Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KYIV573
2009-03-31 04:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE-ROMANIA RELATIONS: CANCELLED SUMMITS AND

Tags:  PGOV PREL RO UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4611
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #0573/01 0900458
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 310458Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7544
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000573 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RO UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE-ROMANIA RELATIONS: CANCELLED SUMMITS AND
ATTACHE EXPULSIONS

REF: 2008 KYIV 1454

Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4(b,d)

Summary
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000573

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RO UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE-ROMANIA RELATIONS: CANCELLED SUMMITS AND
ATTACHE EXPULSIONS

REF: 2008 KYIV 1454

Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4(b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Despite public assertions by Ukrainian leaders to the
contrary, Ukraine's relations with Romania remain strained
following the International Court of Justice's February 3
decision on the disputed Snake Island and surrounding
territory. The bilateral relationship lacks the concrete
cooperation that defines Ukraine's relationship with Poland.
Ukrainian officials contend that Romanian politicians are
playing up the tension for political advantage in advance of
presidential elections there. President Basescu's planned
February visit was scrapped when Romania demanded what
Ukraine saw as unacceptable conditions to a trans-border
travel agreement -- the centerpiece deliverable of the visit.
Ukraine in turn was surprised by the March 2 expulsion of
two of its defense attaches. Some in the GOU are concerned
that Romania is pursuing a "Greater Romania" policy that
would include parts of western Ukraine. End Summary.

Snake Island Decision
--------------


2. (C) On February 3, the UN International Court of Justice
(ICJ) unanimously ruled that Snake Island was a Ukrainian
island, but that the surrounding sea shelf would be split
between Romania and Ukraine at a line between their
respective claims, with Ukraine gaining a 12 nautical mile
exclusion zone around the island itself. Both the GOU and
the Romanian government have said they would accept the
court's decision as final, and both have portrayed the
decision as a victory for their respective sides. Ukrainian
political analysts Oleksiy Haran told us that it was unclear
who won in the ICJ decision, but that opponents of Ukrainian
western integration were pushing the idea that Ukraine lost.
Bohdan Yaremenko, Deputy Head of the Presidential
Secretariat's foreign policy section, told us that the GOU
"does not like" the court's decision, but would work out a
way to implement it.

Relationship Lacking
--------------


3. (C) Deputy Presidential Secretariat Head Goncharuk said
that the ICJ decision paved the way for closer relations
between the two countries. Following a February visit by

Deputy Foreign Minister Khandogiy to Bucharest, the MFA
stressed Romania's readiness to assist Ukraine in its NATO
aspirations. Serhiy Horopakha, MFA desk officer for Romania,
told us that, while Ukraine and Romania had an "active
political dialogue," the GOU was "doing our best" to have a
closer and more mutually beneficial relationship with
Romania, "like we do with Hungary and Poland."


4. (C) Despite senior MFA officials' public assertions that
Romania would assist Ukraine in its preparations for NATO
membership, Horopakha said that no real concrete bilateral
work has been undertaken to assist Ukraine in its
Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations, or on any other key
bilateral or multilateral issue. Horopakha added that, in
addition to the Serpent Island issue, relations are hindered
by the Bystroe Canal. Natalya Bilotsir, a political analyst
with the US-Ukraine Foundation, told us that the bilateral
relationship is "neither close, nor strategic." She said
that Bucharest's approach to Ukraine changed once Romania
gained EU membership, and that Romanian counterparts then
"became overbearing."

Defense Attaches Expelled
--------------


5. (C) Boris Tarasyuk, Head of the Rada Committee on European
Integration, said publicly that Romanian political leaders
were using tension with Ukraine for political advantage in
the lead-up to presidential elections there later this year.
The Presidential Secretariat's Bohdan Yaremenko, echoing
Tarasyuk, told us that the Romanian government was using the
recent expulsion of two Ukrainian defense attaches to "gain
points" with the electorate. He said that they were seeking
to portray Ukraine as "a danger to Romania." Yaremenko said
that the expulsion caught Ukraine "totally by surprise.
According to the GOU's initial review, the attaches were
acting legally, he claimed.

Scuttled Presidential Visit
--------------


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6. (C) A February 23 visit to Kyiv by President Basescu was
scuttled at the last minute when the Romanian side demanded
"new and unacceptable conditions" for an agreement on
trans-border travel, according to Yaremenko. The agreement
was to be the centerpiece deliverable of the second meeting
of the Ukraine-Romania Presidential Commission. The
Commission was first convened during an October 2007
Yushchenko visit to Romania. MFA desk officer Horopakha
could not say when the Basescu visit would be re-scheduled,
saying only that the two countries "needed more time to
prepare" the visit. Yaremenko, speaking more frankly, said
that Romania pushed Ukraine to cancel the visit through its
new demands on the trans-border travel agreement, then took
five days to agree on a one-sentence joint statement
announcing the cancellation. Yaremenko added that the two
sides had tentatively scheduled a visit several times in
2008, only to cancel each time (although not, in this case,
after the visit had been announced).

"Greater Romania"
--------------


7. (C) Political analyst Haran told us that Ukrainians were
worried about Romanian activities in and designs on the
Bukovina region, which includes parts of western Ukraine.
Indeed, the Romanian diplomat and attache expelled in the tit
for tat expulsions were serving in the Consulate in
Chernivtsi Oblast, on the Romanian border, where Romania has
been accused of agitating among ethnic Romanian civic
organizations.


8. (C) Analyst Bilotsir told us that, at lower political
levels and academic levels, Romania is pushing Ukraine to
reclassify Romanian and Moldovan minority groups in Ukraine
into one "Romanian Speaking" minority group. She said that
there are currently 250,000 self-identified Moldovans in
Ukraine, and only 100,000 self-identified Romanians.
Combining the two groups would result in a "Romanian
Speaking" minority that outnumbered all other minority groups
in Ukraine except Russians. Yaremenko told us that the GOU
was concerned that the current Romanian government seeks to
follow a "Greater Romania" policy that would include parts of
Ukraine, Hungary and Moldova. He concluded that Ukraine's
strained relationship with Romania was a serious issue, and
said the GOU was "looking at options" to address the
worsening relations.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) While the ICJ Snake Island decision can potentially
remove a central irritant in the Ukraine-Romania
relationship, other territorial, economic and political
differences remain between Kyiv and Bucharest. Especially
worrying to the GOU are perceptions that Bucharest remains
intent on expanding its activities in the Bukovina region.
These continued tensions will insure that Kyiv will rely on
Poland and other neighbors, rather than Romania, as its
guides toward further integration into European and
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
TAYLOR