Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KUWAIT676
2009-07-08 05:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

AA/S FELTMAN DISCUSSES IRAN, IRAQ WITH PRIME

Tags:  PREL PGOV KUNC IR IZ PK KU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0078
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0676/01 1890553
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080553Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3633
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1463
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000676 

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KUNC IR IZ PK KU
SUBJECT: AA/S FELTMAN DISCUSSES IRAN, IRAQ WITH PRIME
MINISTER

REF: KUWAIT 647

Classified By: A/DCM Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000676

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KUNC IR IZ PK KU
SUBJECT: AA/S FELTMAN DISCUSSES IRAN, IRAQ WITH PRIME
MINISTER

REF: KUWAIT 647

Classified By: A/DCM Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary: During a June 30 meeting between the Prime
Minister and AA/S Feltman, the PM:
-- urged ongoing dialogue with Iran, despite recent events,
and the avoidance of any military option, notwithstanding his
pessimistic outlook on Iran's nuclear program and the
prospects for any opening up by the regime;
-- Insisted on the need for Iraq to take tangible steps to
demonstrate its commitment to UNSCR 833, offering his own
travel to Iraq in return;
-- Sought AA/S Feltman's views on any progress on
Israeli/Palestine issues;
-- Applauded Pakistan's efforts to crack down on AQ
domestically.
End Summary.

Seeking Dialogue With Recalcitrant Iran
--------------


2. (C) AA/S Feltman, during a June 30 call on Prime Minister
Shaykh Nasser Al-Jaber Al Sabah, acknowledged the PM's long
experience as Ambassador to Iran and sought his views on
post-election violence in that country and on how the USG can
most effectively engage Iran. Despite the post-election
problem, the President, Feltman noted, is committed to
dialogue with Iran, but seeks the views of Kuwait and other
partners on how best to push that aim forward given the
absence of a direct USG presence in Iran since 1979. Feltman
noted that Iran has not, so far, been responsive to direct
USG offers for direct diplomatic engagement or to an
invitation from the P5 1 for direct talks. Feltman reassured
the PM that the USG's desire to engage Iran does not imply
any shift in commitment to its GCC partners.


3. (C) The PM, joined in the meeting by his advisor and
former Minister for Cabinet Affairs Faisal Al-Hajji and by
MFA Undersecretary Khaled Al-Jarallah, offered his assessment
(note: shared by others within the GOK. End note) that
Khamenei, whom he referred to as the "Murshad" would prevail,
comparing events in Iran to Mao Zedong's consolidation of
power in China following the so-called "cultural revolution."
The PM suggested that any hope for regime change in Iran was
futile. He supported the President's effort to engage Iran

and urged the U.S. to explore all options leading to a
resolution of bilateral tensions "no matter how many meetings
it requires." The GOK opposes any military action against
Iran and sees no alternative to dialogue, he said. The PM
acknowledged GOK concerns about Iran's nuclear program --
including its civilian nuclear energy program -- noting that
its facilities at Bushehr and several other sites create the
specter of a "Three Mile Island-type event."


4. (C) Turning briefly to the "inevitability" of Kuwait's
reliance on nuclear energy, given the finite nature of their
oil reserves, the PM said that Kuwait has held discussions
recently with the French, who had assured them that safe
programs could be managed within Kuwait's small geographic
area; "and you know," he added, "that the French are the most
experienced in this field." Acknowledging AA/S Feltman's
comment that development of a civil nuclear program by a
"responsible" state like Kuwait did not raise the same
concerns as did such development by Iran, the PM suggested --
without offering any supporting evidence -- that Iran will
eventually "yield" to international pressure to rein in its
nuclear program. At the same time, the PM -- apparently
contradicting himself -- told Feltman that he did not believe
Iran would accept international supervision of its nuclear
program or even "compromise" on its aims.

GOK Needs Tangible Steps On Border from Iraq
--------------


5. (C) Turning to Iraq, the PM reiterated comments made to
AA/S Feltman earlier in the day by Amiri Adviser Mohammed
Abulhassan (Septel) concerning Kuwait's need for tangible
signs from Iraq that it accepts the inviolability of the
UNSCR 833-designated common border and that these steps must
include the removal of Iraqi farmers from Kuwaiti territory
and the maintenance of existing border markers, which the PM
specified meant maintaining just four specific pillars. When
such steps are completed, the PM added, he would be prepared
to visit Iraq "for five days, even; Baghdad, the Kurdish
area, Sistani in Najaf; and Basra", but not before. Feltman,
in response, assured the PM that the UN and U.S. are both
committed to UNSCR 833 and have no intention of re-opening

KUWAIT 00000676 002 OF 002


any of the points covered under that resolution; the land
border is inviolable. The U.S., Feltman added, agrees with
the GOK that Iraq must take tangible steps to show that 833
is being implemented "in fact and on the ground." The U.S.
is supporting efforts by UN Special Representive to the
Secgen Staffan de Mistura on steps that would provide
tangible assurances to Kuwait while, at the same time, avoid
inflaming populist rhetoric in Iraq.

Two-State Solution
--------------


6. (C) Turning to other regional issues, AA/S Feltman noted
continuing U.S. efforts to support the framework for a
two-state solution through generous contributions to the
Palestinian Authority, including preparation to transfer USD
200 million in cash to the PA budget. Feltman noted that it
is important that such contributions provide the wherewithal
for PA employees in Gaza to keep some level of economic
activity going. Feltman noted with approval Palestinian
Authority President Abbas's commitment to keeping economic
activity in Gaza going, notwithstanding his government's
differences with Hamas. In response to a query from the PM
about U.S. relations with Hamas, Feltman confirmed that the
U.S. "has no relations with Hamas." "We are throwing our
efforts behind the PA," he noted, in the belief that the
sooner the Palestinians "have a government that acts like a
government," the sooner a viable Palestinian state will
exist. Noting the President's commitment to moving towards a
two-state solution and a comprehensive Middle East peace,
Feltman told the PM that trying to work out our differences
with Syria through direct talks is an important part of this
strategy.


7. (C) The PM raised Pakistan, noting with approval that, for
the first time, the GOP was deploying its military against Al
Qaida in Pakistan, comparing it to Sri Lankan efforts to
contain the Tamils. AA/S Feltman, while noting that
Afghanistan/Pakistan do not fall specifically within his
brief, expressed appreciation for the humanitarian and other
assistance the GOK has provided to this region.

Friends In Need, Friends Indeed
--------------


8. (C) Wrapping up the meeting, AA/S Feltman assured the PM
of U.S. appreciation for our long friendship with Kuwait and
of our desire to build on the existing partnership; we look
forward to the Amir's August 3 meeting with POTUS in
Washington as a means to this end. The PM, in turn,
expressed deep appreciation for U.S. friendship, noting that
"when we needed you, you liberated us."

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The PM offered no surprises or new thinking on either
Iran or Iraq. The GOK remains deeply opposed to provoking
Iran, given Kuwait's vulnerable geopolitical situation, and
as always prefers a co-optive, consensual approach. His
comments on Iraq reflect widespread and abiding Kuwaiti
paranoia that the border issue, if not clearly resolved now
while the U.S. still holds major cards in the game, will come
back to haunt them sometime in the future, in a reprise of
the events of 1990.





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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
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JONES