Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KINSHASA322
2009-04-06 08:06:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

FARDC INTEGRATION PROCEEDS, HALTINGLY

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS CG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHKI #0322/01 0960806
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 060806Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9424
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000322 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS CG
SUBJECT: FARDC INTEGRATION PROCEEDS, HALTINGLY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000322

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS CG
SUBJECT: FARDC INTEGRATION PROCEEDS, HALTINGLY


1. (SBU) Summary: Father Apollinaire Malu Malu recently shared data
(as of March 30) with the International Facilitation on North Kivu
integration activities. According to his data, around 11,000 of the
approximately 28,000 persons who have undergone some form of
military integration since January are as yet "unidentified." Malu
Malu insists that government officials have accelerated their
efforts to complete identification as soon as possible. For the
moment, however, a large number of armed men present in North Kivu
in FARDC uniforms are essentially behaving as bandits. Malu Malu
has not yet secured GDRC funding necessary to undertake
corresponding integration activities in South Kivu. The Hutu
(Mugabo/Museveni) and Nande (La Fontaine) wings of PARECO remain
dissatisfied with the overall state of affairs. They have been
expressing to us what others are doubtless thinking: the process is
stacked in favor of the CNDP and against the other armed groups.
End Summary.

Haphazard North Kivu Integration
--------------


2. (SBU) Father Apollinaire Malu Malu, the GDRC's point person for
integration issues, shared with us what appear to be the most
up-to-date (as of March 30) figures on North Kivu FARDC integration
activities. According to the data, around 11,000 of the
approximately 28,000 persons who have undergone some form of
military integration since January are as yet "unidentified." There
is no formal record of who they are, to what unit they are assigned,
of what force they previously were part, and whether or not they are
indeed Congolese or otherwise eligible to be FARDC members. This
means that there is no way for them to show up on any payroll,
though commanders are believed to be collecting pay based on gross
numbers. The result of all this is predictable: a large increase
in acts of banditry committed both in the countryside and in towns
(including Goma itself),threats of systematic looting by FARDC in
the northern and central parts of the province, and confusion over
rank and command structures.


3. (SBU) Malu Malu insists that government officials have
accelerated their efforts to complete identification as soon as
possible. Currently, however, a large number of armed men are
present in North Kivu in FARDC uniforms who are essentially behaving

as bandits, while the better-structured (though of course nominally
no longer extant) armed groups, particularly CNDP and the Hutu wing
of PARECO, retain much of their identity, cohesion, and command
structure within a vague FARDC framework.


4. (SBU) However, even the CNDP was unable to adhere to the
requisite one fighter/one weapon rule: 4,611 CNDP fighters entered
"accelerated" integration (for which having a weapon in working
order was supposed to be a requirement),presenting 2,352 weapons.
Those without a weapon were all supposed to go into "classical"
integration, where only three CNDP fighters actually ended up, along
with one FARDC soldier (Comment: North Kivu integration has
therefore been carried out with no reference to any criteria, with
virtually all CNDP and PARECO comers directed into accelerated
integration. End Comment). There are also rumors among the other
armed groups of concealed CNDP units and hidden arms caches,
including heavy weapons.


5. (SBU) Malu Malu said the question of military payrolls should be
dealt with rationally. As he pointed out, the Independent Electoral
Commission managed a huge payroll nationwide with few problems,
mostly by taking advantage of the cash-transfer facilities afforded
by the mobile-phone service providers, which ensured that funds went
directly to the employees.

... And No South Kivu Integration
--------------


6. (SBU) Malu Malu, however, has not yet secured the GDRC funding
necessary to undertake corresponding integration activities in South
Kivu. On February 28, the South Kivu armed groups (with the notable
exception of the FRF) undertook to complete integration and cease to
exist as armed groups within 34 days, i.e., by April 4. To date,
nothing specific has happened.


7. (SBU) South Kivu integration, once it starts, will differ
considerably from the process in North Kivu, partly because the CNDP
has to a large extent been the motor of integration in the latter
and has no real equivalent in South Kivu. At 35,000, the declared
strength of all the South Kivu armed groups (not including the FRF)
is a gross exaggeration, and those who will come in with weapons are
likely to be far fewer in relation to the total than in North Kivu.
This means that, if things are handled with at least a bit more
rigor than in North Kivu, most South Kivu armed group elements will
go into classical integration: barracks, training, and assignment to

KINSHASA 00000322 002 OF 002


recognizable units. MONUC is preparing to support the four proposed
regroupment centers, which will include the already well-equipped
Luberizi complex.

Armed Group Mutterings
--------------


8. (SBU) The Hutu (Mugabo/Museveni) and Nande (La Fontaine) wings
of PARECO are dissatisfied with the state of affairs, and they have
been expressing to us what others are doubtless thinking: the
process is stacked in favor of CNDP and against the other armed
groups. The GDRC-CNDP agreement calls, for example, for automatic
transfer of rank upon joining the FARDC. The armed group agreements
are more equivocal: rank transfers will be considered (though Malu
Malu insists they will be granted anyway). Moreover, CNDP rank
transfers have in fact already been recognized: CNDP colonels are
deployed as "Sector" or "Axis" commanders, whereas others, including
La Fontaine who claims to be a Colonel, are still waiting.


9. (SBU) Comment: The issue of rank is important, of course, to
the individuals concerned and to those under their direct command,
who will assume that their needs will be better attended to if they
can enter FARDC attached to a senior commander. But it goes beyond
these concerns: what PARECO (and doubtless others) are saying is
that to get respect, you have to be a successful rebel. Loyalty to
the GRDC is not enough, many believe. The current
pro-"Rwandophonie" trend in North Kivu is evidence of this, they
say. The CNDP, which declared itself outside of GDRC control, is
now receiving benefits and patronage, while other groups and their
communities have received far less attention. This trend has not
yet led to an open rebellion among the armed groups and their
constituents, but there are mutterings and portents that the GDRC
would do well to heed this tendency.


10. (SBU) Comment continued: As Malu Malu well understands, a key
prerequisite for sorting out this situation is for all units to be
regrouped in barracks, identified, and assigned to recognizable,
stable units under a clear command structure. We are a long way
from accomplishing this. Consolidation of military command and
control, which is admittedly showing some signs of progress in
certain parts of North Kivu, needs to accelerate, otherwise some
kind of new and hard-to-control fragmentation could occur.


11. (SBU) Comment continued: For now, PARECO and others are eager
to be viewed (however implausibly, based on their past history) as
capable and savvy allies in the campaign against the FDLR. However,
their links and affinities with the latter cannot have been swept
away so easily. This does not signal an imminent collapse of the
nascent peace. Nevertheless, as certain armed groups begin to
perceive that they have been marginalized, serious obstacles to
durable stability could re-emerge. End Comment.

GARVELINK