MONUC ANALYST DISCUSSES EVENTS IN THE KIVUS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000192

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PINR PHUM CG
SUBJECT: MONUC ANALYST DISCUSSES EVENTS IN THE KIVUS,
ORIENTALE; QUESTIONS KABILA-MUSEVENI RELATIONSHIP

REF: KAMPALA 207

Classified By: Ambassador William Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Summary: Johan Peleman, Chief of MONUC's Joint
Mission Analysis Cell, told PolCouns and visiting Washington
analysts on February 26 that, although the joint FARDC-RDF
operations against the FDLR had been successful in North
Kivu, dealing with the FDLR in South Kivu represented
enormous challenges. Rwanda, in Peleman's opinion, would not
intervene in South Kivu due to widespread anti-Rwandan
sentiment amongst the population. MONUC has begun the
process to reposition more troops to South Kivu to carry out
joint operations with the FARDC. Further integration of CNDP
elements into the FARDC remains stuck on political issues,
such as the passing of an amnesty law. In Peleman's view,
the CNDP was no longer a national political threat to the
GDRC. The renegade 85th Brigade has apparently been
redeployed to Masisi, with a rumor that RDF forces are
guarding the brigade's Bisie cassiterite mine in Walikale.
Peleman singled out logistical obstacles as the biggest
challenge in the operations against the LRA. FARDC and
Republican Guard forces continue to exhibit discipline
vis-a-vis the population in Haut Uele. In Peleman's opinion,
the GDRC will not allow the Ugandans to remain in the DRC
indefinitely (reftel). Some in the GDRC, according to
Peleman, believe Uganda has a hidden agenda, including a
repeat of its exploitation of DRC timber and gold resources.
Peleman opined that a complex triangular relationship exists
between Kabila, Kagame, and Museveni, with Museveni clearly
displeased over and distrustful of the new rapprochement
between Kinshasa and Kigali. End summary.


Operations in North Kivu successful
--------------


2. (C) PolCouns and visiting Washington analysts met on
February 26 with Johan Peleman, Chief of MONUC's Joint
Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) -- the organization's
intelligence arm -- to discuss developments in the Kivus and
Orientale Province. Peleman said that MONUC was encouraged
by the degree of cooperation between the GDRC and GoR in
carrying out joint operations against the FDLR. Over 4,500
Rwandans had returned to their native country, including just
under 500 ex-combatants. While there had been a number of
FDLR reprisals, Peleman maintained that they were generally
small in nature, albeit widespread. Human Rights Watch had
claimed that the FDLR had killed up to 100 civilians in one
attack, but MONUC then confirmed that this was the total from
14 attacks in separate locations.

South Kivu: the challenge ahead
--------------


3. (C) Peleman emphasized that dealing with the FDLR in
South Kivu would be a much bigger challenge, and everybody,
especially the FDLR itself, recognized this. The bulk of the
rebel group, including military leader Sylvestre Mudacumura,
had relocated to the extreme southern part of South Kivu. In
this area, there was only one FARDC battalion deployed and it
was composed primarily of Mai Mai elements who were
sympathetic to the FDLR. There are rumors that there are
three RDF brigades across the border at Cyangugu, poised to
enter South Kivu. In Peleman's view, the RDF does not want
to become involved in operations in South Kivu. The Rwandans
could not count on the support of any of the local
population, compared to the support they received from the
Rwandophone community in North Kivu. Some elements of the
South Kivu population, particularly the "old Mai Mai," were
vehemently hostile towards Rwanda. (Comment: In addition, the
Banyamulenge, or South Kivu Tutsis, would also oppose any
Rwandan intervention in South Kivu. End Comment.)

How can MONUC help?
--------------


4. (C) Peleman noted that, because of the reconfiguration of
MONUC forces in response to the CNDP actions in Autumn 2008,
MONUC had only half the number of troops in South Kivu
compared to North Kivu. MONUC was concerned that it does not
have enough forces to adequately carry out its civilian
protection mandate, should the FDLR step up reprisals.
MONUC, according to Peleman, recognizes this problem and is

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planning to re-deploy back to the pre-August 2008
configuration, with more troops in South Kivu. In the
meantime, MONUC will reinvigorate its "mentoring" of FARDC
battalions, which MONUC has trained. A key question in
Peleman's view is: how far is the FARDC willing to go in its
South Kivu operations?

Integration stalled
--------------


5. (C) Peleman said that, while the initial accelerated
integration process successfully integrated as many as 4,000
CNDP troops into the FARDC, that process "is stuck." The
snag, according to Peleman, is a series of unresolved CNDP
demands: passing a law on amnesty; recognition of CNDP
military ranks; and some discretion regarding where CNDP
integrated forces can be deployed. The question of amnesty
is "huge," because, as Peleman pointed out, Nkunda had
consistently warned his commanders that they were all facing
charges based on the CNDP's 2004 attack on Bukavu. Peleman
speculated that Rwanda would ultimately push to ensure
integration was completed at a certain level.

Whither the CNDP?
--------------


6. (C) Peleman acknowledged that there was a residual
element in the CNDP that could very easily revert to
banditry, perhaps even linking up with other negative forces
in the region. However, the days of the CNDP representing a
formidable political threat to the Kinshasa regime were over
now. There will still be issues, which are important for the
rank and file, that need to be worked out, e.g., return of
refugees. But on the whole, the CNDP has been fairly quickly
integrated into Congolese institutions, including the
national police, the ANR (intelligence service),immigration,
and customs. The "old CNDP" was in tatters, with Nkunda and
Rene Abandi under house arrest in Gisenyi and Bertrand
Bisimwa under periodic interrogation by Rwandan security
forces.

Commercial arrangements and the infamous 85th brigade
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Peleman said it is still too early to see how the
joint operations had affected established commercial
interests in the region, especially the profitable trade in
minerals. MONUC had received some reports that Rwandan
troops were guarding the Bisie mine, the largest cassiterite
mine in North Kivu, and formerly under the monopoly of the
FARDC's renegade 85th Brigade. According to Peleman, Colonel
Samy Matumo, commander of the brigade, is in Goma and the
majority of the brigade has been redeployed to Masisi. In
the end, Peleman stressed that there was no common ideology
linking the FDLR and FARDC elements in mining areas -- only
common commercial benefits. The GDRC has apparently asked
MONUC for assistance with anti-fraud investigations in the
region. Peleman added that MONUC would probably include
assistance with the deployment of economic inspectors as part
of its larger stabilization plan for the East.

The Nande and Bashi
--------------


8. (C) Acknowledging that proponents, led by former North
Kivu Governor Serafuli, of strengthened Rwandophone
domination of North Kivu had the upper hand, Peleman
cautioned that two important ethnic groups -- the Nande and
Bashi -- were seemingly disadvantaged politically by the
joint operations. According to Peleman, several prominent
Bashi politicians -- notably National Assembly President
Vital Kamerhe and former Presidential Advisor Marcellin
Cishambo -- had lost or were losing influence (Comment: It
is not clear to what extent these individuals' political
troubles are related to events in the East. End comment).
In Goma, rumors remain rampant that North Kivu Governor
Paluku (a close associate of Kamerhe) will soon be removed
from the scene. While the new dynamics have aggravated
certain ethnic tensions, Peleman did not predict that the
situation would completely deteriorate. Peleman asked
cynically whether the Nande or the Bashi had any capacity to
be a nuisance absent a military force. However, Peleman
warned that some Nande politicians, notably former Foreign
Minister Mbusa, might consider "a Ugandan option," fomenting
problems through the ADF-NALU rebel group.

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Operations Against the LRA: Logistical Hurdles
-------------- -


9. (C) Turning to Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT),Peleman
said the main obstacle to effectively dealing with the LRA
was simply enormous logistical challenges. The joint
operations were pursuing the LRA in an area approximately
100,000 square kilometers in size, with very few roads. Even
with more troops on the ground, what MONUC needed most in the
area was additional helicopter support to help it carry out
its civilian protection mandate. Peleman noted that the
Russian Government, led by its Ambassador in Kinshasa and
military attache in Lagos, were pushing hard to deliver 18
helicopters to MONUC. However, it remained unclear whether
or not these helicopters were really available. (Note:
Reports that India, the sole provider of rotary wing aircraft
in the Kivus, may soon withdraw its forces from MONUC would
severely cripple MONUC operations in the east. End note.)


10. (C) Peleman confirmed what post has heard from a variety
of sources (including MSF, UNHCR, and MONUC officials on the
ground) that the two FARDC and three Republican Guard
battalions stationed in Haut Uele continue to exhibit
unusually high levels of discipline vis-a-vis the civilian
population. Part of this, according to Peleman, was due to
MONUC's housing, feeding, and medical caring for the DRC
forces.

Kabila unhappy with SPLA and Ugandans?
--------------


11. (C) According to Peleman, President Kabila is
disappointed by the SPLA, claiming the South Sudanese army
did not properly close the border soon after the operations
began and asserting that leaks about the operation came from
South Sudan. Peleman reflected that Kabila's perception
could be in response to accusations from some in Ugandan
circles that DRC elements tipped off Kony before the attack.


12. (C) Peleman predicted that the GDRC would not continue
to extend OLT indefinitely because of fundamental suspicions
that the Ugandans has a hidden agenda (reftel). The GDRC,
according to Peleman, was concerned that the Ugandans would
once again seek to profit from the lucrative timber and gold
resources in the region. In addition, the GDRC and GoU
continued to squabble over oil rights in Lake Edward, with
Kabila particularly incensed that former Executive Outcomes
officials were advising the GoU. Kabila, according to
Peleman, held a grudge against Executive Outcomes for their
support for Rwanda in the 1998-2003 war and because of EO's
long history of association with the Mobutu regime.


13. (C) Peleman affirmed that a complex triangle existed
between Kabila, Museveni, and Kagame. Museveni, Peleman
stated, was uneasy over the rapprochement between Kigali and
Kinshasa, primarily based on his hostility towards Kagame.
Museveni could, if he wanted to irritate Kabila, re-ignite
the Ituri rebel groups. Moreover, Museveni could potentially
play another card towards Kinshasa and Kigali: some Nkunda
loyalists were reportedly in Uganda hoping to receive support
from the GoU.


14. (C) Comment: We are not in a position to corroborate or
refute much of the analysis presented by Peleman, a Belgian
citizen who has been with MONUC for some time. His detailed
knowledge of the big issues and leading players in the
eastern Congo and neighboring states, however, is impressive.
End comment.
GARVELINK