BALANCE SHEET ON THE DRC-RWANDAN JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000190

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: BALANCE SHEET ON THE DRC-RWANDAN JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN NORTH KIVU


1. (SBU) Summary: Despite some significant risks and political
fall-out, the joint FARDC-RDF operations were a success on the
whole. Most significantly, the operations have solidified the
rapprochement between the GoR and GDRC, who were at the brink of war
just three months ago. The FDLR is in retreat, weakened, and
without much of its traditional revenue sources around semi-urban
areas, although this could change quickly. The CNDP has been
destroyed as a military or political threat to the GDRC. However,
the operations did not resolve all old problems, while creating some
new ones for the GDRC: persistent criticism from politicians and the
media; the FDLR's presence at many remote mines was not affected;
and continued questions about FARDC capacity to go it alone against
the FDLR, particularly in South Kivu. There are also less clear,
unresolved issues relating to the operations and DRC-Rwandan
rapprochement: how to handle the return of Congolese refugees and
how the apparent shift towards a Rwandophone (Hutu and Tutsi)
dominated North Kivu could alienate other ethnic groups,
particularly the Nande. End Summary.

The achievements
--------------


2. (SBU) The number of FDLR killed or repatriated during Operation
Umoja Wetu was modest, and the campaign fell far short of destroying
the FDLR. It did, however, achieve several notable objectives. On
the military front, FARDC Colonel Mamba, who was closely involved in
the operations, noted that the joint operations were successful in
destroying several FDLR headquarters, breaking the FDLR's hold over
North Kivu mines, removing the CNDP as a threat to the DRC
population and government, and pushing the FDLR further away from
the Rwandan border and into more isolated territory, thus decreasing
the rebel threat.


3. (SBU) Umoja Wetu also allowed the GDRC to re-establish a
government presence in much of the Petit Nord area of North Kivu,
including restoring GDRC access to valuable sources of revenue, such
as the Bunagana customs post. The entire DRC-Rwandan border is more
secure, allowing for better control of commercial and individual
movements and reducing suspicions between neighbors. On the
diplomatic front, the joint operations allowed the GDRC to
demonstrate its willingness to actively implement the Nairobi and
Amani Agreements, even though actual FARDC support to the RDF was
minimal.


4. (SBU) The biggest plus from the operations was a new spirit of
cooperation between the GDRC and GoR. As recently as 3-4 months ago
the two countries appeared to be headed for war, with each
government tacitly (or, sometimes, actively) supporting rebel groups
to irritate its neighbor. The Congolese and Rwandans worked out the
rapprochement together, without any appreciable assistance from the
international community. There was undoubtedly a real desire in
Kinshasa and Kigali to improve relations, opening the way for closer
economic cooperation and growth in the region.

Unresolved issues
--------------


5. (SBU) Many questions remain regarding the separate, but
closely-linked issues of how to effect the return of Tutsi refugees
to the DRC and how to facilitate the return home of IDP's (with the
specter of increased FDLR reprisals). The refugee issue was always
a major point for the CNDP. Where to resettle this community and
how to do it without aggravating long-term land tenure controversies
will be challenging, to say the least. Moreover, according to
Kinshasa-based MONUC sources, we have heard that many in the Tutsi
refugee camps in Rwanda are unhappy with the GoR's decision to
arrest Nkunda and possibly to extradite him. How will the DRC deal
with this influx of potential Nkunda supporters?


6. (SBU) Seen from Kinshasa, there seems to have been a tacit
agreement between the GDRC and GoR to reestablish the earlier
dominance (2000-2007) of Rwandophone (Hutu and Tutsi) Congolese
within the provincial government of North Kivu, at the expense of
other ethnic groups. Former North Kivu Governor Eugene Serufuli
appears to be Kinshasa's "point man" for this effort, but the CNDP's
new leadership, with apparent backing from Kigali, seems equally in
step. The big losers are the Nandes (Note: Despite consistent
support for Kabila, North Kivu Governor Julien Paluku, Nande, is
rumored to be in trouble politically. End note.) How this ethnic
re-alignment finally shakes out is uncertain at the moment.

Liabilities for Kabila
--------------


7. (SBU) Many Congolese who remember previous Rwandan incursions

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into the DRC were aghast when Kabila invited former enemies back.
The invitation has caused some political damage to the Kabila camp,
but his stock was already low in the East. Moreover, the better
than expected outcome (at least better what most DRC observers had
believed) of the joint operations may help Kabila to weather any
simmering criticism. Pictures of departing Rwandan soldiers have
helped to convince much of the populace that the incursion was
worthwhile. Residents of villages that the FDLR had occupied were
glad to be rid of the Rwandan rebel group. Some contacts even
speculated that certain villages may request the Rwandans to return
if the FDLR strikes back. Despite these positive developments, the
political benefits of the operation remain uncertain.


8. (SBU) The FDLR controls most of the mines it had been operating
before. Many of them are in remote locations to the north and west
of Walikale, where FARDC/RDF troops never reached. The FDLR was
pushed out of many semi-urban areas, but it lost only a fraction of
its estimated 6,000 fighters. It may be in disarray, but it has
regrouped before and it is reportedly seeking out remote national
parks to regroup in isolation.


9. (SBU) Rwanda played a major role in splitting the CNDP, removing
a persistent nuisance and political threat to the GDRC. However,
Nkunda still retains followers and Bosco Ntaganda's ICC indictment
renders him unacceptable as a national military or political leader.
A large number of CNDP troops agreed to the accelerated
integration, but most observers believe the integration was hasty
and incomplete. Disgruntled CNDP cadres could easily peel off and
return to the bush, perhaps taking FARDC weapons or even soldiers
with them.


10. (SBU) The biggest potential liability for Rwanda in taking part
in Umoja Wetu is its dramatic alliance with the FARDC. Congolese
troops have never displayed mettle, they have collaborated with the
FDLR for years, and their pay and upkeep is always uncertain. CNDP
troops may add some backbone to forward elements, but the FDLR
simply does not fear the FARDC as it fears the RDF. In the days and
weeks ahead, the FARDC could face real battles. There are rumors
that the RDF could re-enter the DRC, if the FDLR becomes too active.
Nevertheless, with its back against the wall, we suspect the FDLR
will regain some of the ground it lost during the operations. How
the FARDC, with MONUC support, performs against the FDLR in South
Kivu will be an important indicator of FARDC capacity and
willingness to maintain the pressure.


11. (SBU) Comment: The status quo was not tenable and the joint
operations deserved, and received, support from the international
community. While the FDLR had not caused major problems in the
Kivus recently, its very presence made a mockery of the Nairobi
Communique and the Amani Peace Process. Cooperation and good
relations between the GDRC and GoR remains the key to long-term
stability in the region. Kabila's decision to invite the RDF into
North Kivu was courageous, made necessary through repeated military
failures to deal with the CNDP. Kabila, whose popularity in the
region had plummeted, has bought some time, and, on the whole, the
operation had more pluses than minuses. The FDLR may recover, but
the CNDP is unlikely to rise from the ashes. End comment.

GARVELINK