Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KHARTOUM532
2009-04-21 03:54:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

KHARTOUM AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE AFTER ACTION REOPRT AND

Tags:  AMGT ASEC AEMR KFLO CASC SU 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0532/01 1110354
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210354Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3568
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000532 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR M, AF/EX, USSES, S/ES-O/CMS, CMT, FLO, DS/IP/AF
NFATC FOR FSI/LMS/CMT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT ASEC AEMR KFLO CASC SU
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE AFTER ACTION REOPRT AND
LESSONS LEARNED

REF: (A) STATE 22076, (B) STATE 34500

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000532

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR M, AF/EX, USSES, S/ES-O/CMS, CMT, FLO, DS/IP/AF
NFATC FOR FSI/LMS/CMT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT ASEC AEMR KFLO CASC SU
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE AFTER ACTION REOPRT AND
LESSONS LEARNED

REF: (A) STATE 22076, (B) STATE 34500


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: When Authorized Departure was announced on March
10, 2009,the post had previously prepared for personnel and
logistical issues associated with a large-scale evacuation of
Mission personnel. However, the Embassy had less than one day's
notice that the Department had decided to put Khartoum on Authorized
Departure (AD) status. As a result, the post had virtually no time
to plan for AD beyond its contingency preparations. After AD
was announced, COM authority over internal decisions such as
in-country travel between Khartoum and Juba, had to be clarified.
Once a system for reporting all travel to and from post was in
place, it worked well. However, USG personnel in Sudan include a
number of TDY staff and others who are not captured in the
Department's generic personnel tracking applications. Post had to
rely on ad-hoc internal tracking and counting mechanisms that were
time-consuming. Support from M/FLO, RM, AF/EX, PMO, DS and others
was outstanding. Our only suggestion is that more detailed
instructions be provided to posts going on AD in areas such as time
and attendance reporting and HR issues. END SUMMARY.

BEFORE AD WAS CALLED...
--------------


2. (SBU) Post has twice come close to going on AD over the past two
years and received crisis management training in December 2008. In
anticipation of the expected early 2009 ICC warrant announcement and
other ongoing security and safety issues, Mission personnel in
Khartoum began holding logistical planning meetings in January 2009.
In addition, prior to AD, the Community Liaison Office conducted a
briefing on AD and Ordered Departure (OD) regulations for Eligible
Family Members and MOHs at post. The CLO briefing was
well-attended, and several packets of information and reference
material were provided. The logistical planning group focused on
the Emergency Action Plan (EAP),consular issues, the logistics
involved in evacuations and identified USG personnel located
throughout Sudan under Chief of Mission authority.

HOW AD WAS CALLED...
--------------



3. (SBU) When Ref A was received at post, meetings were called
quickly to react to the announcement. The COM had been in contact
with the Department regarding the security situation in Khartoum
after the ICC announcement and also had discussed AD with AF prior
to the Department's announcement on March 9. The COM held a
town-hall on March 10 with all American employees and EFMs to
discuss AD. He addressed concerns that many staff members had on
their reluctance to go on AD and the possible impact this might have
on their career. Identifying candidates for evacuation was
sometimes divisive. In an already stressful environment morale
suffered as a result of uncertainties over whether all EFMs would be
ordered to depart (this did not happen,) and if the post would soon
be required to go on OD status. Travel within Sudan became an issue
immediately due to the frequent official TDY back and forth between
Khartoum and Juba (which was not on AD) required to sustain program
and logistical management. An internal procedure was quickly
instituted and cleared with the Bureau to allow the COM to use his
authority to approve in-country travel.

AFTER AD WAS CALLED...
--------------


4. (SBU) TRACKING PERSONNEL. The Regional Security Office had
previously created an effective tracking system to capture the large
number of post personnel, TDY staff and others at the Mission. This
RSO "Head Count" was used to follow the movements and whereabouts of
personnel at post. TDY staff and USAID personnel in Sudan cannot be
tracked in the State Department WebPASS Post Personnel or EMS
applications. The approval process for allowing employees to travel
to post under AD was extremely time-consuming. During the 30-day
AD, approximately 35 requests for travel to post were approved by M.
Post received great support from AF/EX, which expedited all the
necessary clearances and approvals. Khartoum employees are allowed
three rest and recuperation trips for a two-year assignment. For
those employees who planned to travel with EFMs, leaving on R&R
became a very difficult choice as in most cases EFMs would not be
allowed to return. Some employees were near the limit of being able
to take the last R&R and were afraid they would lose the chance to
do if they hesitated.


5. (SBU) REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION - FROM US AND FROM YOU. The
Embassy often responded to multiple requests from the Department for
identical information. An overview of evacuation contacts in the
Department would be helpful. Even better might be a central, shared
location where post could upload and update information on evacuees.
For example, post provided detailed information on all evacuees,
including "wheels up" cables to RM in Charleston. A few weeks into
the evacuation, our time and attendance expert in Charleston

informed us that she was unaware we were on AD and did not have
access to any information or cables previously provided. Correcting
evacuee information to Charleston has been time-consuming and has
inconvenienced employees. On the flip side, when asking for
information from Department contacts, post often found our requests
were sometimes routed to several offices before someone provided an
answer. A stronger HR component in the evacuation process would be
helpful. There is a need to authoritatively answer questions from
employees and family members who wish to know how a decision to
leave post will affect their career or Tour of Duty.

AFTER AD ENDED...
--------------


6. (SBU) RETURNING TO POST. USAID and State Department employees
are still in the process of returning to post. Two Khartoum
employees (an EFM working at post and a USDH State Department
employee) remain at FSI on TDY orders to finish FSI courses started
during AD. Employees who had elected to ship UAB during evacuation
found themselves waiting for it to arrive in Washington or at their
Official Foreign Safe Haven. The authorization of an additional
seven days for transportation issues has been very helpful and most
appreciated for these employees.


7. (U) As stated above, post received impressive and consistently
excellent support from the Department. We are deeply grateful for
all of your assistance.

FERNANDEZ