RWANDA DEFENCE FORCES TOP LEADERSHIP ON EASTERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000172

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA DEFENCE FORCES TOP LEADERSHIP ON EASTERN
CONGO

REF: A. KIGALI 163

B. KIGALI 142

Classified By: CDA Cheryl Sim; reason 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary. Charge d,Affaires and Defense Attache met
Rwanda Defence Forces, (RDF) Chief of Defence Staff General
James Kabarebe, Army Chief of Staff General Charles Kayonga
and Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Muhire on March

18. Kabarebe expressed satisfaction with the recently
concluded RDF-Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC)joint operations,
asserting all Government of Rwanda (GOR) objectives had been
met. Terming the FARDC,s current operations in North Kivu
as the continuation of Phase One of the joint military plan,
he said consideration of Phase Two could only follow Phase
One,s completion. He was critical of what he termed MONUC's
"failure" to assist the FARDC and protect civilian
populations. When drawn out, he admitted the FARDC was not
performing adequately, leaving local communities vulnerable
to Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
reprisals. With regard to the eventual fate of National
Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) leaders Bosco
Ntaganda and Laurent Nkunda, the generals stated Bosco could
end up in front of the International Criminal Court and
Nkunda will likely be extradited in the future to the DRC.
The purpose of meeting may have been to assuage any USG
concern over recent reports of some FDLR reprisals in the
eastern Congo and its attempts to regain lost territories;
the broad strategic goals of the joint operation remain well
in hand and continue to be met. End Summary.


2. (C) RDF Chief of Defence Staff General Kabarebe requested
Charge and Defense Attache meet with him on March 18 so he
could provide an up-date to the Embassy on the situation in
eastern Congo. Generals Kayonga and Muhire, the respective
Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, also sat in on the nearly
two-hour meeting that was surprisingly unhurried and relaxed
for the normally pressed-for-time RDF top command. Kabarebe
began by restating GOR satisfaction with the overall joint
operation, indicating all GOR and RDF primary objectives had
been met much more quickly than the planners had originally
anticipated. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda's (FDLR) capacity to act was seriously degraded, the
relationship between the FARDC and the RDF was rebuilt, and
there was renewed confidence between the GOR and the
Congolese government (GDRC) at the highest levels. He
asserted that DRC President Kabila's presence in eastern
Congo showed that the security situation had improved to such
a degree that Kabila felt more comfortable there than in
Kinshasa. He also cited Kabila's travel by road from
Kisangani to his farm as another indication of how well in
hand the security situation had become.


3. (C) In contrast to reports that described Phase One of
Operation Our Unity as completed (ref b),Kabarebe
characterized the current FARDC operations against the FDLR
as a continuation of Phase One. With Phase One still
underway, albeit without RDF participation, Kabarebe said
Phase Two in South Kivu would have to wait until the GDRC and
FARDC had the situation in North Kivu fully in hand.
Kabarebe asserted that the integration of CNDP forces into
the FARDC was "complete," adding the CNDP no longer existed
as a separate military force. He remained largely
unimpressed by MONUC,s performance and highly critical of
its "failure" to assist the FARDC to hold positions cleared
of the FDLR during the joint operation, and its failure to
protect the civilian population.


4. (C) According to Kayonga, over 600 combatants have now
returned to Rwanda and another 150 had been killed during the
joint operation. Separately, officials at Mutobo
Demobilization Camp report 511 combatants had arrived as of
March 20, with more on the way. Rigorous vetting prior to
camp registration means these Mutobo Camp numbers lag behind
other reported numbers. (Note: It is also likely that the
FDLR suffered losses during the fighting last fall when it
took up FARDC forward positions against the CNDP. Based on
U.S. military doctrine, a ten percent loss of troop strength
represents a significant suppression of a force's ability and
a 20 percent loss equates to effective neutralization of the
force. It is likely that the losses suffered in the fall
when combined with the 750 killed or undergoing repatriation
reaches or exceeds the ten percent level. End note.)
Kabarebe stated the joint operation's primary military
objective was to destroy FDLR's training and command
facilities. The combined force went straight to the FDLR
headquarter locations and occupied those areas. The speed
with which this was achieved demoralized the FDLR and they
fled.


5. (C) Despite their positive assessment of the joint
operation, all three generals acknowledged that the FARDC had
not performed well since the RDF's departure, leaving the
population vulnerable to FDLR reprisals. They described the
FARDC's serious logistic problems, including its inability to
pay, let alone feed, its forces. Kabarebe stated that during
the week following the RDF's official withdrawal, RDF
helicopters had continued to provide support and supplies to
the FARDC. Without RDF maintenance and communication support
personnel on the ground, Kabarebe said he ended the
helicopter sorties since the RDF could not afford to lose
these assets. On the question of feeding the troops, all
three said this problem went to the heart of the FARDC's
difficulties with local communities. The FARDC's roadblocks
and its taxing of local populations were the results of the
forces not being paid. The lack of logistic support and
provisioning resulted in the troops stealing food and
threatening the local populations if they did not comply. In
their assessment of FARDC capabilities, they agreed that the
FARDC rank and file troops could perform if they had proper
pay and training and if there was political will in Kinshasa
to appoint capable leaders to senior FARDC positions.


6. (C) Charge raised the reports of FDLR reprisal killings,
noting former President of Ireland and High Commissioner for
Human Rights Mary Robinson had been in Kigali on March 15.
In her briefing for the diplomatic corps and NGOs, Robinson
described the population in North Kivu as "fearful" for its
security. Robinson additionally expressed concern over the
integration of the CNDP forces into the FARDC without proper
vetting that allowed human rights abusers to "become the face
of the FARDC" -- a reference to Bosco Ntaganda. All three
generals were dismissive of Robinson's comments, noting that
the security situation in North Kivu was much improved as a
result of the joint operation even if the FDLR still had the
capacity to carry out reprisals. With regard to Bosco, none
of the generals argued strongly on his behalf -- Muhire noted
that it would not be surprising if the Congolese turned him
over to the International Criminal Court. Finally, they
confirmed that if the situation in North Kivu deteriorated
and if President Kabila requested, they would be prepared to
return.


7. (C) Turning back to the issue of CNDP integration, Charge
noted there was credible reporting that forces loyal to
Laurent Nkunda appeared to be resisting integration.
Kabarebe insisted that Nkunda was no longer a factor and the
integration of the CNDP into the FARDC was complete. He
confirmed Nkunda (ref a) remained under house arrest in
Gisenyi, but offered Nkunda would eventually be extradited to
the DRC. He added that under the terms of the GDRC-GOR
signed agreement that formed the basis of the joint military
plan, both sides committed to removing any individuals who
stood in the way of the joint operation; Nkunda was clearly
in that category.


8. (C) On the question of President Kabila,s domestic
political problems, Kabarebe opined that Kabila had enough
political support to withstand the challenge posed by DRC
Speaker of the Parliament Vitale Kamerhe, who all three
generals described as being deeply anti-Rwandan. Muhire, who
seemed to be more conversant on political dynamics at play in
the DRC than Kabarebe, acknowledged that Kamerhe posed a
significant problem for Kabila. They also surmised that
without any military support, Kamerhe had likely overplayed
his hand and Kabila would deal with him in the Congolese
fashion of buying off supporters.


9. (C) Comment. Kabarebe,s interest in keeping us briefed
on the situation in eastern Congo was welcome, although we
believe that planning for Phase Two of the joint military
plan is well-advanced on the RDF's part. The RDF top command
is deeply appreciative of USG diplomatic and political
support for the Congo operation and its peacekeepers (septel)
in Darfur -- recently General Kayonga told Charge that the
GOR/RDF should thank the USG more often for that support.
The intent of the briefing appears to have been to reassure
the USG that, despite recent reports of some FDLR reprisals
in the eastern Congo and attempts to regain lost territories,
the broad strategic goals of the joint operation remain well
in hand and continue to be met. End comment.
SIM