Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KINSHASA323
2009-04-06 08:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

OPERATION KIMIA II - MORE STICK, LESS CARROT?

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG 
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VZCZCXRO0222
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0323 0960810
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 060810Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9426
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000323 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: OPERATION KIMIA II - MORE STICK, LESS CARROT?

REF: Kinshasa 306

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000323

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: OPERATION KIMIA II - MORE STICK, LESS CARROT?

REF: Kinshasa 306


1. (SBU) Summary: MONUC and the FARDC are ramping up preparation
for Operation Kimia II with an aggressive campaign to increase
steadily pressure on the FDLR. In contrast to Operation Umoja Wetu,
the new operation will not include DDRRR outreach efforts to
convince Rwandan rebels to return home peacefully. FDLR fighters
can still surrender to DDRRR offices, but "the time for negotiations
is past," according to sources in MONUC. End Summary.

More Push, Less Pull
--------------


2. (SBU) Bruno Donat, Head of Office for the DDRRR program in the
eastern DRC, recently told International Facilitation members that
the Joint Operation Directive for Operation Kimia II against the
FDLR limits DDRRR activities. Donat contrasted the directive with
Operation Umoja Wetu, in which DDRRR representatives were able to
approach FDLR elements in the field with MONUC escort protection in
order to encourage them to surrender/repatriate. Noting threats
against his personnel (at least two DDRRR staff or support personnel
were killed while encouraging FDLR combatants to surrender),Donat
concluded that he could not operate outreach programs to the FDLR
without protection. He added that the Force Commander had never
favored the DDRRR outreach program, but he had been able to convince
SRSG Alan Doss to overrule Gaye during Operation Umoja Wetu.
Despite appeals from Donat and evidence that the previous outreach
had yielded results, Doss declined to overrule Gaye for Operation
Kimia II.


3. (SBU) In a subsequent conversation with the International
Facilitation, including Goma PolOff, Donat said Gaye wants MONUC to
adopt a more aggressive stance and avoid sending "confusing"
messages to the FDLR. Other MONUC sources confirm that "the time
for negotiations is past" and FDLR elements must appreciate that a
decision to resist may be fatal. They should be dissuaded from the
mistaken belief that they can negotiate their surrender. DDRRR
offices will remain open and able to receive FDLR, who wish to
surrender, but outreach efforts will no longer be conducted. In
Donat's opinion, this approach is a mistake and suggested that
donors may want to appeal for a continuation of outreach efforts.
He noted, however, that he would soon be returning to his regular UN
job (he was seconded to MONUC to fill the gap in the DDRRR office).
His successor will be Jean-Marc Tafanie.


4. (SBU) Another DDRRR official told us that an FDLR corporal who
has been in the DRC since 1994 had surrendered to DDRRR in recent
days. In his debrief, he said he made this decision after
concluding that the FDLR would not be able to negotiate the terms of
its return to Rwanda. Since military victory was not possible, he
decided to defect rather than spend the rest of his life in a futile
struggle.


5. (SBU) Comment: We are not sanguine that Operation Kimia II will
succeed in eliminating or even seriously damaging the FDLR, given
the relatively light footprint of Operation Kimia I. It may push
them deeper into the forest and make their existence less
comfortable, but experience shows that most rebels will try to wait
out the operation, and afterwards return to previous areas of
influence. DDRRR activities during Operation Umoja Wetu
demonstrated that sensitization/outreach programs have a role, but
the number of FDLR who voluntarily entered DDRRR was small relative
to the estimated FDLR presence.


6. (SBU) Comment Continued: On the other hand, the new
rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda and the apparent
willingness on the part of the GDRC to work against the FDLR may
signal preparation of a more robust and effective operation (Note:
Press coverage of the recent meeting between the DRC and Rwandan
Foreign Ministers -- see reftel -- speculated that the two countries
might prepare a second joint operation against the FDLR. End note).
In these efforts, DDRRR and MIST deployment will still have an
important role, especially in the longer term as MONUC and the FARDC
gain a better appreciation of the use of psychological operations.
End Comment.

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