UNCLOGGING KUWAIT'S DRAINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001034

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, EEB, EMBASSY AMMAN FOR ESTH HUB OFFICER,
EPA FOR INTERNATIONAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON SENV PINR KU
SUBJECT: UNCLOGGING KUWAIT'S DRAINS

REF: A. KUWAIT 876

B. KUWAIT 244

C. KUWAIT 948

Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
d

Affluent vs. Effluent
--------------


1. (C) Summary: On August 24, some 180,000 cubic meters of
wastewater leaked into the streets and storm sewers of the
affluent Kuwaiti neighborhood of Mishref before making its
way into the Gulf, where it created an ongoing pollution
problem that fouled miles of Kuwait's shoreline and persists
to this day. The relatively new Mishref wastewater recycling
facility -- completed in 2006 at a cost of $160 million --
had been plagued with operational issues; ten of its 14 pumps
had lain inoperable for months (ref A) due to poor
maintenance -- despite innumerable warnings that trouble was
brewing. Moving ahead with repair and cleanup is expected to
take months and will involve enormous costs. The odor of raw
sewage and the damage to Kuwait's offshore waters and
shoreline have prompted widespread introspection and
sclerotic attempts by Kuwait's citizenry to affix blame for
the disaster, with much of the anger directed at the
perceived failure of the government and the ruling Al Sabah
family to provide adequate public services to the nation.
While the GOK has taken some steps to repair the problem,
including calling in the U.S. Corp of Engineers as
consultants, many Kuwaitis view this failure of basic
infrastructure as a metaphor for the GOK's inability to deal
effectively with a range of crises. Much less focused than
the effort to assign blame has been the Kuwaiti public's
effort to orchestrate an effective campaign to demand
accountability and a resolution to the problem. Two months
after the initial disaster, effluent continues to bleed into
the Gulf and a bad smell lingers (both physically and
figuratively). Parliament re-convened on October 27 and will
certainly examine the issue, but more with an eye to grilling
those perceived responsible than to finding an effective
solution. Having aired their complaints in Kuwait's media and
in the country's many diwaniyyas, most Kuwaitis feel they've
done their job; the rest is now up to the government, but
many Kuwaitis have little faith that the government is up to
the task. End Summary.

Fix the Blame, not the Problem
--------------


2. (C) The Mishref sewage disaster provides a glimpse into
the challenges facing civil society in Kuwait. In this case
as in many others, critics responding to the disaster took
their complaints to the diwaniyyas and the press, but the
effort ended there -- there were no Kuwaiti town hall
meetings, no petitions by concerned citizens, no organized
lobbying efforts to try to compel the government to address
the problem more quickly and effectively. The Mishref case
followed a familiar pattern -- angry and urgent calls by
Parliamentarians for the removal of the relevant minister or
other blame-worthy officials (those who approved the design,
the contract, the maintenance contractor, etc.) immediately
overshadowed any real discussion on how best to resolve the
environmental disaster or prevent similar problems from
recurring. (Note: A U.S. Corps of Engineers officer told
Embassy on October 28 that the GOK took 26 days just to plug
an overflowing manhole. The officer noted that efforts to
repair the fundamental problems remain in the early stages,
partly due to Parliament having effectively blocked repair
efforts while it attempted to sort out blame. End Note.)


3. (C) As Zuhair Al-Mahmeed, a prominent moderate Shia
political and social activist (Secretary General of the
Islamic National Consensus Movement) recently told Polchief,
Kuwaitis have adopted a "passive" attitude towards social
problems and are accustomed to relying on government fixes.
In addition, Al-Mahmeed commented, they have a "low level of
environmental consciousness" that renders them surprisingly
accepting of Mishref-type disasters. In Al-Mahmeed's view,
however, (a view echoed by many Kuwaitis) the fundamental
problem is pervasive corruption that allows contracts to be
improperly awarded with little follow-up or oversight. In a
small society like Kuwait, he suggested, citizens are woven
together by ties of kinship and obligation and the guilty
parties in a corruption issue are often one's friends,
neighbors, or relatives. Kuwaitis are content to see a few
high-ranking figures take the fall for a disaster, but few of
them want to peer too closely into the deals their friends

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and associates have cooked (judge not lest ye be judged,
perhaps) and few are prepared to revamp the system that
allows such disasters.


4. (C) This public passivity extends even to the business
class, including those directly impacted by the incident.
With the smell still lingering, hoteliers and business
proprietors most affected by the spill -- those located along
the shoreline -- have told Embassy they hesitate to press the
government for a quick clean-up for fear that, if deemed too
strident in their complaints, they risk being cut out of
future contracts or financial deals dependent on government
largesse. Having vented their frustration, Kuwaitis are
adhering to tradition and waiting for the government -- the
traditional source of largesse -- to fix the problem. Many
Kuwaitis, however, are not optimistic that the government has
the capacity to fix things in a lasting way. As Ahmed
Al-Sarraf, a prominent columnist -- and notoriously outspoken
critic of the government -- recently told Polchief, "there
are hundreds of Mishrefs" that occur all the time; what
distinguishes the present crisis is the unavoidably public
nature of the effluent spill. In Al-Sarraf's view, the
fundamental problem is the GOK's lack of accountability
("only a few bureaucrats will be asked to temporarily step
down or a contractor's license will be frozen for a little
while"); the problem ultimately stems from the ruling
family's unfitness to rule; few of the Al Sabah, Al-Sarraf
commented, have the intellectual depth to grasp complicated
issues or provide a vision for the future and many of them
are involved in corruption; the aged Amir himself is looking
backward rather than forward. In the opinion of Al-Sarraf --
and others in his circle of government critics -- Mishref
shows that the Al Sabahs still view Kuwait as "their"
country, despite their inability to solve its concrete
problems, and do not want to comprehend that it's time for
Kuwaitis to rule themselves.

Crisis Highlights Rivalries
--------------


5. (C) Sitting above the mess in their comfortable homes,
many well-off liberals and conservatives alike tend to
distort the Mishref accident's significance through their own
political prisms. Perceiving the issue as yet another stick
with which to beat the GOK, Islamist Political Science
professor Dr. Ibrahim Al-Hadban recently told poloff that
Kuwaitis are content with the nation's leadership provided
that the state's social welfare continues to "keep us fat and
spoiled." However, he noted, the terms of the social
contract with the Al Sabah (a ruling vice royal family) are
"called into question" with each political or societal
calamity. Almost nonchalant over the financial and
environmental impact of the Mishref spill, many of the
Kuwaiti moderates/liberals (Sunni and Shi'a alike -- those
from "inside the wall" - ref B) see the encroachment of
Islamism -- and those who promote it -- as the real effluent
creating the stench in Kuwait: Amiri Diwan advisor Bader
Al-Baijan told poloff October 18 -- in the context of
discussing the Mishref spill -- that "these Islamists weren't
even citizens 20 years ago, now they're running the country,
deciding our dress and how we greet each other (referring to
a perceived imposition of Islamic greetings)." In the same
conversation, former Health Minister Abdul Al-Taweel, from
his home in Mishref agreed that Islamists were wreaking havoc
in Kuwait, and blamed an overzealous Islamist temperance
movement as the reason for the spread of drugs in the
country.

Comment: Kuwaiti Passivity Prohibits Development
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The GOK's traditional fundamental relationship with
Kuwait's citizenry is one of patronage; the government
dispenses and the people receive. That tradition remains
deeply embedded in the Kuwaiti social and political fabric.
Rank and file Kuwaitis accept the leadership role of the Al
Sabah and its control of the government. With Kuwaitis
paying no taxes, they have little stake in or sense of
ownership of government -- despite the fact that it employs
more than 90 percent of the citizen population.
Accountability takes a back-seat to patronage -- and it is
fear of losing patronage that partially explains why so many
Kuwaitis are comfortable venting in diwaniyyas and the press,
but go no further. Those that do try to advance a more
activist agenda with the government, such as the recently
created (and self-appointed) "Group of 26" senior advisors
(see septel) risk being attacked for taking on airs.


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7. (C) As the Mishref incident has demonstrated, Kuwaitis are
prepared to appeal for services (and grumble loudly when
those services are not delivered) but lack an interest or
capacity to organize effectively (outside of traditional
family or tribal structures) and lobby for the changes they
seek (a challenge also clearly demonstrated in our efforts to
build solid MEPI programs here). Contrary to Al-Sarraf's
hyperbolic assertions, there have not been "thousands" of
calamities on the scale of Mishref, which has enabled the
passivity of a coddled Kuwaiti public, and allowed their
civic and political institutions to lag behind the country's
relative wealth and material comfort. It remains to be seen
whether this episode will prove a "wake up call" or merely
another point of contention between a growing tribal class
eager to feed equally at the generous public trough and a far
more sophisticated (and relatively miniscule) urban merchant
and political class nonetheless spoiled but perhaps more
prepared to take genuine corrective measures (such as
instilling the unfamiliar and largely unwelcome concept of
"maintenance" vice "replacement" whether vis-a-vis
institutions or things) in this most consumerist of
societies. End comment.

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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
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JONES