SA WOLPE IN KINSHASA 3/3: BOSCO, GOMA II, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001064

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG
SUBJECT: SA WOLPE IN KINSHASA 3/3: BOSCO, GOMA II, AND
CONFLICT MINERALS--A VIEW TO THE EAST

REF: A)KINSHASA 957 B) KINSHASA 1056 C) KINSHASA 1061

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (SBU) Summary: Special Advisor for the Great Lakes Howard
Wolpe met with GDRC leaders and key foreign ambassadors as
part of his November 13-17 salutatory visit to Kinshasa in
which he outlined USG objectives and initiatives in the
region (reftels B and C). In meetings with former GDRC Vice
President Ruberwa and recently ousted President of the
National Assembly Vital Kamerhe, SA Wolpe discussed the
situation in Eastern DRC, prospects for peace, and
perspectives on stability. This is the third of three cables
regarding Dr. Wolpe's official visit to Kinshasa. End
summary.

Who is in Control of the Kivus?
--------------


2. (C) Kamerhe said Kinshasa has not fulfilled obligations
under the Goma Accords to integrate National Congress for the
Defense of the People (CNDP) and various Mai-Mai militia into
the DRC armed forces (FARDC) at the appropriate rank and with
a regular salary. The Kabila government instead placed CNDP
commanders in charge of FARDC units--comprised of mostly
former CNDP soldiers--in the Kivus, in a reverse integration
that leaves the CNDP in control of the region. Lack of pay
and provisions contributed to subsequent atrocities by the
nominal FARDC units (i.e. 213th Brigade).


3. (C) Ruberwa, a former rebel leader from the East who
joined the government as part of a power-sharing deal, said
President Joseph Kabila brokered a deal to end hostilities
with current CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda. Exact terms of the
agreement are in question, but seem to consist of Bosco's
joining the FARDC in return for a de facto pardon. Kamerhe
believes Kabila would not turn over Bosco to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in the short-term;
however, a later betrayal of Bosco might be possible. While
Bosco is a capable military leader, according to Ruberwa, he
is not a proficient political organiser--a failing which,
combined with international arrest warrants, impede Bosco
from pursuing any grander ambitions.


4. (C) Ruberwa said Bosco's predecessor is more popular than
Bosco in the Eastern DRC, but his well-known association with
Rwandan President Kagame will ensure Laurent Nkunda's
continued political exile in Kigali. Ruberwa said Kagame was
"a man of his word" who would not violate his agreement with
Kabila to keep Nkunda under wraps. Since 2003, the GDRC
avoided discussions with western diplomats on security-sector
reform problems, such as difficulties with CNDP integration.
Ruberwa said the GDRC limits contact with western governments
fearing the appearance of losing sovereignty. This
reluctance to engage diplomatically in turn led to a lack of
transparency that prevented international assistance from
going where it should. Ruberwa said a visible result of
misappropriated funds from foreign aid and national coffers
are new buildings in Kinshasa built by FARDC generals (on a
salary of $100 per month) and construction in Kigali and Goma
funded by illegal trade in minerals. The solution, Ruberwa
proposes, is professional military education for the FARDC,
and sanctions on minerals (see paragraph 7).

Integrating the Displaced
--------------


5. (C) According to Ruberwa and Kamerhe, former combatants
living in the East fall into three broad categories: those
Qliving in the East fall into three broad categories: those
nominally integrated into the military (e.g. the CNDP),
refugees who wish to return to their homes but are prevented
by fears of persecution (e.g. Rwandan exiles),and those who
returned to their homes and live in squalor (i.e. due to a
paltry resettlement stipend in an area of limited economic
opportunity). Ongoing difficulties in returning Rwandan
refugees stem from Rwandan fears of potential land claims,
ethnic prejudices, and the preconception that all Rwandans in
DRC participated in the genocide. Kamerhe recommended the
ICC in Rwanda try those resident in the Congo and complicit
in the genocide. Publicly naming those wanted by the court
would separate fugitives from refugees, thereby encouraging
local communities which are home to the accused to turn them
in and allowing true refugees to return to Rwanda. Kamerhe
said former militants in Ituri are unemployed and ripe for

KINSHASA 00001064 002 OF 002


militia recruitment. He suggested an agricultural works
program to not only occupy those with idle hands but also to
contribute to regional economic development and combat
malnutrition. He specifically suggested cattle breeding and
cultivation of consumption crops such as corn, beans, manioc,
and potatoes. Failure to settle the regional issues of
former combatant integration and refugee resettlement would
lead to a resurgence in violence in the coming year, said
Ruberwa.

A Call for Goma II
--------------


6. (C) Both Kamerhe and Ruberwa noted that the GDRC signed
the Goma Accords nearly one year ago but has not honored the
terms of the agreement regarding integration of CNDP and
Mai-Mai into the FARDC. Kamerhe called for a Goma II--at
which he and Ruberwa would participate--to evaluate progress,
identify obstacles, and determine the next steps to achieve a
lasting peace in the East. (Note: The UK Ambassador to
Kinshasa suggested the same idea in meetings with SA Wolpe
and in other local fora. End Note.)

Conflict Minerals
--------------


7. (C) SA Wolpe's interlocutors said Eastern DRC is a target
for international and internal conflict because of the
concentration of deposits of precious ores and minerals. An
informal triad formed by GDRC leaders, the para-military
Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR),and
multi-national corporations (MNC) foments and illegally
profits from the lack of stability in the region. Kamerhe
said the local Congolese head of police and a regional FARDC
general are business partners with the FDLR, which is the
target of the ongoing Kimia II military operations. He said a
typical scenario in which military operations threatened
certain mining interests involved the Congolese commander
alerting his FDLR contacts when their locations would be
targeted thereby giving them time to abandon their positions.
Kamerhe pointed toward the presence in Kigali of MNCs which
export minerals not found naturally in Rwanda as proof of
tacit complicity by the international community. Kamerhe
suggested the most recent addition of 3,000 troops to MONUC
be established as a special unit to control the mining areas
and introduce a resource tracking system such as that used
for conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone.


8. (C) Comment: Although Kamerhe and Ruberwa both have
political aspirations which fuel their critiques of the GDRC,
their experiences and contacts in the East give credence to
their interpretation of GDRC actions regarding former CNDP
leaders Bosco and Nkunda, and potential problems with
integrating former warring factions. Curiously, their
support of professionalization of the military and
international support in stemming the flow of natural
resources mirror statements of serving GDRC officials. The
center in Congolese politics appears well established. End
comment.


9. (U) Special Advisor Wolpe cleared this message.
GARVELINK