MONUC -- NO EASY SOLUTION FOR ANTI-LRA OPERATIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000324

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM MOPS CG
SUBJECT: MONUC -- NO EASY SOLUTION FOR ANTI-LRA OPERATIONS

REF: KINSHASA 292

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (S) Summary: According to MONUC Kinshasa, the FARDC will
deploy up to three new brigades in Haut-Ulele for Operation
Lightning Thunder (OLT). Rudia II operations against the LRA
will assume a more aggressive stance, as well as deploying
Joint Protection Teams to help augment civilian protection
efforts. OCHA estimates that the population of many towns in
the region have swollen, as IDPs seek refuge in numbers.
According to MONUC figures, the LRA may have abducted enough
civilians (some becoming new recruits) since September 2008
to more than offset the number of casualties it has suffered.
A senior MONUC military commander warned that OLT had
failed, and would only succeed if MONUC received additional
intelligence from western nations to help locate and
neutralize the various LRA groups. End Summary.


2. (C) MONUC political officers, including Senior Political
Advisor Christian Manahl, recently provided us with an
update/analysis of current anti-LRA operations in Haut-Ulele
District. The FARDC has announced plans to deploy up to
three additional brigades (reftel) in Haut-Ulele (Comment:
based on MONUC sources, it is unclear from where and whether
the FARDC will be able to supply three brigades, particularly
when the FARDC is ramping up for major operations in South
Kivu to undertake Kimia II. We concur with this view. End
comment).


3. (SBU) Rudia II, according to MONUC, will assume a more
robust posture than Rudia I, which was limited to containing
the LRA. MONUC, with 500 troops hunkered down at its base
just outside Dungu, will also take on a more pro-active
stance, deploying forces to Dungu town, Duru, and Faradje.
In addition, MONUC has committed to deploy Joint Protection
Teams (JPT) to Haut-Ulele. This will replicate the JPT model
in North Kivu, whereby MONUC officers from various divisions
-- child protection, political affairs, and human rights --
will deploy alongside military personnel in an effort to
enhance civilian protection.


4. (SBU) In response to PolCouns' question, Manahl said
that, in so far as there was any pattern to LRA movements,
there were three rough outlines: attacks southeast of Dungu,
along the Watsa-Faradje road, a commercial route; attacks
just north of Dungu to replenish supplies; and a group of LRA
forces near Doruma to serve as the forward camp for a
possible escape into the Central African Republic. None of
the groups were seeking encounters, rather they were avoiding
contact with the FARDC.


5. (SBU) OHCA estimates that there are approximately 180,000
IDPs in the region due to the conflict. The LRA has attacked
22 villages, "emptying many areas," according to OCHA. The
population in larger towns has swelled, as IDPs seek shelter
in numbers. Doruma's population, for example, has increased
from 8,000 to 18,000-20,000 since the December operations
began.


6. (SBU) Since the operations began, approximately 900
civilians have been killed, as many as 1,100 since the
upsurge in LRA activity in September 2008. Particularly
troubling, in MONUC's view, is the number of abductees since
September: approximately 1,200. MONUC estimates that the
LRA released approximately half of this number, but that
would still leave several hundred new recruits. This figure,
in Manahl's view, might almost balance out the 400-600 LRA
forces, which the UPDF claims to have killed or captured.


7. (SBU) Manahl warned that, with the withdrawal of most
UPDF troops, there could be a spike in LRA abductions to
resupply their ranks. Manahl noted that we are in a familiar
cycle of LRA reprisals and abductions, a cycle that has
lasted for over 20 years. The LRA, according to Manahl, was
now composed almost 100% of abductees, with virtually none of
the original Ugandan rebels remaining in the group. A
vicious circle was compounding the humanitarian situation:
as attacks continue, albeit on a smaller scale, humanitarian
organizations pull back, assistance decreases, and an
information vacuum develops.


8. (S) Separately, MONUC General Eric Arnaud provided a
blunt assessment of anti-LRA operations: from a diplomatic
and political standpoint, Operation Lightning Thunder has
been a success; from a military standpoint, "it was a

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failure." Although the LRA was now dispersed into smaller
units, it was virtually impossible to locate the groups in
such a large, sparsely populated area. Arnaud maintained
that, unless FARDC/MONUC possessed specific intelligence on
the groups, more troops would do nothing for the military
equation. Glancing at UK and U.S. diplomats, Arnaud said
that "there were countries sitting around the table," which
had the technological ability to track down Kony." Only
"technological arrows" would yield results in the hunt for
the LRA leader.


9. (C) Comment: A broad spectrum of our contacts -- MONUC,
GDRC, and even human rights groups -- acknowledge that
removing Kony is the only hope for a quick resolution of OLT.
Otherwise, the LRA is likely to play for time, avoiding
confrontation, and even feigning interest in a return to
peace talks. The LRA is today perhaps less of a regional
security threat, but it will continue to prey on vulnerable
civilian populations. Absent killing or capturing Kony, what
is needed most is an aggressive containment policy to
steadily exert pressure on the LRA.


10. (C) Comment Continued: It appears that the UPDF has
succeeded in its security objective of reducing the threat to
Uganda posed by the LRA. However for the DRC, the LRA
remains a seemingly growing threat to the population in
Haut-Ulele, "a wounded lion," as one observer noted. Public
support for anti-LRA operations will therefore remain
relatively steady, although not open-ended. For the GDRC,
the prospect of continued civilian depredations remains the
biggest challenge. From a pure national security viewpoint,
the LRA does not represent a threat to regime stability in
Kinshasa. We will need to continue to urge the GDRC to stay
the course to avoid a return to the former status quo. End
Comment.

GARVELINK