SE GRATION MEETING WITH UN RC DAVID GRESSLY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000501

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MCAPS EFIN EAID ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SE GRATION MEETING WITH UN RC DAVID GRESSLY


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The UN Resident Coordinator for Southern Sudan
told U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration that with 20 months
left until the 2011 Referendum, the international community, and
particularly partners to the CPA, must re-focus their energies on
achieving implementation of only those elements of the peace accord
that will take Sudan through and beyond the remainder of the Interim
Period. The CPA's ability to affect Sudan's broad-based democratic
transformation was dead by 2006; with the Referendum looming on the
horizon, the international community must now focus on extending the
peace past 2011. Abyei's resolution, the demarcation of the
North/South border, and Referendum laws for both Abyei and the South
need to be concluded by the end of 2009. Only by reducing the CPA
to its lowest common denominators can the world avoid a resurgence
of North/South conflict. This arithmetic does not require
elections, he noted, emphasizing that "while not un-useful or
un-important, they are not essential to the peace." END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) UN Resident Coordinator for Southern Sudan David Gressly
briefed SE Gration on the status of CPA implementation and the
viability of North/South peace on April 6 in Juba. While upbeat
about the changes the CPA has brought to Southern Sudan since 2005,
Gressly maintained that overall, the public nature of the
agreement's non-implementation (Abyei, census, JIU formation,
wealth-sharing irregularities) of the accord has been so public over
the past three years that should 2009 end without agreement on a law
governing the 2011 Referendum, it will be clear to Southerners that
their "rights will be denied again and change the dynamic of peace
in Sudan." The Special Envoy asked if Southern independence was a
foregone conclusion, noting concerns that expectations for what
independence will hold might outstrip the reality. Gressly hedged
and noted that the point of the Referendum is to assess that belief.
In his opinion, the expectations gap needs to be managed at two
levels: what does unification or separation mean in terms of
tangible deliverables to the people, and how can either outcome be
made more "comfortable" for the two CPA parties.


3. (SBU) Gressly counseled the SE against reading too much into
continued SPLM/NCP dialogue. "Yes, they are still talking but there
has been no meaningful advancement," he said, "the transformative
promise of the CPA is no more." Instead, the international
community needs to focus on selective CPA implementation that will
carry Sudan through the Referendum in an environment of an enhanced,
and extended, peace. The census and DDR, for example, are important
but not essential for the Referendum. "Both sides will do the easy
parts of DDR, but neither will significantly downsize," Gressly
noted. On the other hand, resolving Abyei, demarcating the
North/South border, and Referendum Acts for both Abyei and the South
need to be concluded by the end of 2009 - or by early 2010 at the
latest.


4. (SBU) Gration pressed Gressly on his assertion that elections are
not an essential element of the CPA. "That's correct, because they
are not essential to North/South peace," Gressly continued. "If the
parties reject the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling on Abyei,
this will be a serious blow to the CPA; a Referendum without an
established border could call into question its legitimacy, but the
UN can handle the Referendum without elections, if it is required."
The Special Envoy reviewed his belief that elections are an
important educational tool in advance of 2011, for both the populace
and government. Gressly did not disagree with the point, but noted
that he questioned the mechanics of the timeframe just released by
the National Election Commission - such as Southern voter
registration during the rainy season. "We can still have credible
elections, but it requires a good deal of organization by all
parties," he said.


5. (SBU) SE Gration reviewed current thinking on the possibility of
trilateral discussions between SE Gration, Kiir, and Taha. Gressly
suggested packaging together CPA-mandated post-referendum
arrangements in order to maximize each sides' maneuvering room
during talks. Essential elements covered should include border
demarcation, a limited-period extraordinary wealth-sharing
agreement, and specific provisions for the accommodation of
migratory groups (e.g., Misseriya). (NOTE: In the past, NCP has
also focused on liabilities sharing, or the South assuming a
percentage of Sudan's national debt. END NOTE.) Gressly also
counseled that the SPLM views the CPA as a path to the Referendum,
and anything that deviates from that path, or a set of benchmarks
that deviate from it, will be resisted. SPLM sees its compliance
with the CPA as guaranteeing the international community's
endorsement of the 2011 Referendum's outcome. "SPLM legitimacy is
tied to their very attempt to implement the CPA. Kiir has taken
very personalized hits, and even alienated himself from his cabinet
on issues such as the census, in order to get the South to that
point," he said.

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6. (SBU) Gressly departed from the topic of CPA implementation to
turn to the evolution of Southern Sudan. While he understood donor
concern about the budget crisis, Gressly opined that it held a
silver-lining: it provides Juba with a second chance to get its
financial systems right. The GOSS's present revenue totals mirror
those of 2005/2006, and while not a comfortable period in the
fledgling government's history, "it proves they can manage this, and
hopefully learn from it," to better utilize their oil revenues in
the future.


7. (SBU) Gressly then outlined the three main security challenges
for the South: 1) professionalization of the SPLA (for which he
credited USG assistance efforts) 2) building the capacity and
legitimacy of the Southern Sudan Police Service 3) inter-tribal
conflict tied to the cultural importance of cattle and scarce
natural resources. While none of these alone are enough to derail
the prospects of a lasting peace, continued GOSS distraction from
reform efforts - as a result of Khartoum-Juba tensions or drag on
the economy because of Khartoum's non-payment of arrears, could
spark violence that would lead to delays in CPA consolidation -
delays within a time-period in which there is virtually no margin
for error.


8. (SBU) Comment: We agree with Gressly's assessment that the most
critical aspects of the CPA - in terms of maintaining peace and
stability - are the referendum and items linked to the referendum
such as border demarcation and wealth-sharing post 2011. Elections
are important in order to keep the CPA on track and attempt to
deliver something to greater Sudan on the "democratic
transformation" promise of the CPA, but not as important as the
referendum in terms of maintaining peace. Many observers have made
the argument that elections have the potential to create more
instability if not handled carefully.


9. (U) SE Gration reviewed this message before transmission.

FERNANDEZ