ANNUAL CIWG MEETING - KINSHASA

S E C R E T KINSHASA 000255


NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/ST/CMP AND DS/IP/AF, NAIROBI FOR ESC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2019
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: ANNUAL CIWG MEETING - KINSHASA

REF: STATE 021821

Classified By: RSO Christopher Gu for reasons 1.5 (C) and (D).


1. (S/NF) The Counter Intelligence Working Group (CIWG) met
on 03/13/09. The A/DCM, ORA, DAO, POL, and RSO attended the
meeting.


2. (S/NF) All CIWG members concurred that the technical and
humint capabilities of host country intelligence services are
extremely limited.


3. (S/NF) Financial and material resources for these types of
operations are almost non-existent. The GDRC does have
adequate human resources, but most of their operatives are
poorly trained and do not possess much in terms of technical
equipment.


4. (S/NF) The level of training and experience of the local
services is at best minimal. There are, however, some older
intelligence officers who received extensive training from
the U.S. and other countries during the Mobutu era.


5. (S/NF) The local services have relationships with the
Angolans, South Africans, French, Belgians, U.K., Italians,
Germans, and the U.S. The opportunity to conduct joint
operations is extremely limited.


6. (S/NF) The host country services have no motivation to
target the U.S. presence. There is, however, an
organizational component that is focused on U.S. assets. The
Embassy does share a liaison relationship with local services.


7. (S/NF) Post is not aware of any technical or humint
operations - offensive or defensive - against the U.S. and
believe there is limited motivation or intent of local
services to do so.


8. (S/NF) Third country intelligence services operate in the
DRC, but have not proven to be a significant threat in the
recent past. Third country intelligence services can operate
freely in the DRC and, depending on the level of
sophistication and technological capabilities, could conduct
technical operations if they so desired. Criteria countries
that have diplomatic representatives in the DRC include Iran,
North Korea, and Cuba, however all have an extremely small
presence. The Iranian mission consists of four people, the
Cuban mission consists of one, and the North Koreans have
five people.


9. (S/NF) Post is not aware of any operations being conducted
by any third country against U.S. interests. Several
countries, including France, U.K., Germany, Belgium, South
Africa, Russia, and China have intelligence services
operating in the DRC. Post believes that if they do target
the U.S., it would be an attempt to determine our
economic/political goals and strategies. It is also possible
that the Chinese, French and Belgians may be conducting
limited technical operations such as monitoring our cell
phone conversations for economic information and goals.


10. (S/NF) Conditions do exist that would facilitate a host
government or third country technical attack against the
Embassy. The Embassy is in close proximity to several tall
apartment and office buildings that could easily be used to
launch some sort of technical attack. Housed in these office
buildings are the Chinese Embassy and MONUC. In addition,
the Embassy also shares a common perimeter wall with the
Portuguese Embassy. Members are more concerned with a
possible technical operation from a third country than we are
from the host government because of the lack of resources,
training, and technical capabilities of the local services.
Tapping of hard line phones is impossible since phone lines
do not exist in the DRC which makes cell phones the only
viable means of communication in the DRC. RSO continues to
remind our employees in briefings not to discuss sensitive
matters on cell phones. RSO believes that Post has adequate
physical security measures in place to prevent any type of
clandestine or surreptitious entry. LES and other uncleared
visitors are always escorted in the CAA. Post One and RSO
ensure that procurement procedures for items destined into
the CAA follow the strict CAA procurement policy and there
have been no reportable incidents since the last CIWG meeting.


11. (S/NF) RSO implemented a new and improved LES Counter
Intelligence briefing program in 2007. To maximize
attendance, RSO offered 10 briefings at three different
locations. All LES received a 2 hour briefing outlining CI
awareness, prevention, and reporting procedures. Feedback was
positive from the Embassy community and RSO will again
provide this briefing in 2009.


12. (S/NF) Given the host country's lack of resources and a
relative lack of motivation from third country intelligence
services, CIWG members collectively agree that the SETL
technical threat level should remain at medium.


13. (S/NF) POC is RSO Christopher K. Gu at 342-81-88-44608
(cell) or 934 ext. 2207



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