KUWAIT: MEASURED BUT REAL PROGRESS ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 001017

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, S/CT, EEB/ESC, TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR KTFN KU
SUBJECT: KUWAIT: MEASURED BUT REAL PROGRESS ON
COUNTER-TERRORISM

REF: A. 2008 KUWAIT 563 (NOTAL)

B. 2008 KUWAIT 708

C. KUWAIT 793

D. KUWAIT 951

E. KUWAIT 149

Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------


1. (S/NF) Summary: Based upon concerns expressed during
Washington consultations, upon arrival at post in April 2008,
Ambassador used her introductory calls on the senior Kuwaiti
leadership to assess ways to improve Kuwait's CT performance.
In May 2008, Post laid out a strategy for promoting greater
CT activity by Kuwait through engagement (ref A),including
proposing a visit to Washington by the Prime Minister and
urging Kuwait to build a rehabilitation center for extremists
and possible GTMO returnees. Post separately advocated for a
POTUS letter to the Amir on CT to highlight our concerns.
Some sixteen months later, the foregoing having been
achieved, we assess that the strategy laid out last May -- to
pursue a broader and more intensive bilateral CT dialogue
emphasizing a positive reinforcement approach -- has borne
fruit; we now see measured -- but real -- progress. Since May
2008 the GOK has reined in or arrested a number of terrorists
and terror facilitators, including several of those who were
of priority concern in mid-2008 and the GoK has for the first
time more clearly and at more senior levels denounced
terrorism. CT issues are regularly raised with senior GoK
officials both here and in Washington, and the Ambassador has
established a solid, ongoing CT dialogue with the Interior
Minister. Post has broadened engagement beyond liaison and
KMI to include other CT-related Kuwaiti entities such as the
NSB. Kuwait's interest in securing the return of its final
four (now three) GTMO detainees has also provided a useful
basis to press CT themes with the Kuwaiti leadership -- just
as the April 2008 suicide attack in Mosul by Kuwaiti former
GTMO detainee Abdullah Al-Ajmi provided an opening to press
the Kuwaiti leadership to be more responsive.


2. (S/NF) The results secured by USG engagement must be
measured in the context of the more limited legal and
political framework the GoK operates within by contrast to
some of its Gulf brethren. Kuwait's Constitution, democratic
traditions, relatively free press, weak CT laws and fractious
political process (with divisions both within the ruling
family, between the family and the Parliament, and more
broadly between modernizing merchant elites and conservative
tribals) all conspire to constrain the government's
willingness and ability to act in the absence of a clear and
present danger to Kuwait. When such a threat is perceived,
as in the case of those Kuwaitis plotting attacks on KSS HQ
and US ARCENT forward command at Camp Arifjan, the GoK can
and will respond. Routinizing GoK action against
facilitators supporting groups operating elsewhere, however,
represents more of a challenge, one that will require us to
continue to make our case through sustained engagement
in-country and with senior GoK visitors. Post's specific
ideas to promote progress on terrorist financing issues will
be reported septel. End Summary.


3. (S/NF) Kuwait's improved CT performance over the past
sixteen months comes as a result of more intensive engagement
and dialogue, here in Kuwait and with visiting GoK officials
in Washington. Significant elements in this effort have
included:

-- Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Al Sabah's September 2008
visit to Washington, and the Amir's August 2009 visit, both
of which provided an opportunity to engage the senior Kuwaiti
leadership on CT issues, particularly in the GTMO context, to
include the steps the GoK would be prepared to take to ensure
the surveillance, monitoring, detention and rehabilitation of
returned GTMO detainees and other extremist actors.

-- The June 2008 POTUS letter to the Amir (conveyed by
Advisor to the President on Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism Kenneth Wainstein),which emphasized the

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significance of USG concerns, called for increased
information sharing, and urged that we use "every tool at our
disposal, including diplomatic, financial, law enforcement,
military and intelligence tools" (ref B).

-- Preparations and discussion related to the October 9,
2009 hand-over to the GOK of GTMO detainee Khalid Al-Mutairi
provided a further valuable opportunity for lower-level
government-to-government dialogue on broad CT issues, to
include the possibility of using the new Kuwaiti
rehabilitation center to process other Kuwaiti extremists in
GoK detention, use of existing GoK authorities to prevent
travel of returned GTMO detainees, and surveillance and
monitoring arrangements.

-- The Ambassador developed and has maintained a regular
dialogue with Interior Minister Shaykh Jaber Al Sabah, with a
focus on CT issues and enhanced information sharing; Post
elements have also sustained an ongoing dialogue on CT issues
with counterparts at KSS, MFA, and MOI.

-- Post elements, including liaison, have stepped up
engagement with Kuwait's National Security Bureau (NSB),to
include a regular dialogue with NSB Deputy Director Shaykh
Thamer Al Sabah.

-- Visits to Kuwait by numerous senior USG officials over the
past year, including the Secretary, A/S Feltman, General
Petraeus and S/CT Benjamin, have provided useful
opportunities to remind the GOK of USG concerns and maintain
the pressure on Kuwait to be a proactive CT partner.

-- With Post encouragement, Kuwait Security Services (KSS)
director General Sulayman Al-Muhaylan visited liaison
headquarters in Washington in June 2009 and held a productive
series of meetings.

-- In response to urging by the Ambassador, Kuwait's Interior
Minister welcomed an offer to include six KSS officials in a
law enforcement International Visitor Leadership Program
focused on building investigatory capacity and competence.

Getting Bad Guys Off The Street
--------------


4. (S/NF) Our policy of increased engagement has resulted in
a measured but significant up-tick in the GOK's actions to
rein in terrorists and their facilitators. In Mid-2008, Post
had its eye on a number of priority terror facilitators
believed to pose a threat to USG and/or Kuwaiti interests.
Through increased intelligence sharing and improved Kuwaiti
initiative, the GOK has made a creditable dent in the numbers
and capabilities of terrorists operating in Kuwait. Of the
14 priority facilitators of concern 16 months ago, two are
now serving prison sentences, two are in jail awaiting trail,
two have been arrested and released, and three have had their
assets frozen via UNSCR 1267 mechanisms. The GOK may be
monitoring the whereabouts of an additional five but has not
yet chosen to act against them.

Some key arrests and outstanding cases include:

-- KSS officials arrested Iran-based and AQ-linked Mohammed
Sultan Ibrahim Sultan Al-Ali (AKA Jawad) in February 2009 on
charges of weapons possession, carrying a false passport and
inciting jihad against a friendly state. He was subsequently
sentenced to seven years in prison (and several of his
Kuwaiti associates also received relatively stiff sentences).

-- Nasir Ali Sunaytan Khadran Ajab Al-Utaybi (AKA Shaykh
Nasir, Abu Ali) was a senior deputy of Al-Hajj and a
well-connected Kuwaiti AQ facilitator. He reportedly moved
money and fighters to Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen.
He was an Imam at a local mosque until named as a terror
facilitator by Kuwaiti Abdallah Nafi Hudayb Nafi Al-Utaybi
(extradited from Yemen in June 2009). He was arrested by
Kuwaiti authorities in June 2009; his trial is ongoing.

-- The February 2009 arrest of Mohammad Abdallah Nasr Ubayd
Al-Dosari (AKA Abu Talha, Al-Kuwaiti, Al-Hajj) in Lebanon

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(arrested by the GOL) was a significant blow to AQ-Kuwait.
While the GOK had no direct role in his arrest, the Kuwaiti
authorities have interposed no objections to the Lebanese
service's lengthy debriefing of Al-Hajj and have sent KSS
officers to assist in that process.

-- Acting on shared intelligence as well as on its own
suspicions and extensive surveillance and investigation, KSS
forces in July arrested six Kuwaiti men in whose possession
were found home-made explosives and guns. The group was
charged with planning attacks on Camp Arifjan -- the forward
command of the U.S. Third Army and a vital logistics hub that
is home to thousands of U.S. military personnel -- as well as
KSS headquarters (ref C). (Note: These men all hail from
the extensive Al-Kandari family and some had direct links to
the 2002 Failaka island attack that killed one US Marine and
wounded another. Kuwaiti GTMO detainee Fayez Al-Kandari is
also brother and first cousin to some of those arrested. End
note.) KSS also brought in several other suspects for
questioning. While some suspects were subsequently released,
the core four of the original six arrested remain in custody
pending formal
charges to be filed by the Public Prosecutor, and one is out
on bail pending trial.

-- In response to the Arifjan plot discovery, Kuwait's press,
one of the most open in the Arab world, devoted hundreds of
column inches for liberals, moderates, and even conservative
Islamists to condemn terrorists and their sympathizers. The
clamor of angry press articles suggested a strong and growing
sense of disgust with terrorism, as well as a useful
acknowledgement that home-grown Sunni extremists can
sometimes pose an immediate threat to Kuwaiti interests.
Further highlighting the point, senior GOK security officials
told the Ambassador that the plotters had considered an
attack on the Amiri palace
which, while unconfirmed by the debriefs liaison has
received, represents a Rubicon that all (to include even
those within the security apparatus here who might otherwise
have latent sympathy for Sunni Islamist views) would
recognize. Senior Kuwaiti officials, including the Amir and
the Council of Ministers, publicly condemned the terrorist
plotters and praised the work of the security services in
terms not previously seen here with reference to Kuwaiti
Sunni extremists.

Willing To Work With The Tools It Has
--------------


5. (S/NF) Kuwait's Constitution, democratic traditions,
relatively free press, weak CT laws and fractious political
process (with divisions both within the ruling family,
between the family and the Parliament, and more broadly
between modernizing merchant elites and conservative tribals)
all conspire to constrain the government's willingness and
ability to act in the absence of a clear and present danger
to Kuwait. Nonetheless, the GOK has shown greater
willingness in recent months to employ in a creative manner
the legal tools already at its disposal to combat terror. In
this regard, the GOK informed us in July that the Minister of
Interior now has discretionary authority to prevent the
travel of those he deems could
harm Kuwaiti interests abroad. According to MFA officials,
the Minister could apply this ruling in cases of suspected
terrorists. In addition, while still denying that its lead
charity organization, RIHS, is involved in terrorism
financing, the GOK has increased its monitoring of charities,
including the USG-designated RIHS, and views this stepped-up
effort as having addressed many of the loopholes that might
have allowed funds to be used or diverted to fund terrorism
(see ref C).


6. (S/NF) The GOK has also recently demonstrated heightened
concern over -- and greater action against -- drug smuggling
(particularly by sea from Iran),noting that this illicit
activity may fund terrorist activity (Note: Kuwait media
reported with some relish in June the repatriation of three
disillusioned Kuwaitis who had reportedly traveled to
Afghanistan to "do jihad" but were shocked to find that their
counterparts there included drug users and drug smugglers,

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Islamically forbidden activities. End Note.) Kuwait's
Interior Minister also participated in an October 13 regional
Interior Ministers meeting in Egypt where terrorism and drug
smuggling were discussed; he and other leading members of the
GOK appear increasingly sensitized to the link between these
two threats, and in particular are very concerned to develop
countermeasures to address the new methodologies apparently
employed by Al-Qaeda in the failed attack against Saudi
Arabia's Deputy Interior Minister, Mohammed bin Nayif.

Moving the Ball Forward
--------------


7. (S/NF) In addition to a continuing program of
government-to-government intensive dialogue and engagement,
other opportunities to enhance CT cooperation include:

-- Training/Workshops/Exchanges. We are encouraged by the
Interior Minister's welcoming approach to our offer to send
six KSS officials on a law enforcement International Visitor
Leadership Program. We intend to seek further such training
opportunities. In the same vein, per (ref D) Regional
Strategic Initiative proposal, Post hopes to organize
workshops with MPs and their staff on drafting CT legislation
and with law enforcement officials on CT investigatory
procedures. At Post's urging, the local UNDP office will
consider providing UNODC training courses for parliamentary
staff on understanding and implementing UN
Conventions that relate to terrorism.

-- Rehabilitation. GTMO detainee Khalid Al-Mutairi has been
repatriated and others may follow. Per the GOK's earlier
commitment, Al-Mutairi's return was managed in a low-key
fashion, and he has been arrested and charged by the Office
of the Public Prosecutor which is investigating whether the
evidence is sufficient to warrant a trail. We continue to
receive assurances that Al-Mutairi and any subsequent
returnees will be remanded to the custody of the Al-Salam
rehabilitation center. Post will remain in close contact
with the GOK to monitor progress and assess the viability of
the program, as well as its potential to be used to help
rehabilitate other, non-GTMO-related extremists here.

-- Travel Limits. Post will press the MOI to use its new
discretionary authorities to prevent the travel of returning
GTMO detainees, and will continue to press the GOK to
effectively monitor former detainees, UNSCR 1267 designees
and other terror facilitators.

-- Septel will provide additional proposals for moving
terrorism finance issues forward.

Comment: Maintaining the Momentum
--------------


8. (S/NF) Kuwait is not likely anytime soon to abandon its
age-old approach of using societal pressure -- appealing to
tribal and family groups to rein in their wayward sons and
bring them back into the fold -- as a first resort, turning
to more punitive options only when all else fails or in cases
of clear and present danger to Kuwait. Given that, and the
limitations of the present domestic political landscape, our
best approach is to acknowledge what the GOK has done right
on CT, continue to strongly press for the broadest possible
use of existing tools, apply GTMO-related leverage to obtain
more proactive monitoring and surveillance efforts, all while
urging Kuwait to up its game where that seems achievable (and
here, encouraging movement on CT financing regulations and
law may be a more appropriate near-term target than a
full-blown rewrite of broader CT legislation). We will also
press for Kuwait to use its chairmanship of the GCC Summit in
December to elevate the discussion on CT cooperation, and
will continue to encourage and acknowledge public statements
by senior Kuwaiti leaders deploring terrorism. At the same
time, we will continue to press the GOK to take steps to
strengthen further the liaison relationship through more
pro-active and generous information sharing, while not losing
sight of the reality that actions are ultimately what count.
End comment.


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