REQUEST FOR TERMINATION OF AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE STATUS

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000473

DEPT FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF MANAGEMENT FROM CHARGE
INFO SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/EX TOY

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT AEMR CASC KFLO ASEC SU
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TERMINATION OF AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE STATUS

REF: A) STATE 22076
B) KHARTOUM 343
C) KHARTOUM 305


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Per reftel A (Para 1 B,) I have re-evaluated the
conditions at Embassy Khartoum that led on March 9 to your approval
of Authorized Departure (AD) status. Based on this re-evaluation, I
ask that Khartoum now be taken off of AD on April 9, at the end of
the 30 day AD period. I believe that conditions here have changed in
a manner sufficiently significant to permit the return to Khartoum
of all EFMs and non-emergency staff who voluntarily departed post
under AD provisions. A detailed justification follows. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
SECURITY SITUATION REMAINS STABLE
--------------


2. (SBU) Preceding the March 4, 2009 International Criminal Court's
(ICC) issuance of an arrest warrant for President Omar al Bashir,
the Government of Sudan (GOS) assured me that it would enhance
security at all U.S. Embassy facilities and residences, and would
also be responsive to all requests for increased security from the
Mission. The GOS has fully complied with these commitments. They
provided riot police and additional protection for the Chancery,
other Embassy facilities and designated residences in the days
following the ICC announcement. The GOS also has been responsive to
RSO requests for security assistance and cooperation since then.
There have been no violent demonstrations at or near our facilities
connected with the March 4 ICC announcement or March 5 expulsion by
the GOS of 13 Western NGOs (in retaliation for the ICC action) doing
humanitarian work in Darfur.


3. (SBU) Similarly, there were no demonstrations or any other
threats against Embassy staff or facilities following the March 26
announcement by U.S. and international media that there had been
January and February attacks by foreign aircraft in Eastern Sudan.
These reports indicated that 39 people were killed when jet fighters
attacked alleged weapons convoys bound for Gaza via Egypt. When the
GOS Minister of Transportation, himself from Eastern Sudan,
initially charged that these attacks had been carried out by the
U.S., the GOS immediately tamped-down his allegations.
Government-controlled media prominently featured USG denials of any
U.S. involvement in the attacks. The GOS also made statements in
the media that it was investigating who had staged the January and
February attacks. The GOS emphasized that it had no evidence of any
U.S. involvement. Regarding Darfur, we recognize that the security
situation there remains dangerous and volatile. For this reason, we
will continue to limit the duration of TDY visits to this region.
In addition, we will move forward with plans to build a secure
office/housing platform in El Fasher to permit eventual, longer-term
TDYs to Darfur.

--------------
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IMPROVES
--------------


4. (SBU) In response to the ICC indictment and subsequent NGO
expulsions, President Bashir, other senior GOS officials and
government-controlled media used strong rhetoric to blast both the
U.S. and West as having "colluded" with the ICC in a "conspiracy"
against Sudan. However, as reported (reftel B,) such rhetoric has
decreased markedly in recent weeks, with the result that the
atmosphere here is less politically-charged. Similarly, the GOS has
now returned the passports initially seized from U.S. citizens and
other nationals who directed the expelled NGOs. Other harassment of
the NGOs and their staffs has also declined somewhat in recent
weeks, although GOS demands that the NGOs provide exorbitant
severance pay for their local staffs remain a source of tension.


5. (SBU) Having initially somewhat restricted U.S. Embassy access
to senior National Congress Party (NCP) officials in the Government
of National Unity (GNU) following the March 4 announcement
(restricted in relative terms, as we routinely meet with numerous
high-level officials despite our rocky relationship with Sudan,) the
regime in recent weeks has done an abrupt about-face. It has not
only facilitated high-level NCP meetings for the April 2-11 visit of
new U.S. Special Presidential Envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, but
also has agreed to unprecedented meetings for him with senior Sudan
Armed Forces officers and the NCP Shura Council. In addition, the
regime is allowing him access to previously-off-limits rebel
commanders in Darfur. The GOS has also agreed to a CODEL coming
here later this month. This will be the first such CODEL visit to
Khartoum in the past two years. It too marks a change in the GOS's
reticence to engage politically at senior levels with the USG
following the ICC indictment and NGO expulsions.

--------------
GOS OPERATIONAL "SLOW DOWN" SPEEDS UP
--------------


6. (SBU) In early March, the Post reported (reftel C) that the GOS
had become increasingly less-cooperative on a range of
normally-resolvable, operational issues in the lead up to the March
4 announcement of the ICC arrest warrant. These included GOS
insistence on screening all outbound U.S. Embassy diplomatic
pouches, a "slow down" in issuance of non-diplomatic license plates
for official vehicles, the confiscation at Khartoum International
Airport of a shipment of unclassified E+E radios and equipment
intended for Consulate General Juba, and the refusal of visas for
U.S. military officers assigned to UNAMID. During the past month,
the Mission has been able to resolve all of these operational issues
with the exception of the final one. Mission engagement with the
MFA on the pouch issue, supported by discussions between S/USSES
staff and the Embassy of Sudan in Washington, resulted in GOS
agreement on April 2 to exempt all U.S. diplomatic pouches from
scanning. This agreement was based on assurances of "reciprocity"
for Sudanese diplomatic shipments from the U.S. In mid-March,
following my direct intervention with the MFA Director of Protocol,
the GOS agreed to provide non-diplomatic plates for 40 motor pool
vehicles. We had made this urgent request in January 2008 following
the terrorist assassinations of two of our staff members while they
were traveling in an official vehicle. This re-plating will
decrease the identification with the U.S. Embassy of U.S. staff
traveling in such vehicles. Finally, following prolonged discussion
with various GOS agencies, the shipment of official radios for Juba
was released on March 31.


7. (SBU) Comment: None of these changes in and of itself indicates
a dramatic shift for the better in U.S. bilateral relations with
Sudan. Serious problems and differences with the regime remain.
Clearly, though, there has been significant improvement on a large
number of security, political and operational issues that caused
concern in early March and led to our going on AD on March 9. In
addition, it is worth nothing that despite initial concerns
following March 4 that the GOS could halt incoming containers
urgently needed for the completion of the New Embassy Complex (NEC)
as happened last year, this did not occur. We need only 50 more
containers to have all the needed materials to complete the NEC on
schedule in late 2009. In the meantime, we will continue carefully
to monitor all developments that affect the safety and security of
our staff. We will also work to reduce the number of American staff
at Embassy Khartoum by severely limiting those coming here on TDY
and exploring other ways to reduce our in-country footprint. At
this time, however, there is no longer a need for Embassy Khartoum
to remain on AD.


8. (SBU) Comment Cont'd: Remaining in AD status for another 30 days
will negatively affect both the Mission's operational capabilities
as well as morale here at a crucial time. Staffing levels need to
return to normal to allow this Mission the ability to take advantage
of what may be limited opportunities for the new administration to
engage the GOS on issues of vital importance to U.S. national
security. These include addressing Darfur's looming humanitarian
crisis, establishing a new road map for peace in Darfur, and
ensuring full implementation of the U.S.-brokered, 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Africa's longest civil war.
For all of these reasons, I request that AD be terminated in
Khartoum on April 9.

FERNANDEZ