URGENT DEMARCHE: THREATENED INDIAN PEACEKEEPER

S E C R E T KINSHASA 000195

SIPDIS

FOR IO/PSC (HEATHER VON BEHREN) AND AF/C (CHRISTOPHER
LAMORA)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO UNSC IN CG
SUBJECT: URGENT DEMARCHE: THREATENED INDIAN PEACEKEEPER
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DRC

REF: STATE 18863

Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) In response reftel, Ambassador met March 3 with
Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito. Meeting with President Joseph
Kabila, as instructed reftel, was not possible as Kabila is
away from Kinshasa and is not expected to return until next
week.


2. (S) Prior to meeting with Muzito, Ambassador spoke with
SRSG Alan Doss who briefed on the meeting Sunday between
Kabila and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. Doss asked
Ambassador to emphasize that while progress has been made in
persuading the Indians to reconsider their decision to
withdraw from MONUC, the DRC still needed to make public
statements and reach out to India to reinforce the DRC's
support for India's continued participation in MONUC. Doss
noted that Kabila had indicated to Ban Ki-Moon that Foreign
Minister Alexis Thambwe will soon travel to New Delhi to
deliver a letter to the Indian Government requesting that
India's MONUC contingent remain in the DRC.


3. (SBU) Muzito, who had not been informed of the purpose of
the meeting because of security concerns, was surrounded by
mostly economic advisors, including Jean-Claude Nachega, an
IMF official of Congolese nationality who has been seconded
to the Prime Minister's office to work on pressing economic
issues. Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM. Ambassador
began, noting that the U.S. Government was pleased that there
appears to be progress in persuading India to reverse its
decision to withdraw its forces from MONUC. He stated that
the U.S. viewed India's presence in MONUC, with almost 25% of
all troops, as very important for the success of MONUC's
mission. He also noted that with 23 of 30 aircraft of
MONUC's air wing, it would be difficult for MONUC to maintain
logistical support to the Congolese army (FARDC) in its
operations against the FDLR and the LRA.


4. (SBU) Muzito responded that for some time there had been
dissatisfaction with Indian troops because of their inability
or unwillingness to protect the local population from the
CNDP. He said perhaps the GDRC's analysis had been flawed
regarding the Indians' performance but that at no time did
the GDRC want all the Indians to leave; instead they should
simply redeploy back to India according a pre-established
timetable. He acknowledged that the GDRC has asked the SYG
to not include Indians in MONUC's augmentation of 3,000 new
troops but that this did not mean India was to reduce its
current force level.


5. (C) Comment: The Prime Minister does not usually deal
with foreign policy and was out of his depth. Perhaps not
surprisingly, therefore, Muzito seemed surprised when the
Ambassador said the Foreign Minister was to travel to New
Delhi. Muzito will, however, inform Kabila of the
Ambassador's demarche. We also believe that among the group
of advisors attending the meeting was Kabila's representative
on Muzito's staff; he will certainly inform the president.
At the end of the meeting one of the advisors accompanied the
Ambassador to the press gaggle just outside the PM's office
and insisted on helping with the press conference, ostensibly
to steer questions away from more sensitive issues (in this
case the ambassador's discussion with the PM on the ongoing
political crisis over the anticipated resignation of the
National Assembly president, an issue that will be covered
septel). When the Ambassador told the press that the meeting
had focused on the economic situation, the advisor left. End
comment.
GARVELINK