Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KATHMANDU972
2009-10-26 12:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: P-5 AMBASSADORS VISIT MAOIST CANTONMENTS

Tags:  PGOV MARR UN NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 261237Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7160
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 7499
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2835
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000972 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV MARR UN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: P-5 AMBASSADORS VISIT MAOIST CANTONMENTS

REF: KATHMANDU 0958

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000972

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV MARR UN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: P-5 AMBASSADORS VISIT MAOIST CANTONMENTS

REF: KATHMANDU 0958

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).


1. (C) Summary. During an October 23 visit to a Maoist
cantonment in eastern Nepal, the P-5 plus Japan chiefs of
mission underscored UNSC support for the Nepali peace process
and called for the rapid discharge, integration, and
rehabilitation of Maoist combatants. The Maoist Division
Commander said his party was willing to discharge the 4,008
disqualified combatants -- many considered child soldiers --
but wants generous financial incentives for their
reintegration into society. The Commander called for
integration of Maoist combatants by unit and refused to
consider integration into the police forces, both positions
sharply at odds with those of the Nepal Army and many
independent experts. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On October 23, the Ambassadors and Charge d'Affaires
from France, China, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and
United States, accompanied by the Representative of the UN
Secretary General Karin Landgren, visited the Nepal Army (NA)
Weapons Store at Chhauni near Kathmandu, and the Maoist
Cantonment Site 1 at Chulachuli in eastern Nepal. DATT
accompanied U.S. Charge. The visit was the first collective
visit by Security Council Ambassadors to a Maoist cantonment.
The delegation met with the UNMIN arms monitors, the Maoist
People's Liberation Army (PLA) Division Commander, and a
group of nine women PLA combatants. The delegation issued a
joint press release following the visit (emailed to SCA/INS).

--------------
Nepal Army Weapons Store
--------------

3. (C) In a largely symbolic stop, the delegation first
visited the Nepal Army Weapons Store at Chhauni near
Kathmandu, where they viewed 13 containers of Nepal Army
weapons. The UNMIN monitors and NA Director of Military
Intelligence briefed the delegation on the arms monitoring
procedures. (Comment: The monitoring of the NA weapons has
not been in dispute during the peace process, and the visit
to the NA weapons store was designed to demonstrate "balance"
prior to the visit to the Maoist cantonment. End comment.)

--------------
Maoist Cantonment
--------------

4. (C) The delegation then visited the Maoist Chulachuli

cantonment in the eastern Terai (near Darjeeling),which
holds 1,973 Maoist combatants, including approximately 900
who were disqualified by the UN. (Note: This ratio of
verified to disqualified combatants is unusually high in this
camp, as the total number of "verified" Maoist combatants in
the country is 19,602, and disqualified is only 4,008. End
note.) Conditions in the camp were good, better than many NA
camps according to DATT, with hard structures and cement
floors. The Maoist combatants wore military uniform and
appeared well-fed and healthy. Many appeared very young.
UNMIN monitors from Japan, Nigeria, Egypt, and Jordan,
briefed the delegation on the arms monitoring process. UNMIN
underscored that its mandate is limited to the monitoring of
arms, not personnel in the camp. The delegation met with the
Maoist Division Commander for nearly an hour, as well as his
three battalion-level commanders. Known as a hard-liner, the
Division Commander, speaking in Nepali, was articulate and
effectively presented the Maoist party line on military
issues.

Integration Into Army Top Priority
--------------

5. (C) U.S. Charge asked about the specific steps and
timeline for integrating and rehabilitating the Maoist
combatants into the Nepal security forces. The Commander
said political parties, through the Technical and Special
Committees, would decide integration and rehabilitation
issues. The Maoists expected to be integrated first at the
commander level, then the "unified' command structure would

KATHMANDU 00000972 002 OF 002


decide on integration at lower levels of the Nepal Army. The
Maoists insist on "some kind of unit integration," not
individual integration.


6. (C) The Maoists expect to be integrated into the Army
only, not the Nepal Police or Armed Police (note: even though
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement calls for integration into
undefined "security forces"). The Commander noted that the
two armies stored their weapons, declared a cease-fire, and
thus two armies must be integrated. The police did not store
their weapons. In response to the French Ambassador's point
that the Nepal Army is already oversized, the Commander said
that downsizing will have to take place after integration.

Committed to Discharge but Vague on Details
--------------

7. (C) Asked about the discharge of the disqualified Maoist
combatants, the Division Commander said that the Maoists were
committed to the discharge and could move quickly, but
stressed the disqualified combatants should be discharged "in
accordance with their will." They cannot be sent home with
"nothing." The discharged combatants fought for Nepal and
should receive jobs and "financial assistance." The
combatants come from poor areas, and many have no homes.
They want business opportunities and education. The French
Ambassador and U.S. Charge pressed the Commander to explain
the next steps on the discharge process, but the Commander
only said that the Technical Committee was responsible for
interviewing the disqualified combatants and that process was
"ongoing" (reftel).

What Special Committee Supervision?
--------------

8. (C) UK Ambassador noted that under the peace agreements
the Special Committee on Integration and Rehabilitation
"supervises" the Maoists in the cantonments. He asked the
Division Commander about the Committee's supervision role
over the Maoist combatants. The Division Commander frankly
said that he receives no instructions from the Special
Committee and takes orders only from his Maoist superiors.
To implement the supervision of the combatants, he said that
the political leaders must create a mechanism at the "top
level," then they will implement the command structures in
the field.

Female Combatants Toe Party Line
--------------

9. (C) In a separate meeting with nine women Maoist
combatants, the woman battalion-level commander told the
delegation that the previous government did not respect the
equal rights of Nepali women. Maoist women combatants wanted
the same level of integration into the Nepal Army as men.
When asked by U.S. Charge what they want to be doing in five
years, all the women combatants stated that they wanted to be
integrated into the Nepal army and wanted to make Nepal a
better place. Besides the Maoist women combatants, the
delegation did not have an opportunity to interact with other
Maoist combatants at the camp.

--------------
Comment: Long Way to Go
--------------

10. (C) The P-5 plus Japan visit offered another opportunity
to underscore UNSC concerns about the slow pace of the Nepali
peace process. The Division Commander's comments with regard
to discharge of the disqualified were somewhat encouraging,
but the refusal to consider integration into the police and
the insistence on unit integration were disappointing.
MOON