GDRC-CNDP FINAL AGREEMENT SIGNED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000272

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG
SUBJECT: GDRC-CNDP FINAL AGREEMENT SIGNED

REF: KINSHASA 264

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)


1. (C) Summary: As expected (reftel),but with little
specific advance notice, the GDRC and CNDP signed an
agreement March 23 in Goma, effectively ending the CNDP's
status as a politico-military group and committing it to
transform into a political party. Minister of International
and Regional Cooperation Raymond Tshibanda played an
assertive role on behalf of the GDRC and signed for the
Government, while Secretary-General Desire Kamanzi signed for
the CNDP. All the other officially-recognized armed groups
of North and South Kivu (with the notable exception of the
FRF) also signed yet another in what has now grown into a
series of agreements, each of which ostensibly puts a similar
end to their armed status. International representation at
the event included the two Facilitators (Obasanjo and Mkapa),
SRSG Doss, and USG personnel. End Summary.

Elements of the GDRC-CNDP Agreement
--------------


2. (C) The final agreement between the GDRC and CNDP, on the
face of it, appears to address many of the CNDP's traditional
concerns, while committing the latter, for its part, to cease
its operation as a politico-military group and transform
itself into a legal political party. The agreement also
commits the CNDP to integrate its fighters into the FARDC and
the national police force. Other notable elements from the
text follow below (full text of the agreement to follow
septel).

-- The GDRC commits to free CNDP "political prisoners" and
ensure their return home.

-- The GDRC agrees to promulgate an amnesty law, conforming
to "international law," and to take into consideration CNDP
concerns with the draft amnesty law, as it was circulated
last year. (Note: The "international law" clause appears to
refer to the exclusion of Jean-Bosco Ntaganda ("Bosco") from
any amnesty, to which Bosco reportedly objected during the
course of the negotiations. Bosco allegedly threatened to
pull the CNDP from the talks if this language was not
removed. Others apparently persuaded him that it did not
make any difference whether this language was included or
not, as international law could not be circumvented by an act
of Parliament. End Note).

-- The parties agree to create a national mechanism charged
with leading a reconciliation effort among the Congolese
people, as well as to create a "ministerial structure"
responsible for interior security, local affairs, and
reconciliation (Note: This leaves the option of either
creating a new ministry charged with these responsibilities,
or simply subsuming the responsibilities under existing
ministries. End Note).

-- The creation of a local police force ("police de
proximite"),but as a part of the national police force (PNC)
(Note: Some of the issues and controversies surrounding this
concept were reported reftel. Other than specifying that
this force will not be constituted on ethnic grounds, while
also confirming that it will reflect the "social diversity"
of the localities to which it is deployed, little mention is
made of what its tasks are to be. A later clause does
suggest, however, that, as noted reftel, it will have
responsibility for ensuring the safety of returning refugees
and IDP's. End Note).

-- The GDRC appears to have agreed (however vaguely) to take
under advisement CNDP proposals for redrawing administrative
boundaries, including specific reference to the CNDP's
"decoupage" proposal (Note: This pertains to efforts by
Rwandophonie advocates to separate the predominantly
Hutu/Tutsi Petit Nord from the Grand Nord, where the Nande
are the majority ethnic group. End Note).

-- The agreement calls for the rapid return of all Congolese
refugees and IDPs. To achieve this goal, the GDRC agrees to
re-launch the tripartite commissions necessary to begin the
process of refugee return.

North and South Kivu Armed Groups Agreement
--------------


KINSHASA 00000272 002 OF 002



3. (C) We have not seen a copy of this text, but according
to the armed group representatives who did see it and were
involved in the (apparently perfunctory) talks with Minister
Tshibanda over the weekend, it includes a renewed commitment
to disarm and to transform themselves into one or more
political parties. It also allegedly asks the GDRC to take
their requests for rank transferability and for public-sector
appointments into account. The GDRC, however, reportedly did
not even countersign the statement in question. North Kivu
Governor Julien Paluku beamed that "as of today, the notion
of armed groups in North and South Kivu is groundless."


4. (C) We noted that there appeared to be rumblings in the
ranks of the armed groups at the ceremony. Having just
arrived from Bukavu, the South Kivu groups had not even seen
the document they were asked to sign. The North Kivu groups,
despite discussions over the weekend with Tshibanda, were
apparently unsatisfied with the vague statement they had been
given. In later private conversations, representatives from
the armed groups expressed frustration and anger that they
had yet again been dragged around and expected to sign the
draft as a fait accompli.

Mediation Disengaged
--------------


5. (C) During the signing ceremony, Obasanjo appeared rather
ungracious, remaining surly throughout and making only the
most perfunctory remarks in English. He also insisted on a
truncated ceremony, maintaining that he had to return to Dar
es Salaam the same day. At the same time, Mkapa delivered an
eloquent speech in Swahili, earning him huge points with the
crowd.


6. (C) Comment: Given the attention that such a GDRC-CNDP
agreement might have attracted several months ago, the
ceremony was rather anti-climatic. While the ceremony
represented a symbolic turning of a huge page in recent
Congolese history, the haste with which it was convened and
dispatched gave it the air of a reluctantly completed chore.
The question now, as always, is whether the GDRC and CNDP
have the will and capacity to implement what has been agreed,
especially given the hasty (and therefore unstable) turn of
events of January to which it can ultimately be traced. It
seems questionable, for example, as to whether the CNDP can
really look forward to a vibrant life as a political party in
the DRC.


7. (C) Comment continued: While perhaps not surprising, it
should be noted that the text of the agreement contained very
little that could be construed as part of the alleged
"Rwandophone" plan bandied about in recent weeks. We believe
the Rwandophones who will ultimately play the most important
roles in North Kivu are not likely to come from the CNDP
camp, but instead would be flexible individuals willing to
work with Kinshasa and Kigali in non-partisan ways. Such a
grouping could easily establish a new political party,
somewhat in the footsteps of RCD, but obviously different in
that it would presumably have good ties with both Kinshasa
and Kigali. Finally, an interesting development is that
Raymond Tshibanda has come into his own as a negotiator and
important player, emerging from behind Kabila's shadow. End
Comment.
GARVELINK