Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KINSHASA378
2009-04-16 11:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EUGENE SERUFULI:

Tags:  PREL PGOV PREF MOPS CG 
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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9490
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0021
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0741
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000378 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MOPS CG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EUGENE SERUFULI:
RWANDOPHONIE; IDP RETURNS, AND INDIANS IN MONUC

REF: KINSHASA 33

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000378

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MOPS CG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EUGENE SERUFULI:
RWANDOPHONIE; IDP RETURNS, AND INDIANS IN MONUC

REF: KINSHASA 33

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During an April 14 meeting with Ambassador, Eugene
Serufuli, former RCD Governor of North Kivu, clearly
advocated for a decoupage of North Kivu into a
Rwandophone-dominated Petit Nord and a Nande-dominated Grand
Nord. He cautioned against viewing ethnic relations in
Eastern DRC through the prism of Hutu-Tutsi relations in
Rwanda, noting that Hutus and Tutsis have historically been
allies in the Kivus to protect their interests vis-a-vis
other ethnic groups. The FARDC, in Serufuli's opinion, would
not need RDF support for Kimia II operations in South Kivu.
Serufuli called for Congolese IDPs in North Kivu to go home.
He claimed that most of North Kivu was now safe enough for
returns and he criticized NGOs for having a vested interest
in not encouraging IDPs to return home. Ambassador responded
that, while we also supported IDP returns, the security
situation in many areas was still precarious. Responding to
a question about possible Indian withdrawal from MONUC,
Serufuli acknowledged that it was in no one's interest to
provoke the withdrawal. He maintained that the problem
stemmed primarily from FARDC organizational weaknesses. End
Summary.

The Situation in the East
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador, DCM, and PolCouns met April 14 with
Eugene Serufuli Ngayabaseka, President of the Congolese
National Electric Company (SNEL) and former RCD Governor of
North Kivu. Serufuli acknowledged that there had been
persistent mistrust of Rwandan intentions within the GDRC,
including by President Kabila himself. However, Kabila,
according to Serufuli, is now resolute in maintaining the
positive momentum between the two countries. Now, both
governments need to reinforce diplomatic and commercial
progress.


3. (C) Responding to Ambassador's question whether Rwandan
forces would be invited to participate in Kimia II operations
against the FDLR in South Kivu, Serufuli said the FARDC, with

MONUC support, could carry out the operations against "a
weakened FDLR" without RDF support. Rwandan involvement had
been necessary in the North Kivu operations to "neutralize
the CNDP." Without joint FARDC-RDF action, Serufuli
expressed doubt as to whether the majority of the CNDP forces
would have supported the operations.

Rwandophonie in North Kivu
--------------


4. (C) Turning to the question of increasing influence by
Rwandophonie elements in North Kivu, Serufuli claimed that
discussion of decoupage -- administratively separating the
Grand Nord from the Petit Nord -- had arisen in response to
Nande discrimination against Hutus and Tutsis in the
province. Ideally, Serufuli posited, authorities should
ensure conciliation efforts, but, in reality, they have not
succeeded. Serufuli added that each side should therefore
maintain political control of the areas in which it has a
majority: Nande in the Grand Nord and Rwandophones in the
Petit Nord. Serufuli said that, although a division of North
Kivu was not part of the GDRC's decentralization process, it
could be achieved by simply passing a new law.


5. (C) Serufuli flatly said that the Nande, in his opinion,
wanted to maintain near-complete control of North Kivu.
Nande leaders are only satisfied if they control the reins of
power in Goma, Serufuli added. Serufuli maintained that many
Nande, such as those in Rutshuru, were comfortable in a
multi-ethnic Petit Nord. Unfortunately, Nande from the Beni
and Butembo areas discriminated against these ethnic kin.


6. (C) Serufuli cautioned against viewing Congolese ethnic
dynamics, particularly Hutu-Tutsi relations, through the
prism of Rwanda's ethnic politics. According to Serufuli,
ethnic relations in Rwanda (and to some extent in Burundi)
were perceived as a zero-sum game: either you were in power

KINSHASA 00000378 002 OF 003


or you were on the outside. Acknowledging that there were
some extremist Congolese Hutus and Tutsis, Serufuli
maintained that the overwhelming majority from these groups,
which are both small minorities in the overall DRC context,
understood that they had to cooperate to ensure their
political interests vis-a-vis other ethnic groups, i.e., the
Nande.

Encouraging IDP Returns
--------------


7. (C) Serufuli thanked the USG for its humanitarian and
diplomatic assistance in working towards stabilizing the
Eastern DRC. Particularly in November 2008, when the
security and humanitarian situations were precarious, senior
levels at the Embassy had been active. Now, in Serufuli's
opinion, more needed to be done to encourage IDPs to return
home in North Kivu, given improving security. There were
approximately 100,000 IDPs around Goma who should go home, in
Serufuli's opinion. Serufuli said he had traveled to the
region several times in an effort to facilitate IDP returns,
claiming that his efforts had already resulted in the return
of approximately 30,000 IDPs. Noting that land tenure issues
had been problematic even before the conflict in the East
erupted, Serufuli said this should not slow down efforts to
achieve IDP returns and, eventually, return of Congolese
refugees from neighboring countries.


8. (C) Serufuli lamented that many NGOs simply preferred to
keep IDPs in their camps, with the idea of "no camp, no job."
Thanks to the recent operations against the FDLR, there were
many areas of North Kivu to which it was safe for IDPs to
return.


9. (C) To accomplish this, the GDRC was asking donors to
help bilaterally, but also through re-energizing
DRC-Rwandan-UNHCR and DRC-Ugandan-UNHCR tripartite
discussions. This effort required additional funding, as
well as a stepped-up sensitization campaign. MONUC could
help with logistics, but its mandate did not include
IDP/refugee issues, except for civilian protection actions.


10. (C) Ambassador responded that the USG also supported IDP
returns, but only if the security situation was stable.
Unfortunately, on-going insecurity in some parts of the Kivus
posed problems for IDP returns, as well as for NGOs working
in the area. Ambassador noted that, while some NGOs might be
overly cautious, the larger, more established NGOs recognize
that IDPs should return home when the situation improves.
Ambassador recommended first convincing the UNHCR that the
situation had improved, as many NGOs will look to the UN
agency for guidance on IDP returns. Ambassador highlighted
on-going USG humanitarian assistance to Eastern DRC, pointing
to the more than $100 million in aid that we provided in

2008.

Indians in MONUC
--------------


11. (C) Ambassador raised the possibility that India would
withdraw all its troops and assets from MONUC, emphasizing
that Indian support was absolutely vital for MONUC's ability
to help stabilize Eastern DRC. Serufuli admitted that an
Indian withdrawal would be detrimental to all. Serufuli
portrayed the threatened Indian withdrawal as an
organizational problem within a badly structured and poorly
run FARDC. Some senior level FARDC and GDRC officials have
developed a certain mistrust towards the Indian contingent,
based on real or perceived slights. Serufuli said that in
order for the situation to improve, it would be necessary to
restore the local population's confidence in MONUC, which has
often served as a scapegoat for FARDC/GDRC ineffectiveness.
Ambassador agreed, but added that there most also be a will
at the political level to resolve the impasse.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Congo observers are well aware that Serufuli has
been on a campaign to reassert Rwandophone domination in
North Kivu for several months (reftel),perhaps through a
formal decoupage process or perhaps through more informal,
backroom political pressure. What is also clear is that
Serufuli would not undertake this campaign without backing

KINSHASA 00000378 003 OF 003


from the Presidency. While Embassy Kigali is in a better
position to comment on Rwandan intentions, the creation of a
Rwandophone-dominated North Kivu provincial government could
serve both Kigali's and Kinshasa's interests. The big
question, of course, is how the "losers" in such a power play
would react. Several prominent Nande have recently lost
their positions or their positions are under threat: former
Foreign Minister Mbusa was dismissed in October; North Kivu
Governor Paluku is allegedly under significant pressure from
Kinshasa to resign; and even the well respected head of the
Amani Process and President of the National Electoral
Commission Father Malu Malu has reportedly come under some
criticism. In South Kivu, which would not be affected by any
decoupage process, some argue that senior Bashi are being
sidelined, most notably, Vital Kamerhe. Serufuli's
observations about the IDP situation bear close monitoring;
while his premise about improving security in North Kivu is
correct, we certainly do not want to facilitate the premature
return of IDPs to areas that are not suitably safe. End
Comment.
GARVELINK