THE CNDP RIFT: VIEWS OF TWO PROMINENT EASTERNERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000033

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PREF CG
SUBJECT: THE CNDP RIFT: VIEWS OF TWO PROMINENT EASTERNERS
IN KINSHASA

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In separate meetings with PolCouns and PolOff on
January 8 and 9, Eugene Serufuli, former North Kivu Governor,
and Enoch Ruberangabo Sebineza, a South Kivu civil society
activist and former parliamentarian, discussed the recent
CNDP split, as well as the prospects of joint DRC-Rwandan
military operations against the FDLR. Serufuli, who has
influence within the GDRC, implied that the GDRC preferred to
deal with Bosco as its CNDP interlocutor instead of Nkunda.
Rwanda, in Serufuli's view, also considered Bosco more
willing to address the FDLR problem. Sebineza criticized
both Bosco and Nkunda, noting that their dispute was personal
and clan-based, not ideologically-driven. Serufuli welcomed
the recent warming of relations between the DRC and Rwanda.
Sebineza voiced concerns about FDLR reprisals on the local
population, if the group is attacked. End Summary.


Improving DRC-Rwandan Relations
--------------


2. (C) PolCouns and PolOff met January 8 with Eugene
Serufuli, former RCD Governor of North Kivu and current head
of the Congolese electricity parastatal SNEL to discuss
improving relations between the DRC and Rwanda and the
festering rift within the CNDP. Serufuli claimed that, at
the nadir of relations between Rwanda and the DRC several
months ago, he warned President Kabila that the international
community had lost faith in the GDRC's regional diplomacy.
Serufuli bluntly stated that the mistrust between the two
countries "had come from our side," with Kabila eager to
restore diplomatic relations with Burundi and Uganda, but
much less so with Rwanda. Now, in Serufuli's view, there was
a new optimism surrounding DRC-Rwandan relations.


CNDP Split: Nkunda as Extremist, Bosco as Conciliator
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Serufuli stressed that the CNDP will cease to be a
problem once the DRC and Rwanda reach a resolution of
outstanding issues between them. Certain CNDP members, he
said, are pleased at the apparent reconciliation between the
two countries. He then proceeded to detail the problems
associated with Nkunda, who he jokingly characterized as "the
devil's emissary on earth." Nkunda was erratic; even Nkunda
himself did not clearly know what he wanted. All parties,
including Rwanda, were frustrated by Nkunda's
unpredictability. Bosco "was right" to take action, in
Serufuli's opinion. Serufuli opined that Rwanda would be
able to influence Bosco, unlike Nkunda who, according to
Serufuli, once hung up on Rwandan CHOD James Kabarebe. He
added that 80 percent of CNDP soldiers came from Masisi, and
were therefore loyal to Bosco. According to Serufuli,
Nkunda, on the contrary, only enjoyed the support of his
narrow clan and family circles in the Rutshuru area.
Serufuli labeled Nkunda an extremist, claiming that many
Hutus supported Bosco. Interestingly, Serufuli maintained
that PARECO would gladly decouple itself from the FDLR and
join Bosco.


4. (C) Serufuli claimed that Bosco, in contrast to Nkunda,
was ready to support joint RDF/FARDC operations against the
FDLR and would even fully support the Amani process.
Serufuli pointed out that because of this rift, the CNDP
negotiating team at Nairobi no longer had any legitimacy.
When PolCouns pressed Serufuli about the ramifications of
Bosco's ICC indictment, he admitted that Bosco "would have to
respond to the ICC charges." (Comment: His implication was,
however, that the ICC indictment should not disqualify Bosco
for some kind of leadership role within the CNDP. End Note).



Rwandophones and Nandes
--------------


5. (C) Serufuli emphasized that the ultimate question in
North Kivu did not center around the GDRC-CNDP conflict or
Hutu-Tutsi relations. Rather, the intra-Rwandophone tension
between Hutus and Tutsis simply perpetuated Nande control in

KINSHASA 00000033 002 OF 003


the province. North Kivu, he opined, might function better
split up between a Nande-dominated Grand Nord, with various
other ethnicities in the minority, and a
Rwandophone-dominated (Hutu/Tutsi) Petit Nord, also with
significant minority ethnic groups.


Personal, Clan Rivalries Behind Nkunda-Bosco Split
-------------- --------------


6. (C) During a January 9 meeting with PolCouns and PolOff,
Enoch Ruberangabo Sebineza, a former parliamentarian, South
Kivu civil society activist and member of the Banyamulenge
community, and current President of the Congolese steel
parastatal Sosider discussed the Nkunda-Bosco split, as well
as the FDLR. Sebineza said that, while the division in the
CNDP is real, the source is not ideological, but rather
related to local rivalries, clan differences, and personal
discord between Nkunda and Bosco. According to Sebineza,
Bosco also resented Nkunda's apparent unwillingness to
publicly demand that the ICC dismiss its indictment of Bosco.
Reconciliation between the two would be very difficult,
particularly following their public airing of grievances.
Contradicting speculation among some of our interlocutors and
in the media, however, Sebineza opined that Nkunda would
never hand over Bosco to MONUC. There was a certain level of
solidarity between the two and Nkunda would undoubtedly lose
significant support from the Tutsi community, if he turned
Bosco over to international authorities.


7. (C) Sebineza recounted a recent event to emphasize that
local disputes were at the heart of this split. A group of
journalists traveling to meet with Bosco were stopped at a
CNDP barrier at Kimoka, the commander of which was
Banyamulenge. Bosco dispatched some soldiers to Kimoka,
stressing to the South Kivu commander that he should stay
clear of this dispute between North Kivu interests. The
commander apparently allowed the journalists to pass.


8. (C) Rwanda's hand, according to Sebineza, was also behind
the split, although he could not explain how Kigali would
benefit from the rift. Sebineza implied that, once the GoR
had used Bosco to depose Nkunda, Rwanda would then distance
itself from Bosco. Rwanda's security and political interests
in the Kivus, Sebineza added, went far beyond mere support
for an individual.


9. (C) The bottom line, in Sebineza's view, is that both
Nkunda and Bosco have only created problems for the Tutsi
community in the DRC, stirring up hatred on the part of other
ethnic communities towards the Tutsis. He underlined that
certain influential Masisi politicians and businessmen were
also frustrated by the on-going conflict. He stressed that
Tutsis cannot adopt an attitude of "defense at all costs,"
which only radicalized the population; he noted that such
radicalization has occurred within his own Banyamulenge
community in the High Plateau, where many people view Kabila
and the GDRC as their sworn enemy.


FDLR Will Carry Out Reprisals, If Attacked
--------------


10. (C) Turning to the FDLR, Sebineza said that the GDRC
possesses neither the will nor the means to drive the FDLR
from the DRC. He warned that, if attacked in a large-scale
operation, the FDLR would certainly carry out reprisals
against the local population, along the lines of LRA
reprisals in northeastern DRC. Sebineza stressed that a
precarious, but stable, equilibrium between the FDLR and the
Banyamulenge community in South Kivu had developed over the
last decade, with neither side provoking the other. He
claimed that FDLR forces sometimes even protect Banyamulenge
pastures and cattle from the Mai Mai, as well as providing
munitions to the Banyamulenge armed group FRF.


11. (C) To explain the modus vivendi between the FDLR and
the Banyamulenge community, Sebineza offered up several
theories: the strength of the FRF; FDLR fear that Rwanda
would retaliate if it began targeting Tutsis; and the
possibility that anti-Tutsi ideology was becoming less
relevant to the group over time.


Comment
--------------

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12. (C) Despite Serufuli's assertion that the vast majority
of North Kivu Tutsis support Bosco, from Kinshasa and from
various other sources, it remains unclear whether Bosco or
Nkunda holds the upper hand. Serufuli's claims that Bosco
would address ethnic problems better than Nkunda seems
off-base, given Bosco's background and Nkunda's efforts
(admittedly opportunistic) to include other ethnic
communities in the CNDP. The split might indeed represent
some kind of DRC-Rwandan agreement to deal simultaneously
with Nkunda (Kabila's nemesis) and the FDLR (the GoR's
primary concern). Serufuli, who enjoys a close relationship
with Kabila, was clearly selling the GDRC's ideas on how to
move forward to solve the conflict in the East. Sebineza's
overriding concern is the protection of Banyamulenge
interests. His uncompromising anti-CNDP and anti-Rwandan
attitude is therefore not surprising. His caution about
provoking FDLR reprisals should be viewed in this context.
GARVELINK