Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KINSHASA120
2009-02-05 18:38:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

DRC: A Look Back on 2008 and a Preview of 2009

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF EAID KDEM KPKO CG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 KINSHASA 000120 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF EAID KDEM KPKO CG
SUBJECT: DRC: A Look Back on 2008 and a Preview of 2009

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Summary
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 KINSHASA 000120

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF EAID KDEM KPKO CG
SUBJECT: DRC: A Look Back on 2008 and a Preview of 2009

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (GDRC)
faced substantial challenges in 2008 but made tangible progress in
dialogue with armed groups, judicial, decentralization, and economic
reforms and development cooperation. In 2009, the DRC faces many of
the same challenges that it grappled with in 2008. The peace
process in Eastern Congo, which began so promisingly with the Goma
Actes d'Engagements in January 2008, has come full circle. The
intense armed conflict, which began in October, gave way to renewed
efforts to broker a political settlement between the GDRC and armed
groups. Laurent Nkunda's CNDP rebel group fragmented through
internal division and UN-mediated talks. Military cooperation with
neighbors South Sudan and Uganda to neutralize the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) began at the end of 2008 and continued into 2009 followed
by joint operations with Rwanda against the armed group FDLR. The
threat of a dispersed, but rampaging LRA presents the GDRC with a
new variable in the East. On the domestic political side, there is
concern about the power of the Presidency, although parliament
continues to display a growing streak of independence. There are
clear signs that the new GDRC will pursue a more active role in a
variety of domains, including better coordination with international
donors. While the Congolese army's (FARDC) collapse in 2008
provoked heightened security and human rights concerns, a change in
the military's senior leadership presents the USG and its
international partners with a fresh opportunity to intensify efforts
to professionalize the FARDC and to move forward with a Rapid
Reaction Force as a cornerstone of this process. On the economic
front, the GDRC missed many opportunities in 2008 and will face
difficult questions in 2009. Falling international commodities
prices, endemic corruption, and regulatory and policy constraints
remain impediments to economic growth. In 2009, the GDRC should
demonstrate greater political will to: re-establish an IMF program;

give priority to regional economic development and concurrently
address the problem of illegal economic activity in war-torn eastern
DRC; and take measures to improve the investment climate. USG
assistance will continue to support USG policy goals in the DRC,
including the promotion of peace and security in eastern DRC.
Development programs will target the sectors of health, education,
democracy and governance, economic growth, peace and security,
environment, and social protection. End Summary.

--------------
Political Developments
--------------

The East
--------------


2. (SBU) The 2008 political scene in the DRC was dominated by
continued unrest and conflict in the eastern provinces. Momentum
from the January Goma Agreement, the resultant Amani Peace, Security
and Development program and the associated cease-fire did not parlay
into a lasting peace agreement and demobilization of armed forces.
The peace process stalled amid cease-fire violations despite regular
contacts between regional government delegations, international
facilitators, MONUC, and civil society. Despite moments of renewed
optimism, such as the Kisangani Conference in May, during which
dozens of FDLR-RUD fighters vowed to lay down their weapons and
enter the demobilization process, in August the CNDP renewed
hostilities with the DRC. High intensity conflict erupted between
FARDC, CNDP, FDLR and various Mai Mai groups, culminating in the
CNDP's march on Goma in late October. The DRC's participation in
Operation Lightning Thunder, along with Uganda and South Sudan,
demonstrated the resolve to take on the ever-present and serious
threat posed by the LRA. In a remarkable turn of events, DRC and
Rwandan forces began joint operations in January 2009 to eliminate
the presence of former Rwandan Army and genocide-era militia members
(FDLR) in the DRC. Widespread civilian displacement and human
rights violations continue to occur in the heavily militarized
eastern DRC.


3. (SBU) The challenge in 2009 will be to intensify efforts to
achieve a durable political settlement, which will enable the GDRC
to extend state authority in the area. The apparent rapprochement
between Kinshasa and Kigali in January 2009, permitting joint
Congolese-Rwandan military operations against the FDLR, is a first
step to the re-establishment of Congolese state authority in the
eastern DRC. The USG should continue to support conflict
mitigation, including: improved relations between the GDRC and its
eastern neighbors; facilitating integration of Congolese armed
groups and encouraging DDRRR options; mitigating the danger of
ethnic conflagration; and initiating steps to address illegal
economic activities, which continue to fund armed groups and deprive

KINSHASA 00000120 002 OF 007


the GDRC of legitimate state revenues. It will be necessary to
exhort the DRC to improve its dismal human rights situation in the
East, partially a byproduct of incessant conflict. On the LRA
question, the USG should encourage the GDRC to stay the course with
Operation Lightning Thunder, aiming to capture LRA leaders or
persuade them to opt for a genuine political solution.

Domestic Politics
--------------


4. (SBU) A MONUC investigative report criticized as "excessively
violent" the reaction of the central government to incidents of
unrest and insurrection committed by the Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)
separatist movement members in Bas-Congo in January, February, and
March 2008. Hundreds of civilians were killed and BDK places of
worship were razed during operations led by the national police
(PNC). The opposition and many international observers criticized
President Kabila's use of executive privilege to dismiss and appoint
magistrates and prosecutors in February, and again in October when
he appointed hundreds of sub-provincial civil administrators. The
appointments precede national preparations for the
constitutionally-mandated process of decentralization and 2009 local
elections.


5. (SBU) The September resignation of Prime Minister Antoine
Gizenga ended a long period of absentee government. One month
later, on the eve of nominating Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito,
Kabila made a rare television appearance, calling for unity as the
country mobilized against threats in the east. The Muzito
government retained key economic and fiscal figures, including the
Ministers of Economy, Finance, and Plan. Notable changes occurred
at Defense and Interior, likely a consequence of the FARDC poor
performance in the east. The new government also included three new
posts for Vice Prime Ministers, whose dossiers reflected Kabila's
campaign-winning slogan touting development priorities. Renewed
engagement by DRC Ministers in the last quarter of the year with
foreign donors, regional neighbors, and international organizations
has inspired optimism that the government has assumed a more active
role, which it was unwilling or incapable of doing during Gizenga's
tenure.


6. (SBU) Parliament met in regularly scheduled spring (March-June)
and fall (September-December) sessions, both sessions followed by
30-day extensions. Parliament passed and Kabila promulgated the law
establishing the judicial oversight commission, prerequisite laws
for decentralization and local elections, the law on the protection
of children, and a law establishing the media regulatory body. Key
omissions in 2008 included the law establishing general amnesty for
crimes of insurrection in the Kivus, the creation of the permanent
successor to the national electoral commission, the establishment of
the courts and judicial order, and additional laws establishing
local jurisdictions ahead of decentralization and local elections.
The National Assembly enthusiastically engaged in oversight
responsibility, frequently questioning government officials and
national deputies, although little official censure resulted from
the proceedings. The National Assembly also lifted immunity from
prosecution for 12 deputies who allegedly took payments to influence
their votes on the 2009 National Budget. In December, the National
Assembly and Senate Presidents refused a call to join the GDRC team
in the bilateral Nairobi talks with the rebel group CNDP.


7. (SBU) Despite promising diplomatic and military cooperation
between the DRC and Rwanda in January 2009, ongoing conflict and
human displacement in the east will be compounded by the
implementation of the decentralization process and anticipated local
elections. The USG can use these challenges as opportunities to
assist the DRC in the following areas:

-- further entrench and legitimatize the USG presence in Goma as a
symbol and hub of US commitment to ending the crisis in the short
term and continued engagement in the region in the long term;

-- intensify diplomatic engagement to push for action against GDRC
and FARDC involvement in illicit mining activities, sexual and
gender-based violence, trafficking in persons and child labor;

-- continue USG mediation and facilitation in regional conflict
resolution forums such as the Tripartite Plus Commission;

-- remain engaged with the GDRC leading up to local elections and
decentralization, encouraging the GDRC to move forward with these
efforts in a consistent and democratic manner;

-- remain engaged in justice reform, ensuring this will be a key
pillar in the development of democratic institutions through
continued funding of training and delivery of legal services;

KINSHASA 00000120 003 OF 007



-- persuade the GDRC to stay the course on developing democratic
institutions and practices, allowing political space for an
opposition and proceeding with local elections, as scheduled.

--------------
Security and Defense Aspects
--------------


8. (SBU) Three interrelated issues dominated the military situation
in the DRC in 2008, and they will present potential challenges and
opportunities in 2009. First, a culture of impunity and corruption
have made the FARDC an army in name only, and one whose human rights
record is so abysmal that the DRC's citizenry are at more risk from
it than from many of the extralegal armed groups in the country.
Second, this factor contributed to the military stalemate in eastern
DRC, as the FARDC remains as likely to collaborate with or flee from
illegal armed groups in the region as it is to fight them. Finally,
change in FARDC leadership at both the civilian (Minister of Defense
- MOD) and military levels (Chief of Defense - CHOD) has the
potential to improve the military situation if they are given
adequate political and fiscal resources.


9. (SBU) The FARDC's new leadership is taking steps to address
these problems, although it is uncertain whether or not it will have
adequate will or political and financial capital to make the
fundamental changes necessary to address the military's significant
challenges. With the assistance of the European Union's Security
Mission in Congo (EUSEC),the FARDC has completed a bio-metric
census of its membership and appears poised to implement a chain of
payment separate from the chain of command. The FARDC is also
focusing on the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force composed of up to
twelve infantry battalions with supporting air and riverine
capacity, which it views as a "model army" for the rest of the
military and intends to use to end the military stalemate in the
Kivus. Making the FARDC a professional force, or even settling for
one that is merely harmless, will require more than structural
change, however. President Kabila and the new MOD and CHOD will
have to take meaningful steps to reduce corruption and impunity at
all levels of the FARDC and establish a systematic professional
military education program that will forge and sustain a generation
of leaders who will institutionalize a professional military ethic
into its organizational culture.


10. (SBU) The USG has an important role to play in the FARDC's
reform effort, but the complex nature of the problem and limited
resources militate for a response based on persistence, precision,
and presence. Consistent presence is required to demonstrate the
USG's commitment to security sector reform (SSR),to make continuous
guidance available to the FARDC, and to provide an example of the
professional military ethic in action. Precise targeting of USG
military assistance resources is also necessary to address the
fundamental problems facing the FARDC and maximize their impact by
carefully coordinating them with other USG agencies, EUSEC, the
United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC),and other states and
entities involved in SSR. Lastly, the USG must be persistent in the
face of fluctuations inherent in complex, dynamic situations, such
as the current situation in the DRC, and offer its consistent
support to those areas in which it chooses to engage while firmly
holding the GDRC's leadership accountable for the FARDC's behavior.

--------------
Economic Outlook
--------------


11. (SBU) The DRC's economic environment changed dramatically
during the course of 2008 as a result of the global recession in the
final quarter of 2008. Double-digit GDP growth projections for
2008, forecast as recently as October, have been revised downward to
8 percent. GDP growth for 2009 is projected at below 5 percent.
The once robust mining sector significantly contracted towards the
end of the year due to falling international commodities prices,
tightening international credit, and dampened investor confidence in
the sector. International reserves reached a five year low. Within
this rapidly changing landscape, there are several key economic
developments of note in 2008: the conclusion in early 2008 of a $9
billion Sino-Congolese agreement to exploit mining resources and
develop Congolese infrastructure; the completion by mid-December of
mining contract reviews for all but six of the 61 companies;
progress, albeit incomplete, toward the re-establishment of an IMF
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF); the passage of a
record, if unrealistic, $5 billion budget for 2009; an August 2008
meeting on development cooperation between President Joseph Kabila,
Ambassadors from donor countries and representatives of multilateral
aid organizations; and renewed engagement with traditional donors
under the new leadership of Prime Minister Muzito. Progress was

KINSHASA 00000120 004 OF 007


made in implementing several key economic reforms during 2008,
including: higher than anticipated revenues due to improved
mobilization efforts and continuing reforms in the tax and customs
administrations; improvements to the budget-execution system,
including through implementation of a reporting mechanism within the
public finance management system; and establishment, in coordination
with international donors, of more specific and coherent policies to
support infrastructure development. Overall, the DRC's economic
record for 2008 was mixed, with missed opportunities by the GDRC to
improve its investment climate, diversify its economy, and undertake
necessary reforms that would have reduced the country's
vulnerability to external shocks.


12. (SBU) As the DRC braces for a challenging economic outlook in
2009 -- including significantly lower economic growth, significant
balance of payments and financing gaps and unrealistic spending
levels in its 2009 budget -- the USG has an opportunity to advocate
and engage in several key economic areas. These include:

-- Re-establishment of a formal IMF program: The GDRC has shown
greater political will to revisit the Sino-Congolese agreement with
the aim of establishing an IMF PRGF and accelerating Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point. The USG should
continue to advocate, both with the GDRC and the PRC Government, the
importance of making the Chinese agreement compatible with debt
sustainability.

-- Support for immediate financial assistance: Post encourages USG
support at the IMF Board level for immediate IMF financial
assistance through the IMF's Rapid Access Component of its Exogenous
Shock Facility. Support for this facility would provide critically
needed fiscal space for the GDRC and provide leverage for us to push
the DRC to work towards a formal IMF agreement and key reforms,
including more transparent emergency spending. Without emergency
financial support, the GDRC could face a financial crisis as early
as the first quarter of 2009, possibly derailing prospects for the
IMF program, further deepening the country's grinding poverty and
potentially destabilizing the Government.

-- Regional Integration: There has been growing recognition, by the
GDRC and donors, that economic integration can serve as a positive
mechanism to reduce illegal trade and exploitation of natural
resources by supporting legitimate commerce in the Great Lakes
region. The USG should look for ways to reinvigorate existing
regional economic institutional mechanisms and promote legitimate
economic activities within the sub-region.

-- An improved investment climate: The DRC must do more to
facilitate trade and investment, including reducing bureaucracy and
corruption and resolving key outstanding investment disputes. A key
goal for the GDRC in 2009 must be to improve its position from
dead-last on the World Bank's Doing Business rankings. The USG
should continue to engage with the GDRC at the highest levels to
advocate for specific improvements in the investment climate.
Working level GDRC officials have indicated a willingness to engage
on these issues through a bilateral commercial dialogue.

-- Food Security: The International Food Policy Research Institute's
Global Hunger Index ranks the DRC last among 88 countries surveyed.
The country has much untapped agricultural potential but is overly
reliant on food imports, including food aid, while agricultural
production and market access are severely depressed. The USG should
support development of the GDRC's strategic policies in this sector
in the context of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Program (CAADP); increased support for the agricultural sector, and
seeking to leverage other donors' support to reduce the DRC's import
and aid dependence and promote growth of incomes in this sector.

--------------
Social and Human Development Aspects
--------------


13. (SBU) The DRC ranked 177 out of 179 countries on the 2008
update of the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI
ranks countries according to life expectancy at birth; adult
literacy rates and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary
gross enrollment ratios; and standard of living by GDP per capita.
For the first time, a Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) was
conducted in the DRC in 2007, with nearly 10,000 women and nearly
5,000 men between the ages of 15 and 49 interviewed in all 11
provinces.

-- Health: The DHS shows a continued high fertility level, with an
average of 6.3 children per mother. Results show that only one in
five married women are using any form of family planning, and only
one in five women indicated she would not want more children.

KINSHASA 00000120 005 OF 007


Childhood mortality remains extremely high in the DRC with 92
children per 1,000 live births dying before their first birthday.
Maternal mortality also remains high, according to the DHS, with 549
maternal deaths for every 100,000 live births. Less than one in
five children between the age of one and two received any childhood
immunizations. Less than 10 percent of households own an
insecticide treated mosquito net (ITN). One quarter of children
under the age of 18 are considered to be orphans or vulnerable
children. The HIV prevalence rate was 1.3 overall, with almost 90
percent of those tested unaware of their HIV status. Prevalence
rates were higher in urban areas than in rural zones.

-- Education: The DHS revealed elevated literacy rates, expressed as
a 27.7 percent illiteracy rate for women, and a 13.6 percent
illiteracy rate for men. Only 46 percent of the population attended
primary schooling, 30 percent secondary schooling, and 3 percent
completed university-level education.

-- Gender Based Violence: The DHS reported that nearly 75 percent of
women have suffered from spousal or partner abuse, whether physical,
emotional, or sexual. Nearly two thirds of women reported suffering
from physical violence since age 15, and nearly half of women
suffered violence during the past 12 months, with married women
reporting higher levels of violence. Sixteen percent of women have
been forced to have intercourse against their will at some point in
their lives.

--------------
USG Assistance
--------------


14. (SBU) USAID/DRC continued to implement development programs in
the sectors of health, education, democracy and governance, economic
growth, peace and security, environment, and social protection in

2008. The major challenge facing U.S. foreign assistance programs
in fiscal year 2008 was ongoing tension and conflict in the eastern
DRC, which not only fueled a humanitarian crisis affecting hundreds
of thousands of people, but also distracted the GDRC from fully
focusing on the country's development agenda. In response to the
crisis, humanitarian programs, including both food aid and non-food
assistance, provided life-saving support. Overall, direct U.S.
foreign assistance to the DRC totaled approximately $215 million,
including $125 million in development assistance and military
cooperation, and $90 million in humanitarian assistance funding,
including emergency food aid. Funding for 2008 included $12.5
million in supplemental assistance.


15. (SBU) Support for a negotiated end to conflict received strong
support in 2008, with programs in conflict mitigation, community
stabilization, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) building a foundation for an eventual end to hostilities. In
2008, U.S. foreign assistance included over $9 million dollars in
National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1207) resources for
support to military justice, civilian justice, and local government
strengthening activities and $12.5 million in fiscal year 2008
Supplemental Economic Support Funds for return, reintegration and
recovery activities. In 2009, assistance will continue for
stabilization activities as the central cross-cutting theme for U.S.
assistance.


16. (SBU) Embassy Kinshasa was one of three embassies in Africa to
develop a new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) in 2008, a
whole-of-government strategic planning document that summarizes the
direction and design of U.S. foreign assistance to the DRC for
2009-2013. The new CAS provides a tool to better communicate and
plan for U.S. assistance activities to the DRC. The negotiation and
signature of a new bilateral framework agreement -- the first
rewrite since the 1948 accord with Belgium --provides the basis for
strengthening coordination and cooperation with the government of
the DRC in programming these resources. In 2009, USAID will develop
sector-specific assistance agreements with the GDRC in order to gain
increased commitment and participation in the implementation of
foreign assistance, while at the same time ensuring that resources
are in line with the DRC's development agenda and the Country
Assistance Framework endorsed by 19 multilateral and bilateral
partners, including the United States.


17. (SBU) At the end of 2008 the DRC faced a severe budget crisis
caused by the sharp decline in commodity prices, particularly for
industrial metals that are the basis of the country's revenue
earnings. U.S. foreign assistance will increasingly focus on the
DRC's economic growth needs, in particular through support for a new
agricultural development activity to support job creation and
address the country's severe food insecurity problem. Although it
has vast areas of arable land, the DRC is limited in agricultural
production by a lack of infrastructure, endemic corruption, and a

KINSHASA 00000120 006 OF 007


policy and regulatory environment that discourages investment. In
2008, nearly 30,000 rural households benefited from U.S. assistance
in agriculture. The assistance also supported the creation of over
50 small and medium enterprises.
In 2009 a new agricultural development program will focus on
processing and marketing issues in addition to increased production,
but the more challenging issues of corruption and economic policy
will remain high-level issues for engagement.


18. (SBU) In 2008, highlights in the democracy and governance area
included the training of 275 national legislators and legislative
staff on key issues such as financial procedures, and support in
drafting eight key pieces of legislation, including decentralization
legislation. In 2009 assistance will focus on improving governance
and the rule of law, as the country implements an ambitious
decentralization program and puts in place constitutionally-mandated
judicial institutions. Further assistance will encourage civic
participation in political processes, including planned 2009 local
elections.


19. (SBU) Assistance in the social sectors, including health,
education, and programs targeting survivors of gender-based violence
and vulnerable children, continued to be an important focus of U.S.
foreign assistance in 2008. In health, USAID supported the delivery
of a package of basic health services for over 10 million people in
82 health zones, including a focus on maternal and child health;
prevention and treatment of malaria, TB, and HIV/AIDS; and family
planning and reproductive health. In education, enrollment rates
increased in USAID-supported schools by 22 percent, with over
600,000 students and 21,000 teachers benefiting from education
programs. USAID provided critical care and treatment services to
more than 20,000 vulnerable people, including survivors of sexual
and gender based violence (SGBV) and abandoned and at-risk children.
Under the new CAS, the health and education portfolios will begin
new activities in 2009 to address critical needs in these areas.
Programs targeting the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, in
particular, will be implemented with increased PEPFAR resources.
Programs targeting survivors of gender-based violence will continue,
though limited resources will not expand activities responding to
this growing crisis.


20. (SBU) U.S. military assistance to the DRC increased in 2008, in
recognition of the central role of a strengthened armed forces in
the DRC's stability and long-term development. The U.S. is
supporting the establishment of a rapid reaction force battalion to
enable the DRC to respond to pressing security threats from illegal
armed groups and develop a model around which future professional
units can be formed. Congolese institutional military capacity was
improved by providing a senior advisor to the Ministry of Defense,
and by supporting professional training for 650 brigade and
battalion level officers in leadership, decision making, human
rights and basic staff skills training. U.S. assistance also
supported refurbishment of an officer training center in Kinshasa.


--------------
Environment, Forest Conservation, and CARPE
--------------


21. (SBU) The GDRC made important strides in forestry management
and environmental conservation in 2008, notably the final conversion
of forest logging titles into concessions in conformance with the
2002 forestry code. An inter-ministerial commission, with local
community representation, reduced legal concessions from 156 to 49,
with a corresponding 75 per cent reduction of area allocated for
logging. The national park service approved three new protected
areas to bring the total protected area of national territory to
over ten percent (Note: the government target is 15%. End Note)
The Ministry of Environment and Forestry adopted an ambitious legal
reform agenda and improved coordination with the donor community
through regular and well structured thematic donor group meetings.


22. (SBU) In 2009, the decentralization process will challenge the
DRC's capacity to manage protected areas. DRC conservation
financing through the Bali Global Climate Change Road Map envisions
carbon market payments to the GDRC within the global reduction of
deforestation and degradation (REDD) framework. The USG has a
massive investment in tropical forest and biodiversity conservation
through the Congo Basin Forest Partnership and the Central Africa
Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). USG support
contributes to improved management of 45 zones totaling 24 million
hectares in the DRC. These investments can facilitate DRC
participation in future carbon markets and support poverty reduction
at local levels.

--------------

KINSHASA 00000120 007 OF 007


Comment
--------------


23. (SBU) Recent diplomatic and military cooperation with Uganda,
South Sudan, and Rwanda underpin optimism for security and
pacification in the eastern DRC in 2009. The USG should capitalize
on these developments to support the demobilization and integration
of armed groups and the professionalization of the national army.
Regional cooperation will be a cornerstone of DRC national security
and economic reform. DRC coordination with regional partners,
international donors, and international institutions such as the IMF
will simultaneously address short-term responses to the global
economic downturn and promote long-term financial assistance and
development programs. Cessation of armed conflict in the east would
allow development assistance to take hold and permit the transition
from costly defense spending to desperately needed infrastructure
investment. The development of effective checks and balances within
the national government is a work in progress which will be further
complicated by the decentralization process, and continued USG
assistance and oversight is essential to prevent a return to the
centralized regimes of the past. Guarded optimism and focused
engagement, tempered by memory of recent military and economic
reverses, should guide the USG policy towards with the DRC in 2009.
End Comment.

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