political party) tends to focus on the
promotion of Brailvi religious ideology, lobbying for Brailvi inclusion
in provincial and federal religious bodies, and occasional pressure
campaigns/demonstrations calling on the government to counter
Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith influence (today often referred to as
Talibanization). Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat has ties with both the Pakistan
Peoples Party in Sindh and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz in the
Punjab. The attempt to form a separate Brailvi political party under the
late Mufti Noorani, Jamaat Ulema Pakistan (JUP),largely failed. Even
before Noorani's death, several Brailvi Alim split from the party to
form their own factions. Noorani's decision to take the JUP into the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) religious alliance undercut much of its
credibility. While JUP still has a handful of elected representatives
in both Sindh and Punjab, its influence in the Brailvi community is
minimal.


4. (C) The Tanzeem-ul-Madaras, the Brailvi madrassas board, is
the Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat's primary challenger for organized influence
among the Brailvi Ulema. The Tanzeem-ul-Madaras is, in the Punjab,
dominated by Sarfraz Naeemi, head of Lahore's largest and best
financed madrassa Jamia Naeemia. Sarfraz Naeemi is a conservative
Brailvi with traditionally strong anti-Western views and little
tolerance for non-Brailvi Islamic leaders. His supporters were
largely responsible for the violence that accompanied the Danish
cartoon riots in Lahore in February 2006. Naeemi has close political
ties to the Sharif brothers, having served as their personnel cleric,
and the Sharif family is believed to remain his primary financial
patron. While Naeemi's checkered past makes him a difficult ally, he
has been outspoken against Talibanization and is in the leadership of
civil society's anti-Taliban movement in the Punjab.


5. (C) As a response to the Deobandi extremist group
Sipah-e-Sahaba's (SSP's) forcible occupation of Brailvi mosques in
Karachi and SSP's assassination of Brailvi clerics, a group of
radical Brailvi Ulema formed the militant organization Sunni
Tehrik. Sunni Tehrik had as its principal objective the use of
violence, including targeted assassination, to "defend" the Brailvi
community from Deobandi advances. At its height, Sunni Tehrik was
most powerful in Karachi and Hyderabad with lesser but nonetheless
significant influence in the Punjab. Its growing influence in urban
Sindh ultimately brought it into open and often violent conflict
with the secular Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM). Sunni Tehrik's
senior leadership was devastated in a 2005 bomb attack in Karachi
during which most of its senior leaders were murdered. The
organization has only partly recovered, and although it has not
formally eschewed violence, it has also not actively targeted
Deobandis in recent years. Despite statements from Foreign Minister
Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi, post does not consider Sunni Tehrik
an appropriate entity with which to engage against the Taliban due
to its previous history of terrorism and its waning influence in the
broader Brailvi community.


6. (C) The Pirs are a divisive group with only a minimally clear
hierarchy and competing personal religious and political agendas.
Cooperation among them is limited as each Pir views the other as a
potential competitor for followers, money, and influence. Three
of the four Sufi schools of thought have a clear living heir to
their South Asian founder, who is generally accorded slightly
hire status than other Pirs of the same school of thought --
Makhdoom Iftikhar Gilani of the Qadriya school (a PML member of
the Provincial Assembly from Uch Sharif),Makhdoom Chishti of the
Chishtia school (based in Pak Pattan and affiliated with the PML-N),
and Makhdoom Zamrud Bokhari of the Naqshbandia school (custodian of
the Jalal-ud-Din Bokhari Surkh Posh Shrine in Uch Sharif and
largely apolitical). The fourth, the Suhrwardiya school ostensibly
headed by Foreign Minister Qureshi, is divided as to whether or not
Makhdoom Qureshi is the rightful heir. Attempts to unite the Pirs
through the Jamaat Ahl-e-Mushaikh organization, headed by Pir
Fazl-e-Haq of Faisalabad, have been only marginally successful.


7. (C) The Pirs traditionally exercised influence and gained
followers through the provision of social services (free food,
medical camps, free lodging) at their shrines. These good works
were financed by the wealthier of their followers who made regular
donations to the Pir and/or the shrine in order to obtain God's
favor. A handful of the Pirs were also gifted with substantial
tracts of agricultural land, held in the name of the shrine, which
continue to provide them and their families with an income today.
A proliferation of descendants, the creation of numerous small
shrines, and disputes over inheritance of the shrines has weakened
the current generation of Pirs and divided the financial base of
their followers into smaller and smaller units. The decision by the
government to take over the administration of the shrines and
collection of donations to the shrines through the Auqaf Department
has taken away a significant portion of the Pirs' incomes.
Charitable activities through larger shrines and by more prominent
Pirs still occur but on a far smaller scale than in the past. Many
of the less prominent Pirs have completely sacrificed this portion of
their spiritual inheritance.

The Shi'a


8. (C) Like the Brailvi, the Shi'a are divided into two primary
groups -- the Ulema and the Pirs. Much of what hold true for the
Brailvi Pirs holds equally true for their Shi'a counterparts. The
one notable exception is that most of the Shi'a Pirs have
effectively abandoned their religious role and have become
traditional feudal landlords, leaving the Shi'a Ulema to dominate
this religious sect. The Shi'a Ulema, however, unlike their Brailvi
counterparts have no overriding structure. The Shi'a political
party, Tehreek-e-Islami-Pakistan and its madrassa board are disparate
organizations, although as a whole, the Shi'a are united in their
vigorous opposition to the Taliban and can play a crucial role in the
anti-Taliban movement. Dealing with the Shi'a Ulema on an individual
basis, however, is essential for success.



9. (C) A comparatively small number of Shi'a Ulema are heavily
influenced by Iran and take a strong anti-Western orientation.
These Ulema have been the primary ideological backers of the now
largely defunct terrorist group Sipah-e-Mohammad and the radical,
sometimes violent student group, the Imamia Students Organization.
The majority of the Shi'a Ulema, even if they receive funds from
Iran or Iranian backed groups, are largely independent and equally
critical of Iran and the West.

Deobandi


10. (C) While the Deobandi sectarian ideology is largely
responsible for the birth of the Taliban, there are a small but
influential number of moderate Punjabi Deobandi leaders, who are
opposed to the radicalization that has occurred within their
Islamic sect. These Deobandi leaders, while conservative in their
personal beliefs and behaviors, reject the notion of imposition of
their ideology by force, believe in participation in the democratic
process, and see considerable value both in intra-faith and inter-
faith dialogue. Some even go so far as to claim themselves
hereditary Pirs in an attempt to link themselves to more moderate
Sufi traditions. These moderate Deobandi draw their inspiration
from Deobandi leaders in India, who have largely rejected the
concept of violent armed struggle. In recent weeks, many of these
moderate Deobandi leaders have spoken out against the Taliban.


11. (C) The center of moderate Deobandi thought in the Punjab is
in Lahore at the Jamia Ashrafia and the Badshahi Mosque. Both of
these institutions and their leaders -- Maulana Abdul Khabir Azad
and Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahim -- have long-standing links to Deobandi
groups in India, have condemned vigorously extremism and terrorism,
and have shown a willingness to work with the USG to promote a more
tolerant form of Deobandi Islam. Given their influence in Deobandi
circles, owing largely to the prestige of their institutions and
forefathers, these leaders are well-positioned to moderate Deobandi
statements, thought, and actions. Although they have no influence
over the Taliban, these Punjabi Deobandi leaders are willing to
press their co-religionists to adopt a harder anti-Taliban stance
through the Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabiya, the Deobandi madrassa
board in which they have a partial ally in Secretary General Qari
Hanif Jalandhry.

Ahl-e-Hadith


12. (C) The Ahl-e-Hadith are generally seen as the most radical
of Pakistan's Islamic sects, drawing their inspiration from Saudi
Arabia's Wahhabi school of thought. The community, however, is a
fractured one between violent extremists who are linked to
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, and as such derive considerable funding from
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and their more moderate but less well-
financed opponents. The opposition to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba in the
Punjab is split between three personality-driven Ahl-e-Hadith
organizations, the Markazi Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith, the Jammat
Ahl-e-Hadith Ropri of Abdul Wahab Ropri, and the Jamiat Ulema
Ahl-e-Hadith of Qazi Abdul Qadir Khamosh.


13. (C) The most influential of these three groupings, thanks to
a recent merger is the Markazi Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith jointly headed
by Allama Sajid Mir and Allama Hafiz Zubair Ahmed Zaheer. Both
of these leaders have already issued strongly worded statements
against the Taliban. While Allama Sajid Mir is a very recent,
and it would seem opportunistic, champion of moderation, Allama
Zaheer has a long-standing, positive relationship with the USG.
Given their combined influence in religious circles, engagement
through the Markazi Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith is the most effective way
to reach moderate Ahl-e-Hadith leaders.

Financing is the Key


14. (C) The one unifying factor between these various moderate
groupings is a severe lack of financing in comparison to their
radical counterparts. The proliferation of madrassas and
"charitable" activities linked to extremist clerics in southern
and western Punjab is a direct challenge to the on-the-ground
influence of moderates. These extremist clerics, who continue
to receive regular infusions of cash from backers in Saudi Arabia
and Gulf states, are able to use patronage to increase their
followers and their influence in erstwhile moderate strongholds.
For moderates to stem effectively this growing tide of
radicalization, they will need access to greater cash reserves
than are currently available to them. These groups all welcome
engagement with the USG, and believe that association with and
financial support from the United States will increase rather
than undercut their influence. All moderate clerics consistently
highlight the need for financial assistance.


15. (C) Post is planning several outreach efforts to this
community and will explore possible strategic communication
programs to engage moderate voices.


HUNT