Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KYIV395
2009-02-27 17:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:
STAFFDEL SOCHA HEARS CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA
VZCZCXRO5360 PP RUEHDBU DE RUEHKV #0395/01 0581754 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271754Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY KYIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7388 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000395
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PARM UP RS
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SOCHA HEARS CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000395
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PARM UP RS
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SOCHA HEARS CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffdel Socha
visited Kyiv February 19 and 20 to explore questions of
regional security, Euro-Atlantic integration, and the effects
of the financial crisis. Ukrainian officials emphasized
concerns about Russia's more assertive foreign policy and the
threat this poses to Ukraine. The GOU is preparing its
Annual National Program with NATO for submission by late
April. End Summary.
NSDC: Don't Forget Ukraine
--------------
2. (C) Senate Foreign Relations Committee senior staff member
Christopher Socha (office of Jim DeMint, R, NC) visited Kyiv
February 19 and 20. He met with Acting Head of the
International Relations Department of the National Security
and Defense Council (NSDC),Volodomyr Ivanov. Ivanov
highlighted concerns about Russian assertiveness. He
wondered whether a "new model" of US-Russian relations would
work to Ukraine's disadvantage. He urged the US not to allow
Ukraine to be used as a "bargaining chip," lest Ukraine slip
into the Russian sphere. Ivanov suggested that a new
mechanism to manage US-Ukraine relations was needed. He
harkened back to the Kuchma-Gore Commission as a model. The
key thing is to maintain regular contacts at senior levels,
he said.
3. (C) Asked if the August war in Georgia had changed
Ukrainians' perceptions of a Russian threat, Ivanov said poll
numbers in Russia show that increasing numbers of Russians
regard Ukraine as unfriendly, but there is not much evidence
of a similar change in attitude among Ukrainians. Within the
Ukrainian government, however, Ivanov told Socha that
awareness of Ukraine's vulnerability to potential Russian
threats and to Russian influence has increased, along with
concern about Russia's politicization of most aspects of its
relationship with Ukraine. Ivanov underlined the importance
of the 1994 Bucharest Memorandum under which the U.S. and
Russia gave guarantees to Ukraine in return for its
de-nuclearization. Ivanov said Ukraine needs a new
guarantee. The START Treaty should be extended or a new one
put in its place, but Ukraine should be part of the process.
4. (C) Turning to Crimea, Ivanov observed that the situation
is not analogous to South Ossetia. Crimea has not declared
independence, is far bigger than South Ossetia, shares a
history and strong economic ties with Ukraine, and has
considerable public opinion that supports remaining in
Ukraine. Furthermore, he believes that the international
reaction to any Russian military action in Crimea would be
far greater and Russia knows that. Ivanov noted that nearly
all of Crimea's water and electricity come from Ukraine.
Nonetheless, the destabilizing nature of Russia's massive
propaganda campaign in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine is
troubling. Given the large number of retired Black Sea Fleet
servicemen in Crimea, there is a ready market for Russian
nationalist propaganda.
5. (C) On Afghanistan, Ivanov said he believes Russia is
serious about stability. Instability in Afghanistan does not
serve Russian interests. That said, getting the US out of
Manas was a great way to show who is boss in Central Asia.
Ivanov said that Ukraine would not speak against a U.S. or
NATO base in the region, including in the Caucasus, to supply
Afganistan. However, he predicted a very negative Russian
reaction.
Ministry of Defense: the Threat of Russian Influence
-------------- --------------
6. (C) At the Ministry of Defense, Socha explored defense
reform issues, in particular the effects of Ukraine's budget
problems, and the Ministry's views on Russia's role in the
region with Military Policy and Strategic Planning Deputy
Director Colonel Polischuk and Head of Euro-atlantic
Integration Section Lt. Colonel Kovalenko. Polischuk noted
that exchange rate losses since September contributed to a
fifty percent reduction in the MoD's budget. In the current
environment, MoD must focus on the most essential tasks:
retaining key personnel and maintaining the current readiness
levels of the joint Rapid Reaction forces. He noted that
President Yushchenko hopes to increase the number of
Ukrainian troops in or contributing to operations in
Afghanistan. There may be reductions in levels in Kosovo,
however. Polishchuk stressed the importance at this time of
maintaining NATO's full open door policy.
KYIV 00000395 002 OF 002
7. (C) Turning to Russia, Polischuk listed the following
concerns at MoD: Russia's determination to maintain forces in
Transnistria and Russian encouragement of a trilateral
dialogue on Transnistria that excludes Ukraine, the EU, and
the U.S.; recent Russian-Belarussian joint military exercises
that did not exclude an invasion scenario; Russia's CFE
withdrawal, which Ukraine recognizes as an unfriendly action;
and the impending expiration of START and the unlikely chance
that Russia would reconfirm the 1994 trilateral agreement,
now that Ukraine is a non-nuclear state.
8. (C) Polischuk went on to describe the map as MoD sees it:
Russian forces within easy reach of Ukraine's southwest
border (and Odessa) in Transnistria; Russian forces in
Crimea; Russian forces along Ukraine's entire eastern border
and much of its northern border; and Belarussian and/or
Russian forces on Ukraine's north-northwest border. This is,
he continued, the environment that MoD will have in mind as
it holds its Strategic Defense Review. Ukraine will make
every effort to conduct it according to international and
NATO standards. Summing up his comments, Polischuk noted
that open conflict would split Ukraine in half and must be
avoided. However, in the Ministry's opinion, Russian
influence on different parts of Ukrainian society is the
biggest strategic threat to Ukraine's security.
MFA on NATO
--------------
9. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Director for NATO
affairs Vadym Prystaiko noted the difficulties that MFA has
had in coordination the Annual National Program (ANP) within
the GOU. Prystaiko said that anti-NATO critics in the
Ukrainian government demanded to know what Ukraine would get
in return for continuing to alienate Russia when NATO had no
intention of moving Ukraine toward membership in the near or
mid-term.
Vice PM's Chief of Staff on Financial Crisis, Yushchenko
-------------- --------------
10. (C) Chief of Staff to Deputy Prime Minister Nemyria,
Ihor Zhovka, told Socha the Prime Minister believes Ukraine
can weather the financial crisis if it receives EBRD and
World Bank sectoral project funding in addition to the IMF
standby facility. According to Zhovka, negotiations on the
Association Agreement with the EU are well advanced.
However, Yushchenko made a mistake by promising the
Ukraine-EU Free Trade Agreement would be complete by the end
of 2009. This will not be possible. (Note: the FTA is an
integral component of the Association Agreement.)
11. (C) Zhovka went on to focus criticism on President
Yushchenko's handling of Euro-Atlantic policy issues, blaming
him for causing late submission of Ukraine's Annual Target
Plan, which, Zhovka told Socha, was returned by Yushchenko to
the Cabinet of Ministers with edits after the deadline in
Brussels in late 2008. However, the situation is now
resolved. Ukraine will now turn to its Annual National
Program document, and should have a draft ready by late April.
12. (U) Staffdel Socha did not have an opportunity to clear
this cable.
TAYLOR
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PARM UP RS
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SOCHA HEARS CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffdel Socha
visited Kyiv February 19 and 20 to explore questions of
regional security, Euro-Atlantic integration, and the effects
of the financial crisis. Ukrainian officials emphasized
concerns about Russia's more assertive foreign policy and the
threat this poses to Ukraine. The GOU is preparing its
Annual National Program with NATO for submission by late
April. End Summary.
NSDC: Don't Forget Ukraine
--------------
2. (C) Senate Foreign Relations Committee senior staff member
Christopher Socha (office of Jim DeMint, R, NC) visited Kyiv
February 19 and 20. He met with Acting Head of the
International Relations Department of the National Security
and Defense Council (NSDC),Volodomyr Ivanov. Ivanov
highlighted concerns about Russian assertiveness. He
wondered whether a "new model" of US-Russian relations would
work to Ukraine's disadvantage. He urged the US not to allow
Ukraine to be used as a "bargaining chip," lest Ukraine slip
into the Russian sphere. Ivanov suggested that a new
mechanism to manage US-Ukraine relations was needed. He
harkened back to the Kuchma-Gore Commission as a model. The
key thing is to maintain regular contacts at senior levels,
he said.
3. (C) Asked if the August war in Georgia had changed
Ukrainians' perceptions of a Russian threat, Ivanov said poll
numbers in Russia show that increasing numbers of Russians
regard Ukraine as unfriendly, but there is not much evidence
of a similar change in attitude among Ukrainians. Within the
Ukrainian government, however, Ivanov told Socha that
awareness of Ukraine's vulnerability to potential Russian
threats and to Russian influence has increased, along with
concern about Russia's politicization of most aspects of its
relationship with Ukraine. Ivanov underlined the importance
of the 1994 Bucharest Memorandum under which the U.S. and
Russia gave guarantees to Ukraine in return for its
de-nuclearization. Ivanov said Ukraine needs a new
guarantee. The START Treaty should be extended or a new one
put in its place, but Ukraine should be part of the process.
4. (C) Turning to Crimea, Ivanov observed that the situation
is not analogous to South Ossetia. Crimea has not declared
independence, is far bigger than South Ossetia, shares a
history and strong economic ties with Ukraine, and has
considerable public opinion that supports remaining in
Ukraine. Furthermore, he believes that the international
reaction to any Russian military action in Crimea would be
far greater and Russia knows that. Ivanov noted that nearly
all of Crimea's water and electricity come from Ukraine.
Nonetheless, the destabilizing nature of Russia's massive
propaganda campaign in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine is
troubling. Given the large number of retired Black Sea Fleet
servicemen in Crimea, there is a ready market for Russian
nationalist propaganda.
5. (C) On Afghanistan, Ivanov said he believes Russia is
serious about stability. Instability in Afghanistan does not
serve Russian interests. That said, getting the US out of
Manas was a great way to show who is boss in Central Asia.
Ivanov said that Ukraine would not speak against a U.S. or
NATO base in the region, including in the Caucasus, to supply
Afganistan. However, he predicted a very negative Russian
reaction.
Ministry of Defense: the Threat of Russian Influence
-------------- --------------
6. (C) At the Ministry of Defense, Socha explored defense
reform issues, in particular the effects of Ukraine's budget
problems, and the Ministry's views on Russia's role in the
region with Military Policy and Strategic Planning Deputy
Director Colonel Polischuk and Head of Euro-atlantic
Integration Section Lt. Colonel Kovalenko. Polischuk noted
that exchange rate losses since September contributed to a
fifty percent reduction in the MoD's budget. In the current
environment, MoD must focus on the most essential tasks:
retaining key personnel and maintaining the current readiness
levels of the joint Rapid Reaction forces. He noted that
President Yushchenko hopes to increase the number of
Ukrainian troops in or contributing to operations in
Afghanistan. There may be reductions in levels in Kosovo,
however. Polishchuk stressed the importance at this time of
maintaining NATO's full open door policy.
KYIV 00000395 002 OF 002
7. (C) Turning to Russia, Polischuk listed the following
concerns at MoD: Russia's determination to maintain forces in
Transnistria and Russian encouragement of a trilateral
dialogue on Transnistria that excludes Ukraine, the EU, and
the U.S.; recent Russian-Belarussian joint military exercises
that did not exclude an invasion scenario; Russia's CFE
withdrawal, which Ukraine recognizes as an unfriendly action;
and the impending expiration of START and the unlikely chance
that Russia would reconfirm the 1994 trilateral agreement,
now that Ukraine is a non-nuclear state.
8. (C) Polischuk went on to describe the map as MoD sees it:
Russian forces within easy reach of Ukraine's southwest
border (and Odessa) in Transnistria; Russian forces in
Crimea; Russian forces along Ukraine's entire eastern border
and much of its northern border; and Belarussian and/or
Russian forces on Ukraine's north-northwest border. This is,
he continued, the environment that MoD will have in mind as
it holds its Strategic Defense Review. Ukraine will make
every effort to conduct it according to international and
NATO standards. Summing up his comments, Polischuk noted
that open conflict would split Ukraine in half and must be
avoided. However, in the Ministry's opinion, Russian
influence on different parts of Ukrainian society is the
biggest strategic threat to Ukraine's security.
MFA on NATO
--------------
9. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Director for NATO
affairs Vadym Prystaiko noted the difficulties that MFA has
had in coordination the Annual National Program (ANP) within
the GOU. Prystaiko said that anti-NATO critics in the
Ukrainian government demanded to know what Ukraine would get
in return for continuing to alienate Russia when NATO had no
intention of moving Ukraine toward membership in the near or
mid-term.
Vice PM's Chief of Staff on Financial Crisis, Yushchenko
-------------- --------------
10. (C) Chief of Staff to Deputy Prime Minister Nemyria,
Ihor Zhovka, told Socha the Prime Minister believes Ukraine
can weather the financial crisis if it receives EBRD and
World Bank sectoral project funding in addition to the IMF
standby facility. According to Zhovka, negotiations on the
Association Agreement with the EU are well advanced.
However, Yushchenko made a mistake by promising the
Ukraine-EU Free Trade Agreement would be complete by the end
of 2009. This will not be possible. (Note: the FTA is an
integral component of the Association Agreement.)
11. (C) Zhovka went on to focus criticism on President
Yushchenko's handling of Euro-Atlantic policy issues, blaming
him for causing late submission of Ukraine's Annual Target
Plan, which, Zhovka told Socha, was returned by Yushchenko to
the Cabinet of Ministers with edits after the deadline in
Brussels in late 2008. However, the situation is now
resolved. Ukraine will now turn to its Annual National
Program document, and should have a draft ready by late April.
12. (U) Staffdel Socha did not have an opportunity to clear
this cable.
TAYLOR