UKRAINIAN ACQUISITION OF PERRY CLASS FRIGATE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000685

SIPDIS

NAVYIPO FOR STEVE POPPE, EUCOM J5 FOR LEE GABEL/JOHN
DRISCOLL, DSCA FOR DIANE LAMB, OSD/ISA FOR GARY ESPINAS,
EUR/PRA FOR MATT HARDIMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: MASS MCAP MARR PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN ACQUISITION OF PERRY CLASS FRIGATE:
COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Taylor, Reason 1.4 (B,D)

Summary
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1. (SBU) Summary. On 23 September 2008, in a letter from
First Deputy Minster of Defense V.V. Ivashenko addressed to
U.S. Ambassador William Taylor (MoD Letter #220/3918) the
GoU formally requested the U.S. to consider providing an
Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate FFG) to the Ukrainian
Navy. Following subsequent briefings and discussions, U.S.
Embassy Kyiv provides the following Country Team Assessment
in support of such a transfer, per IAW DoD 5101.38-M,
Chapter 5. End Summary.

Reason Ukraine desires FFGs
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2. (C) The Ukrainian Navy's aging Soviet-era capability is
difficult to maintain and rapidly approaching obsolescence.
As part of Ukraine's ongoing Strategic Defense Review
process, Ukraine is re-evaluating its threat assessment and
capability requirements, particularly in light of the August
2008 Georgia-Russia conflict. This ongoing reevaluation is
creating a desire to enhance Ukrainian naval capability for
both coalition operations and national defense. Obtaining
and fielding a FFG would also provide valuable opportunities
to broaden cooperation with the USN through training and
technical cooperation, another key Ukrainian Navy goal.
Finally, the transfer would provide a visible symbol of
Ukraine's close relationship with the U.S. and enhance the
prestige of the Ukrainian Navy.

How articles would affect Force Structure
--------------

3. (SBU) In initial discussions, Ukrainian Navy officials
indicated their intent to meet personnel and other
requirements for this fielding through decommissioning of
outdated ships and reapportionment of existing personnel.
Post does not anticipate a net increase in Ukrainian Navy
end strength.

How articles would contribute to U.S. and host nation
security goals:
--------------

4. (C) Increasing Ukrainian Navy capability and
interoperability for coalition operations, particularly
maritime domain awareness and maritime interdiction
operations, are key U.S. and Ukraine objectives as agreed in
the bilateral U.S.-Ukraine Work Plan for Military
Cooperation, the USEUCOM Strategy for Active Security and
Country Campaign Plan for Ukraine, and in guidance resulting
from U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Defense Consultations.
Expanding the scope of our security cooperation was called
for in the recently-concluded U.S.-Ukraine Charter.


5. (SBU) Ukraine has and intends to continue active
participation in all NATO-flagged operations (the only PfP
partner state to do so),including OPERATION ACTIVE
ENDEAVOR, even though most Ukrainian warships lack adequate
station keeping capability and are extremely difficult to
operate on extended deployments far from home waters. A
recent deployment of a Ukrainian corvette highlighted the
need for larger and more capable ships. Ukraine has
expressed interest in participating in counter piracy
operations off the coast of Somalia and security
cooperation/capability development activities such as AFRICA
PARTNERSHIP STATION, and greater cooperation with the EU, a
goal the U.S. supports.

Justification of type/quantity
--------------

6. (C) Provision of an Oliver Hazard Perry class FFG to the
Ukrainian Navy will enhance existing capabilities and
promote the durability of these capabilities into the
future. Based on initial discussions, the Ukrainian Navy
intends to use the ship for maritime defense and security
operations, including potential participation in
expeditionary counter terrorism and counter piracy
deployments as part of an international coalition. An
Oliver Hazard Perry class FFG would be appropriate for such
requirements, since it is capable of extended blue water
operations, and its station-keeping capability would greatly
enhance Ukraine's contribution to coalition operations. At
the same time, the FFG would be small enough for the
Ukrainian Navy to operate and maintain. Capabilities
necessary to meet anticipated mission requirements are, but
not limited to: air, surface, and sub-surface surveillance;
point air defense; under-sea/anti-submarine warfare;

surface-to-surface missiles; and interoperable command; and
contro
l
capability IAW guidance from EUCOM J6.


7. (C) Specific systems needed would include retention or
addition of:
- MK 75 76mm gun and ammunition
- MK15 CIWS Blk 1B and suitable ammunition
- Surface Vessel Torpedo Tubes (SVTT) and MK46-equivalent
torpedoes
- MK 38 25mm gun
- SPS-55 surface search radar
- SPS-49 air search radar
- AN/S-89 ASW suite
- MK13 GMLS (missile launcher)
- Combined Antennae System (CAS)
- MK92 gun and fire control system (retain CAS)
- Harpoon missiles and canister launch system (CLS) (or
alternative MK13 re-installation)
- Sea RAM as alternative point air defense system
- Interoperable voice and data communication capability

Combatant Commander's concurrence/assessment
--------------

8. (C) Will be provided SEPTEL

Anticipated Reaction of neighboring nations
--------------

9. (C) Reactions of neighboring nations are likely to be
mixed. There is an exaggerated belief among many Ukrainian
officials that the frigates could provide the Ukrainian Navy
with the ability to defend Ukraine's shores from, among
others, Russia. Although these ships could, depending on
how they are eventually outfitted, provide the Ukrainian
Navy with a real combat capability, this capability would
not be something to challenge Russia or Turkey (with the
region's most serious naval presence). At the same time, we
assess that it is quite likely that Russia will use the
acquisition as an opportunity for an anti-Ukrainian and
anti-NATO public information campaign - most particularly
directed to media outlets in Crimea, where Russia still
hopes to maintain the Black Sea Fleet after the current 2017
expiration of its basing treaty with Ukraine.


10. (C) The negative public relations campaign
notwithstanding, our assessment is that an FFG is likely to
do little or nothing to change the balance of power in the
region. We would not expect either Russia or Turkey to
share Ukraine's assessment of the strategic impact or
military importance of a frigate in the region. Likewise,
we would expect little militarily substantive reaction from
either country in response (e.g., serious objection,
diplomatic protests, or changes in posture).


11. (C) We believe other Black Sea littoral states are
likely to have a muted response or take a neutral position.
While political relations with Romania are currently
strained, we would anticipate that, by the time this
purchase (if approved) were ready to move forward, relations
are likely to have recovered. Georgia, which is allied with
Ukraine and which depends on Ukraine for political support
in the region, may see a Ukrainian frigate purchase as a
positive development.

Assessment ability to support, safeguard, maintain
-------------- --------------

12. (C) The Ministry of Defense has been chronically
underfunded; this situation has been exacerbated by drastic
cuts to the defense budget resulting from the current
financial crisis (see paras 15-17). Absent the question of
resourcing, the current sophistication of Ukrainian Navy
planning gives post high confidence in the tactical and
technical ability of the Ukrainian Navy to support,
safeguard, and maintain these ships. Ukrainian Navy Staff
is already reviewing requirements and preparing initial
plans for on-shore upgrades and modifications, and compiling
data on the capabilities of shipyards in Ukraine and
throughout the region to support different requirements, as
well as visiting/consulting with regional partner states
that have experience with EDA FFGs.

Training required either in-country or in the United States
and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of
U.S. trainers in country
-------------- ---



13. (C) Operation and maintenance of such a ship would
require extensive crew and officer training and maintenance,
primarily in the U.S. but also at training facilities in
Ukraine. As part of case development, the embassy's Office
of Defense Cooperation will develop a detailed Integrated
Training Plan in cooperation with the Ukrainian Navy and
U.S. NETSAFA. Presence of USN and civilian personnel on
Ukrainian naval bases to conduct security cooperation
activities have been a common occurrence for several years
and would not present a significant change to current
practice.

Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might
be required as a result of providing the article
-------------- --------------

14. (C) In-country U.S. presence that would be required as a
result of providing a frigate would be minimal, as the
contract for maintenance and support is likely to be handled
through existing Ukrainian facilities in Mikolayev, and
conducting the necessary End Use Monitoring in conjunction
with normal visits to the Ukrainian Navy HQ in Sevastopol
would be well within the means of the Embassy's Office of
Defense Cooperation. As stated in paragraph 8, requirements
for training are not anticipated to depart from existing
practice.

Source of Financing and the economic impact of the proposed
acquisition
-------------- --------------

15. (SBU) Ukraine will source the financing for the
acquisition from the national budget. Making funds available
for the purchase is largely a question of Ukrainian
political will. In recent years, a lack of political will
at the national level has led to chronic underfunding of
defense budgets by the Ukrainian parliament, and spending
has not met levels needed to achieve defense modernization
and reform goals. The current financial crisis has led to
additional cuts in current defense spending. The cost of
the acquisition is high given today's economic situation and
low levels of defense funding.


16. (C) Nevertheless, post also notes that the expected
timeline would put the transfer, if approved, no earlier
than 2012. In addition, the first decision point to
apportion funds for this purchase is likely come in spring
2010, when money will be needed for training. This moment
will be reached well after presidential elections (currently
being planned for October, 2009),by which time Ukraine's
political and economic situation will be more clear.


17. (C) Post does see the possibility that the purchase
will be viewed as a priority by political leaders, despite
positioning and posturing among rival political groups in
Kyiv and despite current budgetary pressures. The Ministry
of Defense will need to work with Ukrainian leaders to
increase their understanding of the costs associated with
their strategic defense goals. The cost of a frigate should
be viewed as strategically related to, but financially
separate from other important defense reform goals, such as
establishing a professional force, equipment maintenance and
upgrades, modernizing training, and improved
compensation/benefits for military personnel - areas also in
need of substantial funding.

Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed
acquisition
-------------- --------------


18. (SBU) None

End Use Monitoring Plan
--------------

19. (SBU) Conducting the necessary End Use Monitoring in
conjunction with normal visits to the Ukrainian Navy HQ in
Sevastopol would be well within the means of the Embassy's
Office of Defense Cooperation.

Recommendation whether the USG should approve transfer of
the article and justification
--------------

20. (SBU) Recommend approve.

Night vision devices
--------------

21. (SBU) N/A

TAYLOR