Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KATHMANDU950
2009-10-16 06:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: UN SUPPORTS JOINT HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000950 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: UN SUPPORTS JOINT HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY

REF: A. KATHMANDU 898

B. KATHMANDU 887

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000950

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: UN SUPPORTS JOINT HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY

REF: A. KATHMANDU 898

B. KATHMANDU 887

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).


1. (C) Summary. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) and Post agreed to develop a joint human
rights framework, identifying emblematic human rights cases
and pressing both the Nepal Army and the Maoists to take
specific actions to punish the perpetrators. While this
strategy would not address all outstanding human rights
violations, positive movement on emblematic cases would send
a powerful signal to Nepalis that the culture of impunity is
beginning to end. End Summary.

Joint Strategy, Parallel Pressure
--------------

2. (C) In a October 13 meeting, the Representative of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, New Zealand-national
Richard Bennett, and Charge agreed that the international
community should develop a joint human rights strategy to
address impunity in Nepal. Bennett concurred with Charge's
suggestion that the UN and like-minded countries apply
parallel pressure on both the Maoists and the Nepal Army,
using this balanced approach as leverage against both
institutions (ref A).

Working Level Dialogue
--------------

3. (C) OHCHR and Post agreed to establish a working-level
dialogue to develop a common list of emblematic human rights
cases, with specific and doable requested actions. Bennett
agreed that the list of cases should be defined and that it
was unrealistic to expect either the Maoists or Nepal Army to
investigate and prosecute all allegations of past human
rights violations. The list should include specific
individual cases, group violation cases, and systematic
reforms. Charge noted that developing a common list is
likely to be more effective than presenting the Maoists and
Nepal Army with various "competing" lists containing
overlapping and conflicting cases. OHCHR and the U.S.
Government will also consult with the EU, which is pursuing
its own human rights impunity strategy, and other like-minded
countries such as Japan and Australia.

Emblematic Case
--------------

4. (C) Bennett highlighted the Maina Sunuwar murder as the
type of emblematic case that should be on the list. A local
district court recently ordered the Nepal Army to hand over
the investigation file relating to Sunuwar's murder to the
Nepal Police, as well as suspend the Nepal Army officer
implicated in the case (ref B). (Note: According to
Bennett, OHCHR has seen the Sunuwar military investigation
file -- although they were not allowed to keep or copy it --
and the interview notes are very damaging to the Army
officer's case. End Note.) The court decision establishes
some concrete benchmarks to present to the Nepal Army.

Obstacles Ahead
--------------

6. (C) Bennett observed that the Nepal Army and the Maoists
tend to react differently when presented with evidence of
past abuses. The Nepal Army will often deny that the abuses
took place or present highly legalistic defenses of Army
actions. The Maoists, on the other hand, usually acknowledge
that the human rights violations took place, but refuse to
cooperate with Nepal Police on prosecuting the cases -- nor
punish their own "cadres" for the violations.

Realistic Expectations
--------------

7. (C) Bennett separately noted that he did not believe the
proposed Nepal Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
would lead to criminal prosecutions. (Note: the Nepal
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction is concluding its public
consultations on the TRC and will soon present a revised

KATHMANDU 00000950 002 OF 002


legislative proposal to the parliament. End Note.) Based on
a review of other experiences from around the world, Bennett
suggested that the most that could be expected from the Nepal
TRC is a chance for victims and victims' families to air
grievances and perhaps therefore contribute to national
reconciliation.

Comment: Long-Term Strategy
--------------

8. (C) Post is optimistic that we will be able to work with
OHCHR and the EU on a common human rights framework, with a
list of specific human rights cases and defined actions. We
are much less optimistic that the Maoists and Nepal Army will
take action on these cases. Ending the culture of impunity
will be a long struggle in Nepal, requiring the type of
political courage and vision that few of the country's
leaders have shown signs of possessing.
MOON