DIMENSIONS OF THE RWANDOPHONE RISE IN NORTH KIVU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000388

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT: DIMENSIONS OF THE RWANDOPHONE RISE IN NORTH KIVU

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)


1. (C) Summary: It appears likely that, as previously
reported, one of the central dynamics in North Kivu in the
coming months will be the rise of "Rwandophone" power. The
context of this dynamic is that in late 2008, Presidents
Kabila and Kagame probably made a deal whereby Kagame would
deactivate the CNDP and Nkunda in exchange for increased
Rwandophone influence in North Kivu, i.e., a more
Rwanda-friendly power structure in the province (Note:
Permission to enter the DRC to attack the FDLR was clearly
also a part of this agreement, but not the most important
component. End note). Implementation of the key aspects of
the Rwandophone agenda began in earnest in January 2009 and
has proceeded rapidly, though potential flashpoints and
setbacks are emerging (analyzed septel). End summary.

Definitions
--------------


2. (C) We use the term Rwandophone to refer broadly to the
Rwandan Government and those Hutus and Tutsis in the DRC
roughly allied to its interests (Note: Of course, by no
means are all Congolese Hutus and Tutsis allied to Rwanda.
End note). "Petit Nord" is the main area of Rwandophone
interest, comprising the North Kivu territories of
Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, Masisi and Walikale, plus Goma town
and, to a lesser extent, the part of South Kivu on the
western shore of Lake Kivu.

Military Aspects of the Strategy
--------------


3. (C) A key part of the Kabila-Kagame deal was the speedy
integration of the CNDP into the FARDC, and with it all other
North Kivu armed groups, notably the Hutu wing of PARECO.
The result fulfills the strategic priorities of both
presidents: for Kagame, the FARDC in the Petit Nord is now
dominated by Rwandophones; for Kabila, the CNDP has been
(seemingly) quickly dismantled and integrated into the FARDC.
Notably, Rwandophones have two of the four Sector
Commander/Deputy slots; eight of the ten Axis Commander slots
and, in total, hold 24 of the 34 command positions. They
have also just added approximately 11,000 of their number to
the FARDC rank and file in the Petit Nord.


4. (C) On the one hand, this "takeover" has in part
officialized the actual military situation from the end of

2008. At that time, the CNDP already controlled much of
southern Rutshuru and eastern Masisi, while PARECO-Hutu was
in control of the Masisi-Chugi axis. However, it also
represents a significant expansion of the Rwandophone domain,
as their influence now extends west to the resource-rich area
of Walikale and north to the strategically critical town of
Kanyabayonga, which CNDP tried and failed to capture last
year. Additionally, the March 23 GDRC-CNDP agreement commits
the GDRC to recognize CNDP officers' ranks. Some CNDP
officers have even been promoted.

Political Aspects
--------------


5. (C) The GDRC-CNDP agreement committed to offering the
CNDP a range of political and administrative positions at the
territorial, provincial and federal levels. However,
consolidated or increased Rwandophone political power is
already apparent in two distinct ways.


6. (C) The first concerns specific appointments, which
includes recognition of positions that the CNDP -- and to a
much lesser extent PARECO -- had established de facto by
January 2009. Most important here is the retention of all
CNDP-appointed administrative staff in Masisi and Rutshuru
(other than the territorial administrators and their
deputies, who will be given jobs elsewhere); integration of
up to 2,000 CNDP and 750 PARECO "police" into the PNC in
Masisi and Rutshuru; and retention of CNDP-sanctioned
immigration (DGM) and customs (OFIDA) staff at the Bunagana
border post.


7. (C) Additionally, the post of Provincial Minister for
Justice, Human Rights and Community Resettlement in North
Kivu has gone to the CNDP (Note: Significantly, the person in
this position will oversee resettlement of IDPs and refugees.
End note). It is likely that the CNDP will also be given a
national-level ministry, probably dealing with local affairs

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and community reconciliation.


8. (C) A major consideration here is the long-standing
Rwandophone goal of "decoupage" -- cutting North Kivu in two,
so the Petit Nord becomes its own, Rwandophone-dominated,
province. There is clearly new political momentum behind the
idea. Its principle advocate, former North Kivu Governor
Eugene Serufuli, was apparently intimately involved in the
Kabila-Kagame deal (Comment: It is possible that Kabila has
already promised to deliver decoupage in exchange for the
Rwandophones voting for him in 2011. Regardless, the fate of
decoupage will be a good indicator of Rwandophone political
fortunes. End comment).

Economic Aspects
--------------


9. (C) We can likely expect a significant rise in
Rwandophone economic fortunes on several counts. For
example, the Rwandophones' military dominance will allow them
to profit from the usual road-based taxing of civilians and
commercial vehicles, which continues to be widespread in the
Petit Nord, as well as from the taxing and/or control of the
Petit Nord's lucrative charcoal and mineral trades (Note:
There are already reports of illegal mineral-laden flights
from Walikale to Rwanda. End note). Additionally, their
political and administrative appointments will deliver the
usual flow of siphoned-off cash and ill-gotten contracts.

Social Aspects
--------------


10. (C) Rwandophones have long demanded the return to the
Petit Nord of the Congolese refugees currently in Rwanda and
Uganda. UNHCR estimates there are 67,000 Congolese in Uganda
(mostly Hutus from Rutshuru) and 55,000 in Rwanda (mostly
Tutsis from Masisi). Upon their return, most will reclaim
land they either sold or abandoned, in many cases as far back
as 15 years ago. If they succeed, it will be a significant
victory for the Rwandophones: more land, more economic
power, more political and electoral clout, and more cultural
dominance in the Petit Nord.


11. (C) Comment: The recent Kinshasa-Kigali rapprochement
is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for this
strategy to take hold in North Kivu. Coupled with Nkunda's
departure, it means the sting has, at least temporarily, been
drawn from the national and international layers of the
conflict. Nevertheless, the longer-standing, underlying
local layers remain, and may well be inflamed (septel). The
exact extent and form of power the GDRC ultimately allows the
Rwandophones to assume in North Kivu is not set in stone.
This inevitably has been left to an ongoing, multi-level
negotiation process, the outcome of which will depend on
Kinshasa's evolving engagement, as well as the evolving
cost/benefit analyses of the myriad interests of each side's
allies in the Kivus. End comment.
GARVELINK