PROMINENT PPRD PARLIAMENTARIAN ON KIMIA II, SGBV,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001071

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KWMN MOPS KPKO KDEM CG
SUBJECT: PROMINENT PPRD PARLIAMENTARIAN ON KIMIA II, SGBV,
MONUC, AND ELECTIONS

Classified By: William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with polcouns, Jean
Mbuyu Luyongola, a prominent PPRD parliamentarian, stressed
that sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) was a societal
problem in the DRC. Ill-disciplined FARDC and police
aggravated SGBV, as did the culture of impunity. Creating n
effective and disciplined military would be a big step to
combat SGBV, in Mbuyu's opinion. Mbuyu vociferously defended
the military pressure that the Kimia II operations had put on
the FDLR, but he also opined that to definitively "deal with
the FDLR," ultimately, Rwanda would have to accept a
political opening to non-genocidaires FDLR and the DRC would
have to agree to resettlement of some FDLR on its territory.
Mbuyu said a lack of adequate financing was the main obstacle
to holding local elections, which, in his opinion, would not
take place before 2011. He maintained that there needed to
be a minimum 12-month gap between local and national
elections for logistical reasons, pushing national elections
out to 2012 or 2013. End summary.


2. (U) During a November 30 meeting with polcouns, Jean
Mbuyu Luyongola, a prominent PPRD (leading party supporting
President Kabila) parliamentarian and former GDRC Great Lakes
Envoy discussed Kimia II, sexual and gender based violence
(SGBV),an eventual MONUC withdrawal, and the timing of local
and national elections.

SGBV: A Societal Problem
--------------


3. (SBU) Mbuyu broke down SGBV into two separate, but
related areas: the traditional view of women in Congolese
society; and how armed conflicts have exacerbated SGBV.
Mbuyu said that, especially out in the countryside, young
girls are often forced to marry at the age of 12-14 and soon
afterward begin bearing children. With high morbidity rates
of newborns in rural areas, women are encouraged to have as
many children as possible. This is a fact of Congolese
society, Mbuyu lamented, which needed to be addressed at the
state and family levels. Acknowledging that it was a huge
and long-term challenge, Mbuyu said that the GDRC needed to
provide better educational and work opportunities for young
women. Just as importantly, Mbuyu added, was to emphasize
equal rights for women at a grass roots level.


4. (C) According to Mbuyu, the FARDC very often exhibited
the same lack of discipline that is common to rebel groups.
They both prey on the local population, exacting commercial
gains and perpetrating SGBV. Combatants believe they are
immune to any persecution. And, although the police are
somewhat better disciplined, in Mbuyu's opinion, the civilian
population still harbors a negative image about the police's
ability to administer justice. Related to this is the
question of impunity, which is rampant and "limitless",
especially in the interior of the DRC.


5. (SBU) To fight SGBV, Mbuyu stressed that it would be
crucial to create "an effective and disciplined" army. It
was therefore advisable for the GDRC and donors to put their
full efforts behind SSR. Implementing mandatory and
effective garrisoning of troops was also key, as well as
strict regulations on when troops could carry arms. Mbuyu
argued that accelerated decentralization, especially in the
justice sector, would also help fight impunity. Finally,
Mbuyu suggested that local police should be empowered, as
QMbuyu suggested that local police should be empowered, as
they know their communities. National police, by contrast,
are always armed and are frequently stationed outside of
their home communities. According to Mbuyu, they are
therefore much more likely to commit crimes, including SGBV,
than are local police.

Kimia II
--------------


6. (C) Mbuyu strongly backed the Kimia II military
operations against the FDLR, whose capacity had been greatly
reduced. It was a "good decision," Mbuyu maintained, to
launch the operations. Now, however, we needed to take stock
of the situation, Mbuyu said, recognizing that the military
operations cannot last forever. Accepting that military
pressure should continue against the FDLR in the short-term,
Mbuyu opined that more should be done on the political level.
Specifically, Mbuyu suggested that Rwanda should, at some
point, accept an inter-Rwandan political dialogue between the
regime and the non-genocidaires in the FDLR. The GOR

KINSHASA 00001071 002 OF 002


considers the younger generation of FDLR fighters, Mbuyu
opined, as more acceptable as potential political actors than
the old guard. Mbuyu also pointed to resettlement of some
FDLR elements in the DRC as critical to longer-term efforts
to deal with the rebel group. The GDRC, Mbuyu said, should
be more willing to accept this. Mbuyu pointed to northern
Katanga as an example of a region where FDLR elements had
successfully and informally integrated into local communities.

MONUC
--------------


7. (C) Mbuyu put forward an interesting argument why MONUC's
presence in the DRC was no longer necessary. According to
him, MONUC had given the GDRC some "breathing space,"
ensuring that, during the period of strained relations
between Kinshasa and Kigali, Rwanda or its surrogates could
not overthrow the GDRC. Now, with markedly improved
relations between the two governments, MONUC was no longer
needed. MONUC, Mbuyu continued, had been too unwieldy,
primarily because of the logistical headaches of running
field operational decisions to Kinshasa, New York, and
foreign capitals and back. Noting that President Kabila had
just publicly invited MONUC to begin plans for an eventual
withdrawal, Mbuyu said that any withdrawal would be
staggered, perhaps lasting as long as three years.

Elections
--------------


8. (C) The biggest obstacle to holding local elections,
according to Mbuyu, was the lack of financing. Mbuyu claimed
that local elections would cost around $300 million (Comment:
While not improbable, this amount is at the upper end of the
range. Many observers believe $200 million is a more
accurate estimate. End note). Mbuyu claimed that the GDRC's
2010 draft budget does not contain a line-item for local
election expenses, and that the IMF would not accept any
extraordinary spending for local elections in the 2010 budget
(Note: the draft budget contains 20 billion Congolese Francs
($22 million at current exchange rate) for "2011 elections"
under emergency and exceptional expenses. End note).
Nevertheless, Mbuyu noted that Kabila's recent statement that
local elections would be held was a political necessity.


9. (C) Mbuyu said most experts agree that it would be
logistically impossible to hold local and national elections
simultaneously. Furthermore, Mbuyu maintained that there
would need to be a minimum 12-month separation between the
two elections for administrative and logistical reasons.
With no funds budgeted for local elections in 2010, Mbuyu
said that the earliest local elections would happen would be
in 2011. Thus, national elections would slip to 2012 or 2013.


10. (C) Comment: Mbuyu's analysis of the SGBV problem in the
DRC was candid, highlighting the multi-faceted dimension of
the problem. We fully agree with him that achieving some
success on SSR would be a big first step towards reducing the
incidence of SGBV. Although Mbuyu voiced the government line
on Kimia II, he was forward leaning (perhaps too much so) in
his recommendations to promote an inter-Rwandan political
dialogue and resettlement of some FDLR in the DRC. Both
ideas may ultimately be unacceptable, however, to the GOR and
GDRC. Mbuyu's comments about timing for the local and
national elections were probably sequentially correct. On
that issue, while we should not condone endless delays in
holding the elections, our primary objective should be to
Qholding the elections, our primary objective should be to
ensure free and fair elections, not simply perfunctory voting
exercises. End comment.
GARVELINK