Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KUWAIT502
2009-05-18 12:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

KUWAIT CLAIMS TO BUILD TERRORIST REHAB CENTER,

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV PINR IR KDRG PHUM KU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6894
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0502/01 1381238
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181238Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3351
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000502 

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR IR KDRG PHUM KU
SUBJECT: KUWAIT CLAIMS TO BUILD TERRORIST REHAB CENTER,
SEEKS RETURN OF LAST FOUR GTMO DETAINEES

REF: A. 06 KUWAIT 2020

B. PARTO 000002

C. 06 KUWAIT 4582

D. 06 KUWAIT 4429

E. 08 KUWAIT 1188

F. 08 KUWAIT 0159

G. 08 KUWAIT 370

H. 08 KUWAIT 0508

I. KUWAIT 110

Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
d

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000502

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR IR KDRG PHUM KU
SUBJECT: KUWAIT CLAIMS TO BUILD TERRORIST REHAB CENTER,
SEEKS RETURN OF LAST FOUR GTMO DETAINEES

REF: A. 06 KUWAIT 2020

B. PARTO 000002

C. 06 KUWAIT 4582

D. 06 KUWAIT 4429

E. 08 KUWAIT 1188

F. 08 KUWAIT 0159

G. 08 KUWAIT 370

H. 08 KUWAIT 0508

I. KUWAIT 110

Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
d


1. (C) Summary. GOK interlocutors have advised us a long
promised rehabilitation center for Islamic extremists --
mentioned by Kuwait's Prime Minister during his September
2008 meeting with Secretary Rice -- has been completed and
could soon begin operations. The GOK, under significant
domestic pressure, continues to pursue the handover of its
four remaining GTMO detainees notwithstanding its
embarrassment after one of the eight previously repatriated
reportedly perpetrated a suicide attack in Mosul last year
and others evaded surveillance. Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr.
Mohammed Al Sabah reiterated this desire to the Secretary on
April 24. On April 29, Ambassador Khaled Mughames, Director
of MFA's Follow-Up and Coordination Department, assured
POLCOUNS that the GOK now has the capability to rehabilitate
extremists who are returned to it, as well as the ability to
detain and monitor them effectively, notwithstanding previous
GOK laxity. While the GOK's assurances are doubtless
sincere, its actual ability to detain and monitor these
individuals remains in serious question. Absent compelling
evidence, (which the USG has been unable to provide in
earlier cases) the GOK lacks either the political will or the
judicial framework to ensure vigorous legal proceedings
against GTMO detainees, and only a very limited capacity to
rehabilitate or monitor them. This cable provides a brief
overview of detainee-related events over the last several
years. Ambassador will pursue this matter with the Interior
Minister following the May 16 parliamentary elections and
formation of a new government. End summary.


-------------- --------------
Background: Calls for Return of Kuwait's GTMO detainees
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Upon learning that twelve Kuwaiti citizens were among
the enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan by U.S. forces
in late 2001, Speaker of the Kuwaiti Parliament Jassem
Al-Khorafi in 2002 called on the U.S. to try the prisoners,
vowing that Kuwait would support any USG finding on their
disposition. In response to domestic pressure, however, the
GOK and the Kuwaiti press began gradually to call for their
immediate return or release, especially following the 2003
launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Growing numbers of
Kuwaitis expressed frustration that, Kuwait's support for the
U.S. war effort notwithstanding, the GOK was still not
entrusted with its own detainees. In 2004, Kuwaitis were
again vexed when British Guantanamo detainees were released
while Kuwaiti detainees continued to languish without formal
charges being filed. In 2005 and 2006, in response to
persistent high-level GOK assurances that these men would be
monitored, tried in Kuwaiti courts, and prevented from
traveling, the U.S. returned eight of the twelve to Kuwait.
Subsequently, GOK officials lamented to emboffs the dearth of
evidence provided by the USG to support effective
prosecutions (ref A); by March 2007, according to Embassy
records, all eight were tried and acquitted of all charges by
Kuwaiti courts and then released. Contrary to earlier GOK
assurances these individuals would be prevented from
traveling outside of Kuwait, several of them were able to do
so. In a development that proved embarrassing for the GOK,
former GTMO detainee Abdullah Al-Ajmi reportedly was involved
in a subsequent suicide bombing in Mosul (see below).
Nonetheless, Kuwait's Foreign Minister, noting the
President's announcement he would close GTMO by the end of
2009, reiterated to the Secretary April 24 the GOK's request
that its four remaining GTMO detainees be returned (ref B).

-------------- --------------
Background: Disposition of Kuwaiti GTMO Detainees
-------------- --------------


3. (S) The USG has returned eight of the twelve Kuwaiti
detainees; Embassy records indicate that the GOK undertook
the following judicial actions in their cases:

--- In January 2005, the DOD transferred Guantanamo detainee
Nasser Al-Mutairi (ISN-205) to Kuwait. The GOK commenced

KUWAIT 00000502 002 OF 004


trial proceedings against him in March but released him on
bail in April 2005. In June 2005, a court acquitted him of
all the charges against him. In November 2005, an appeals
court overturned Al-Mutairi's acquittal and sentenced him to
five years in prison. However, this finding was overturned
by the Court of Cassation (highest level court in Kuwait) in
December 2006 and he was acquitted and released (ref C).
--- In November 2005, the DOD transferred Guantanamo
detainees Abdullah Al-Ajmi (ISN-220),Abd Al-Aziz Al-Shammeri
(ISN-217),Mohammed Fnaitel Al-Daihani (ISN-229),Adel Zamel
(ISN-568),and Sa'ad Al-Azmi (ISN-571). Trials for these
detainees commenced in March 2006; all five were acquitted by
a criminal court judge of all charges in July 2006 and then
released. The Public Prosecutor's office in July 2006
announced that it would appeal the court's decision to acquit
but allowed the period for filing an appeal to lapse (ref D).

--- In September 2006, following a direct appeal by the Amir
to then President Bush at the White House (against the advice
of his advisor and half-brother Shaykh Misha'al -- Ref E) the
DOD transferred Guantanamo detainees Omar Rajab Amin
(ISN-065) and Abdullah Kamel Al-Kandari (ISN-228) to Kuwait.
A Kuwaiti criminal court acquitted the pair on all charges
and released them in April 2007. These acquittals were
upheld by the Court of Cassation in February 2008 (ref F).
-- For a detailed chronology of GTMO-related events, please
visit our GTMO timeline on Embassy's website.

--------------
Status Updates to GOK
--------------


4. (S) Despite GOK assurances that the returned detainees
would be prevented from leaving Kuwait, by March 2007 the USG
uncovered evidence that Sa'ad Al-Azmi had traveled to Yemen,
Adel Zamel to Albania, and Abdullah Al-Ajmi to Syria. In
January 2008, NEA/ARP updated Kuwaiti Ambassador Shaykh Salem
Al Sabah on the status of the four Kuwaiti citizens still
detained at GTMO:

-- Fouad Mahmoud Hasan Al-Rabia (ISN-551),Faiz Mohammed
Ahmed Al-Kandari (ISN-552) would likely face a Military
Commission tribunal. No court date had been set. (Note:
Embassy is unaware if a court date has yet been set in this
case.)
-- Khalid bin Abdullah Mishal Thamer Al-Hameydani (ISN-213)
and Fowzi Khalid Abdullah Al-Awdi (ISN-232) would not face
trial but were not approved for transfer. (Note: Embassy is
unaware of any updates in this case.)
-- In March 2008 a two-person Kuwaiti delegation traveled to
GTMO, but all four remaining Kuwaiti detainees refused to
meet with them. Also during March, Kuwaiti Amir Shaykh Sabah
raised the issue of the remaining GTMO detainees with
visiting DHS Secretary Chertoff, assuring him that the GOK
would ensure they would no longer pose a threat to U.S.
interests. Secretary Chertoff responded by noting U.S.
concerns over possible recidivism and the GOK's ability to
effectively monitor their activities (ref G).

-------------- -
Background: Al-Ajmi's Suicide Mission in Mosul
-------------- -


5. (S) Strong evidence suggests that former detainee Abdullah
Al-Ajmi perpetrated a suicide attack in Mosul, Iraq on April
26, 2008. Interior Minister Shaykh Jaber al-Khaled al-Jaber
Al Sabah informed Ambassador that Al-Ajmi had sued
successfully in court for the return of his passport, a fact
later confirmed by FM Dr. Mohammed. Dr. Mohammad added that
the GOK was not planning to send a forensics team to Mosul,
but hoped the USG would share the results of any forensics
investigation into the attack. Dr. Mohammad also asserted
that, following the Mosul attack, all seven remaining
returned detainees had surrendered their passports to the GOK
authorities (ref H). Subsequently, during his September 18,
2008 meetings in Washington, Prime Minister Nasser Mohammad
Al Sabah reiterated Kuwait's desire for its remaining
detainees to be released, and committed to the creation of a
rehabilitation center for extremists as a mitigating tool
against recidivism, and said the Ambassador would be invited
to tour it.


6. (S) Absent any movement on the rehabilitation center, the
Ambassador in February 2009 called on Interior Minister
Shaykh Jaber Al Sabah who reiterated his earlier skepticism
that Kuwait could develop an effective rehabilitation center
for the remaining four GTMO detainees absent special
legislation and/or a manifest of strong political will,
neither of which he thought likely (ref I). Shaykh Jaber's

KUWAIT 00000502 003 OF 004


views reflect those of the Deputy Head of the KNG and close
advisor and half-brother to the Amir, Shaykh Misha'al (ref
E). Also during February, S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson
clarified to Kuwaiti Ambassador Shaykh Salem that the
President's determination to close GTMO did not imply a
decrease in security concerns (ref I). He also stressed that
the alleged al-Ajmi suicide bombing would complicate the
release of the remaining four, who were deemed more dangerous
than the previous eight. The Ambassador reinforced these
points separately to FM Dr. Mohammad.

-------------- --------------
Current GOK plan: Rehabilitation Center & Surveillance
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Following on the FM's unanticipated April 24
announcement to the Secretary (ref B) that Kuwait planned to
place the four remaining detainees in a "clinic" within
Kuwait's Central Prison, Ambassador Mughames told PolCouns
April 29 that construction work on Kuwait's rehabilitation
center -- to occupy a portion of the largely abandoned
Central Prison -- had recently been completed, that he was
prepared to facilitate a visit by U.S. officials to the
center, and that the center would be staffed by moderate
clerics and trained psychiatrists whose goal would be to
return the detainees to a "proper" appreciation of moderate
Islam, with the goal of their eventual return to normal
society. The Kuwaiti rehabilitation center, he noted, would
be modeled after Riyadh's new Center for Care and Counseling.
Mughames stressed that, as in the Saudi rehabilitation
program, families would play a central role in the
rehabilitation process, encouraging the rehabilitation of the
detainees in the first instance, and then enfolding them and
monitoring them (in addition to monitoring and surveillance
to be conducted by GOK officials) following their eventual
release.


8. (C) According to Mughames, the planned rehabilitation
center is designed to accommodate other apprehended
extremists as well, including any returned from Iraq or other
conflict zones. Mughames downplayed any legal constraints to
holding the detainees for the period necessary for their
rehabilitation. Evidence against each detainee, he noted,
would be subject to an exhaustive judicial review and, he
assessed, GOK embarrassment over the Al-Ajmi suicide bombing
would sensitize judicial officials to the need to avoid
premature release of the detainees. Mughames added that
passage of a long-anticipated anti-terrorism law would
facilitate the extremists' detention. Mughames suggested
that "after a few years" in the rehabilitation center, the
former detainees would be released and monitored on a 24-hour
basis; the GOK, he asserted, could manage all this on its
own.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (S) The announcement by the GOK that its long-awaited
rehabilitation center has suddenly come to fruition is
somewhat surprising, given earlier GOK official observations
and the continual absence of an anti-terrorism law, which we
don't foresee being passed any time soon. Our sense is that
the GOK has been galvanized by the President's announced
plans to close Guantanamo by the end of the year and
resultant domestic pressure on the government to bring "their
boys" home. It raises concerns, however, that a hurried GOK
rehabilitation program might lack the resources necessary to
effectively detain and/or mitigate the recidivist behavior of
alleged extremists. We note, in addition, that Mughames'
assertions conflict with the opinion expressed by Kuwaiti
Ambassador to the U.S. Shaykh Salem Al Sabah during a May
2008 meeting with NEA A/S Welch and S/WCI Ambassador
Williamson, in which Shaykh Salem said the GOK is technically
incapable of providing 24-hour surveillance of all former
detainees.


10. (S) Should any or all of the GTMO four be released to GOK
custody, we assess -- based on GOK proclivities and political
constraints -- that monitoring and/or detention would be on a
limited time basis only. Lacking legislative muscle to
enforce continued detention, the GOK would likely transfer
the "GTMO Four" into the custody of their families. In light
of the Al-Ajmi incident, the four would likely surrender
their passports, making travel difficult but not impossible.
While Mughames (who joined the Foreign Minister's April 24
dinner for the visiting Secretary) is the GOK's front man on
the GTMO issue, he has not presented -- in our view --
compelling evidence that Kuwait is ready to detain, try,

KUWAIT 00000502 004 OF 004


monitor, and effectively control dangerous persons who are
returned to its custody. Our understanding, in fact, is that
the GTMO "talking point" was added at the last minute to the
FM's briefing papers. The question will require further
exploration, in conjunction with the actual inspection of the
rehabilitation center once it is completed. Senior GOK
officials, including the Interior Minister, are declining
appointments prior to the May 16 parliamentary election and
subsequent cabinet reshuffle, but Ambassador will follow up
immediately thereafter. End comment.


********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
JONES