JAMAICA: OAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL SAYS CUBA MUST

UNCLAS KINGSTON 000467

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR WHA/CAR (DHOFFMANN) (VDEPIRRO) (WSMITH)
WHA/EPSC (MROONEY) (FCORNEILLE)
EEB/ESC/IEC/EPC (MCMANUS)
SANTO DOMINGO FOR FCS AND FAS
TREASURY FOR ERIN NEPHEW
INR/RES (RWARNER)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PHUM ECON EFIN EAID ASEC SOCI PGOV OAS SOCI JM
CU, XL
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: OAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL SAYS CUBA MUST
TAKE INITIATIVE TO REJOIN OAS, CALLS FOR GREATER CARICOM ATTENTION
TO HAITI

Summary
--------------


1. (U) Summary: In an informal June 5 press conference in Kingston,
Organization of American States (OAS) Assistant Secretary General
(ASG) Albert Ramdin of Suriname described as "historic" the
recently-concluded 39th General Assembly (GA) session in San Pedro
Sula, Honduras, that saw the rescinding of Resolution 6, the 1962
resolution that had effectively suspended Cuba from the OAS for 47
years. Although the obstacles to Cuba rejoining the international
system have now been removed, Ramdin made it clear that the next
steps toward rapprochement must come from Havana. Ramdin also
reaffirmed the OAS's commitment to Haiti and called on the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) to play a greater role in that country's
development. End Summary.

Cuba and the San Pedro Sula Declaration
--------------


2. (U) Passing through Kingston en route to the U.S., the ASG hailed
the assembly and the "visible commitment of its members to work
together on all issues," including Cuba, Haiti, non-violence, crime,
drugs, and the security in the Caribbean. Ramdin noted that the
"positive mood" and "willing[ness] to work for consensus"
established at April's Summit of the Americas (SOA) in Trinidad had
provided a "mandate" and "set the stage" for what the GA had
accomplished regarding Cuba.


3. (U) Ramdin described the OAS's Resolution 2438 as the San Pedro
Sula Declaration, although its formal title is simply "Resolution on
Cuba." Noting that the debate over Cuba's readmission to the OAS
had been raised and faltered several times since 1962, Ramdin
nevertheless described the resolution as "an expression of what was
in the minds of many" in the OAS. Ramdin pointed out that "the
world had changed in the 47 years since Resolution 6 was adopted"
and that Cuba needs to rejoin the OAS and the Inter-American
community. However, the ASG made it quite clear that the next steps
must come from the Government of Cuba (GOC) and the Cuban people.

Inside Baseball
--------------


4. (U) The ASG provided considerable detail on the deliberations of
the Cuba Working Group that hadcrafted the resolution at San Pedro
Sula. Although several views had been expressed, Ramdin described a

"real desire for consensus" and noted that all participants,
"including the U.S.", had made concessions. Historically, the U.S.
had opposed rescinding Resolution 6, but Ramdin described an
evolution of the U.S. position from one in which the U.S. "would
support revocation of Article 6 at the end of a process" to one in
which the U.S. "would support revocation of Article 6 at the
beginning of a process." Others, most notably the member states
(Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras, Dominica, and St. Vincent
and Grenadines) constituting the Bolivarian Alternative for the
People of our America (ALBA),had not wanted to include any mention
of a "process" of reintegration in the resolution. Ramdin noted
that CARICOM had played an "important role" independent of both the
U.S. and ALBA in drafting the resolution, with both Jamaica and
Belize participating in the Working Group.


5. (U) As is the norm for the OAS, the resolution had been adopted
by the Working Group and the General Assembly through consensus,
without any formal vote. The direct participation of Foreign
Ministers in the Working Group on June 2 had "lifted the discussion
to a higher level" and had ensured that the negotiations moved
quickly toward consensus, since they could make decisions without
waiting for direction from superiors. After consultations, the
Working Group meeting had resumed the morning of June 3 and had
approved the resolution by acclimation. Shortly thereafter, the
resolution had been formally approved by the General Assembly.
Although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had departed the
previous evening and left Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon in
charge of negotiations, Ramdin said that she had played "a critical
role" and that he had appreciated Shannon's "frankness." The U.S.
also compromised by not insisting that the resolution, drafted in
Spanish, be translated before its release.


6. (U) Ultimately, Ramdin contended, the resolution proved that the



OAS is "relevant" and "can solve problems." The ASG noted that "now
we must wait to see how Cuba will respond. The obstacle is gone,
the ball is in their court, now the dialogue can start." As a
result, OAS representatives are now free to visit Cuba, although
Ramdin pointed out that there had never been a formal OAS policy
preventing this, and he expressed hope that Cuba might allow an OAS
office to be opened in Havana. In the meantime however, Ramdin
hoped that the resolution would facilitate bilateral relations among
member states and Cuba, and stressed that Cuba might benefit in some
nonpolitical areas - educational exchanges, agricultural programs,
disaster preparedness - without formally rejoining the OAS.

The Cuban Perspective
--------------


7. (U) Osvaldo Cardenas, the former Cuban Ambassador to Suriname
from 1980-83 and now a sociologist and businessman living in
Kingston, was present at the press conference and offered his
thoughts as to how the Cuban leadership might perceive the
resolution. While the OAS and the world may have changed since
1962, Cardenas noted, it is important to remember that Cuba's
leadership - Fidel and Ral Castro - has not. As a result, the GOC
still sees the dramatic events of the early 1960s - the breaking of
diplomatic relations with Havana, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the
Cuban Missile Crisis - very emotionally, and the 1962 Punta del Este
resolution suspending Cuba's OAS membership as a personal rebuke to
the Castros.


8. (U) Cardenas didn't believe that the GOC had fully considered the
potential benefits of rejoining the OAS, but would likely interpret
the U.S.'s concurrence with Resolution 2438 as a tacit admission
that Cuba had a right to be a member of the OAS and that 1962's
Resolution 6 had been wrong. Nevertheless, Cardenas didn't believe
that serious discussions regarding Cuba's next step had yet taken
place in the GOC and likely wouldn't any time soon, implying that
the Castro brothers would have to leave the political scene in Cuba
before any rapprochement with the OAS could take place. Cardenas
contended that the new Obama administration was a "major challenge"
to the regime and that the GOC was uncertain as to how to deal with
the new president. Ramdin agreed that "biological pressure" and the
passing of the "major ideology" of the Castros would be a major
impetus for change, and that such change must be nurtured, not
forced.

Parsing the Language
--------------


9. (U) One audience member noted that the U.S. had initially
insisted that the resolution include a reference to the
Inter-American Democratic Charter, but that the final resolution
made no mention of it: had the U.S. changed its position, and had
the OAS rejected the charter? Ramdin replied that "nobody wanted to
be blamed for the failure of this resolution," and that all
participants, including the U.S. and the ALBA countries, had been
committed to consensus. The ASG also maintained that the spirit of
the Democratic Charter was evident in the resolution's language. In
fact, Ramdin noted, the OAS has never invoked the charter overtly in
its resolutions and contended that, in some ways, the language of
the OAS charter is stronger than that of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. The ASG nevertheless insisted that the
resolution's preamble was a strong statement affirming OAS
principles.


10. (U) The same questioner then asked if Ramdin was worried that
some Cuban-Americans have threatened to lobby Congress to target OAS
funding over this issue. While Ramdin agreed that this was a
theoretical possibility, he insisted that the OAS would not allow
itself to be blackmailed by the U.S. Ultimately, the ASG concluded
that such calls for retribution did not represent official U.S.
policy, and that he wasn't overly concerned that the U.S. would cut
OAS funding.

"Too Many Countries Say They Speak for Cuba..."


11. (U) Cuba's process toward reintegration into the OAS community
will of necessity be a slow and methodical one, Ramdin pointed out,
and based on the principles in the OAS's General Declaration of
Human Rights. Most importantly, this process must be an expression



of the "voice of the Cuban people," Ramdin noted. "Too many
countries say they speak for Cuba," Ramdin claimed. "Cuba needs to
do so." The GOC has expressed no public interest in rejoining an
organization that it has described as the U.S.'s "Ministry of
Colonies," although both Ramdin and Cardenas agreed that the GOC and
its ALBA allies had likely consulted in regard to the resolution.
The ASG pointed out that Resolution 2438 includes no framework or
process for Cuba's reintegration into the OAS, reaffirming that such
a framework or process would be up to the GOC and the people of Cuba
to initiate.

Haiti
--------------


12. (U) Ramdin noted that Haiti "has never enjoyed such solidarity
in OAS," and expressed the desire to organize a mission to the
country in August or September, 2009 to include representatives from
the OAS, the International Development Bank (IDB),the Pan American
Development Foundation (PADF),the Inter-American Institute for
Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA),as well as representatives from
OAS member states, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),members of the
U.S. Congress, and international media, in order to showcase
positive projects in Haiti that each participant had sponsored.
Ramdin also said he'd like to see the OAS work with these same
partners to sponsor an Inter-American Program in Haiti. "At some
point, the U.N. mission will leave Haiti, and it will be a natural
role for the OAS to step in and take over," Ramdin predicted.


13. (U) The ASG also expressed the hope that CARICOM would escalate
its engagement and provide more leadership with Haiti, a CARICOM
member. Although Haiti has enjoyed relative peace and stability
recently, Ramdin expressed concern that next year's presidential
elections might jeopardize these gains. Although CARICOM does not
have much available in terms of resources, Ramdin felt that much
could be accomplished through the personal intervention of CARICOM
leaders. Ramdin pointed out that although Haiti has a strong
commitment to CARICOM, many in the Government of Haiti (GOH) feel
that the organization does not treat them as an equal member. The
ASG pointed out that Haiti is visited far more often by official
visitors from the U.S., Canada, and Brazil than by CARICOM foreign
ministers.


14. (U) Further economic and financial assistance to Haiti is
necessary, Ramdin said, noting that Trinidad and Tobago had called
for the OAS to establish a Hemispheric Development Fund for Haiti.
Although Ramdin supported the concept in principle, he said that he
would have to study the proposal more thoroughly to determine how to
coordinate it with existing OAS programs.

Summary
--------------

15. (U) Ramdin went to great lengths to downplay any suggestion of
discord over the resolution, choosing instead to praise the
contributions of all participants in the working group and the
spirit of consensus that he said had prevailed there. The ASG
clearly felt that the next steps in Cuba's rapprochement with the
OAS must come from the GOC and the Cuban people, although Ambassador
Cardenas's comments suggested that those steps might be a long time
in coming. Furthermore, Ramdin's discussion of Haiti before an
audience clearly more interested in the Resolution on Cuba suggested
that he feels very strongly about the OAS initiatives that he
proposed toward that country.

Moss