Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAHORE230
2009-12-10 06:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lahore
Cable title:  

UPDATE ON OCTOBER 15 ATTACKS ON LAHORE SECURITY

Tags:  PGOV PTER PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0529
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RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 5431
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAHORE 000230 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON OCTOBER 15 ATTACKS ON LAHORE SECURITY
INSTALLATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: Carmela Conroy, Consul General, U.S. Consulate
General Lahore, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAHORE 000230

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON OCTOBER 15 ATTACKS ON LAHORE SECURITY
INSTALLATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: Carmela Conroy, Consul General, U.S. Consulate
General Lahore, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary. On October 15, 2009, extremists killed
eighteen police personnel and injured over 100 in three
simultaneous attacks on security installations in Lahore. The
extremists had learned from previous attacks, enhancing their
weapons and disguising themselves as police. Attackers appeared
to be young men seeking "martyrdom." Quick reaction by the
police minimized causalities and secured the facilities within
five hours. Punjab police, however, still lack the resources to
fight the growing terrorist threat in Pakistan's most populous
province. The increasing number of extremist attacks targeting
security installations and enhanced security measures within the
province are depleting already limited resources. The federal
government has not responded to a provincial request for more
equipment and training, leaving police unable to perform routine
tasks, or up their game to counter extremists. End Summary.



OCTOBER 15 ATTACKS LEAVE 27 DEAD




2. (U) Starting around 09:30L, gunmen attacked the Federal
Investigation Agency (FIA) Regional Headquarters, the Elite
Police Force Training school, and the Manawan Police Training
Center (reftel A). At all three sites, police successfully
fought back and killed or captured the attackers. At FIA, seven
FIA personnel and two attackers died; at the Elite training
facility, five attackers died; at the Manawan training center,
nine police and four attackers died. Police secured all three
facilities by 14:30L.



RSO AND LEGATT TEAM VISIT ATTACK SITES




3. (C) A LEGATT Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Team visited
the three attack sites on October 16. The EOD team learned that
attackers at the three sites were armed with AK-47 rifles fitted
with grenade launchers. All were outfitted with ammunition
vests and suicide jackets. Police discovered dried fruit and
nuts in their vests, indicating they anticipated long sieges
within the facilities. The explosive used in the suicide
jackets of these attacks, potassium chlorate mixed with diesel
fuel, was the same explosive found in four improvised explosive

devices (IEDs) recovered January 26 outside Lahore's Senior
Superintendent Police Operations building.




4. (C) The LEGATT team examined the remains and took DNA
samples, but was unable to identify any of the attackers. Most
of the attackers appear to be in their mid-20s, and all were
male. One attacker, based on a physical examination, appeared
to be about 15-years-old, according to Lahore Police officials.
Two attackers appeared to be Uzbeks. The rest appear to be
Pakistani, possibly Punjabi, judging by physical
characteristics. Two of the extremists were wearing shalwar
kameez, a traditional Pakistani outfit of a long, loose shirt
and pants. The others were in muhafiz police uniforms
consisting of a black t-shirt with "muhafiz" ("protector") in
white lettering on the back, and black trousers. All attackers
wore black and red headbands that said "Shariat ya Shahdat,"
which means "Islamic law or martyrdom." Note: Muhafiz is the
patrol wing of the Lahore police. Police uniforms can be easily
purchased in markets throughout Pakistan.



ENHANCED TACTICS, POLICE PREPAREDNESS




5. (C) The extremists employed the same weaponry in the attacks
on October 15 as the March attack on Manawan Police Training
Center (reftel B). Attackers were armed with suicide vests,
AK-47s and grenades both times. In the October attacks,
extremists disguised themselves as police officers, which

LAHORE 00000230 002 OF 003


provided them with easier access to facilities, and enhanced
their AK-47 rifles with grenade launchers. Five attackers chose
to detonate their vests in the October 15 attacks. None of the
March attackers detonated their suicide devices. The March
attack lasted eight-hours as extremists barricaded themselves in
a single police training facility. In October the attackers
divided their forces among three facilities and the Police were
able to secure all three facilities within four hours.



PUNJAB POLICE REQUESTS GO UNANSWERED




6. (C) The terrorist attacks in Lahore in 2009 to date,
beginning with the March attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team
through the three attacks on security installations in October,
have strained the resources of the Punjab police. Following the
March attack on the Manawan Police Training Center, Punjab
Inspector General of Police Tariq Saleem Dogar requested USD 67
million in operational equipment, ammunition and rifles from the
federal government. The requested equipment, intended to
supplement existing supplies and provide additional training,
included bullet proof vests, grenades, a vehicle scanner and
hand guns. The federal government has not responded to this
request to date. Punjab police lack proper equipment, such as
ammunition and rifles, for operations, leaving little resources
for training. Note: Post believes the federal government, like
the provincial government, is facing a budget deficit and does
not have funds available to support this request.



RSO PUSHES FOR MORE TRAINING




7. (U) Working closely with Diplomatic Security Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA) Program, Department of Justice International
Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance (ICITAP) Program,
and IGP, RSO Lahore initiated training programs for the Punjab
Elite Force, and, in consultation with the IGP and Punjab Home
Secretary Nadeem Hassan Asif, proposed a dedicated course for
Punjab's recently developed Counter Terrorism Force. RSO Lahore
is working to establish a designated training group from ATA,
ICITAP, and Embassy Islamabad's Narcotic Affairs Section (NAS)
for the Punjab Province. Representatives from these
organizations have discussed their willingness to provide "train
the trainer" courses to mid-level officers to create a
sustainable training platform for new police hires. These USG
officials have also discussed how to provide essential equipment
that Punjab Police currently lack. USG training for police in
Pakistan has traditionally focused on officers from the
Northwest Frontier Province with representatives from Punjab
comprising between five to ten percent of the participants. RSO
Lahore is working with ATA, ICITAP, NAS and the Punjab police to
vet better candidates for the available training programs to
increase the opportunities available to Punjab officers.



COMMENT: CHANGE OF TACTICS, POLICE NEED ASSISTANCE




8. (C) Comment. Targeting three installations at
approximately the same time, with enhanced weaponry, successful
adoption of police uniforms and using suicide vests illustrate a
change in tactics in Lahore. Disguised as police, extremists
initially gained access to the security facilities but met
fierce resistance after the attacks started. Police prevented
attackers from taking control of their facilities and secured
their facilities in half the time. Although the attackers
changed their techniques, police were prepared to maintain
control of their installations and minimize damage. However, if
the Punjab Police do not receive external support for
additional equipment, they will have to tap existing budgets,
leaving little room for much needed counterterrorism training,
and making them more vulnerable to future attacks. Improved

LAHORE 00000230 003 OF 003


equipment for operations and an established training program
will provide police the tools necessary to combat terrorism.
Post will continue to seek ways to support the security forces
that support the USG presence in the Punjab. End Comment.
CONROY