FRAUD SUMMARY - KATHMANDU, NEPAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 KATHMANDU 000910

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS, DHS, LEGATT & DEA
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC NP
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - KATHMANDU, NEPAL

REF: KATHMANDU 157



A. Country Conditions
--------------


1. Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per
capita income of less than USD400. A precarious peace following ten
years of armed civil conflict, the Maoist party intimating a
potential return to violence, weak government institutions under the
current government - the second government since elections in April
2008 - and a faltering economy, including high unemployment and
rising inflation, are all factors encouraging Nepalese to look for
greater opportunities outside the country. Political and social
instability are exacerbated by occasional incidents of both
criminally and politically-motivated violence, especially in the
Terai (the southern strip of Nepal bordering India).


2. The economy does not produce enough jobs to keep pace with
students graduating from universities. Nepal produces approximately
400,000 new workers every year. Many of these look abroad for work.
It is hard to get accurate figures, but the IMF estimates that
remittances comprise more than 10 percent of GDP. During the recent
global economic downturn, demand for Nepalese workers in Arabian
Gulf countries and southeast Asia contracted rather than expanded,
as had been the trend before the recession.


3. Nepal is a country with high levels of fraud. Corruption is a
way of life in government institutions and beyond. Counterfeit
educational, government-issued, bank, and employment documents are
readily available for purchase. Genuine but fraudulently-obtained
documents are also available, including passports and national ID
cards, although these are significantly more expensive than
counterfeit documents. In recent years, the level of fraud has
risen most significantly in B, F, H, and L NIV visa categories,
employment-based immigrant visas and the Diversity Visa program.


B. NIV Fraud
--------------


4. During FY 2009, post referred 210 NIV cases to the Fraud
Prevention Unit (FPU). Applicants submit counterfeit educational
certificates, bank statements, business registration documents, and
invitation letters allegedly from business or personal contacts in
the U.S. in support of their applications. Visa consultants often
provide counterfeit documents and misguided interview preparation
services. These agencies make deceptive offers through newspaper,
television and radio advertisements, convincing visa applicants that
their chances of obtaining a visa will be enhanced by the
consultants' assistance and advice. Approximately four years ago,
the rise in the level of fraudulent documents presented by
applicants led post to institute the practice whereby FPU screens
all submitted documents prior to visa interviews. In the past
month, Post has contracted a local production company to produce a
set of public announcements for television and radio to dissuade
Nepalis from resorting to fraud in their visa applications.

5. There are occasional reports of counterfeit U.S. NIV visas being
produced inside Nepal and of Nepalis attempting to buy fake visas
outside of Nepal.. In July 2008, post was alerted to a small office
that was offering U.S. visas without having to go through the
Embassy. A prospective recipient of a 'visa' presented a copy of
one of these fake visas to the Embassy, inquiring about its
authenticity. The individual provided the location of the office to
the Embassy and local police arrested two suspects who were involved
in the operation. A third suspect eluded police. Similarly in June
2009, an individual presented a copy of a supposed 'visa' to the
Embassy. He admitted that he had sent his passport via courier to
an address in Nigeria and was awaiting the return of his passport.
He told us that the person in Nigeria who had promised the visa was
awaiting his payment of thousands of U.S. dollars before his
passport would be returned to him. In this case post was not able
to apprehend the culprits but shared the information with post's
RSO.

Student Visas
--------------

KATHMANDU 00000910 002 OF 008




6. Despite a decrease in student visa applications in FY2009
(13,018 applicants in FY2008 versus 8,780 in FY2009),a large number
of Nepalis still apply to study in the U.S. As a result, instances
of fraud remain frequent in these cases. A high percentage of
student applicants appear for their interviews unprepared. They
have difficulty providing credible explanation for why they chose
the university and subject of study, and what is their general plan
after receiving an American education. Consular officers have
become familiar with common phrases visa facilitators coach their
applicants to use, thereby making it easier to distinguish
applicants trained by consultants from those who have done their own
research, and therefore who are more likely genuine students.

Student visa applicants also recognize that their ability to pay the
high cost of universities in the United States is an additional
hurdle to their successfully getting a student visa. Applicants
regularly bring to their interviews audit reports showing overvalued
land, business holdings and property leases. Often, bank balances
are either artificially built up within weeks of the visa interview,
or someone within the bank, itself, falsifies months of credits and
large deposits to indicate a credible source of income.

Post has become experienced in detecting counterfeit documents,
thanks to the efforts of our FPU staff. Consular staff members work
closely with RSO colleagues and the Criminal Investigation Division
of the Nepal Police; when information is available, consular staff
assist the police in tracing and prosecuting vendors of such
documents. Unfortunately, few cases have resulted in convictions
due to the lack of police resources to investigate and build solid
cases. Post reaches out to, and receives invaluable assistance
from, colleagues at posts in India when necessary to verify Indian
academic certificates.


7. In early summer 2008, FPU staff learned that some educational
consultancies were offering client students counterfeit documents to
bolster their portfolios. Around that same time, FPU began
noticingthat some of the government-issued business registration
certificates student applicants presented also looked suspicious.
Post reached out to the Nepal government office that issues such
certificates, to verify the suspicious documents' authenticity.
More than three-quarters of the suspicious documents verified with
the business registration office were counterfeit. This was an
indication that many student applicants' financial strength was not
as sound as was being falsely presented.

Religious Visas
--------------


8. During FY 2009, fraud in religious visas continued to decline,
particularly after R visas became subject to the visa petition
process. Post had been seeing evidence of fraud, primarily among
applicants posing as either Buddhist monks or genuine monks who
presented fraudulent invitation letters, and secondarily among
applicants claiming to be Hindu priests. A database, including
sample genuine documents from many sponsoring organizations in the
U.S., developed by post to combat R visa-related fraud has continued
to show its effectiveness in helping to identify mala fide
applicants, even in the face of a declining applicant pool. The
result of cooperation between monastery leaders and FPU staff has
been a growth in the discovery of counterfeit letters presented by
applicants claiming connections to well-known monasteries. On the
U.S. side, CA/FPP assisted post in checking the bona fides of
sponsoring organizations. Many cases resulted in determinations
that organizations were fictitious or the letterhead of genuine
organizations was being used fraudulently.

Temporary Worker Visas
--------------


9. The demand for H1B visas in Kathmandu has grown, as the number
of Nepali students studying in the U.S. has increased. Post
anticipates continuing growth in H1B cases in coming years as the
larger student numbers of the last few years complete their studies
and employment in the U.S. There has been a corresponding growth in
fraud in H1B cases as the number of applicants has risen.

KATHMANDU 00000910 003 OF 008




10. During FY 2009, H1B cases that were most often fraudulent were
those in which the applicant completed his or her education in
Nepal. Most H1B case reviews by FPU involved verifying educational
documents or experience letters. In addition to counterfeit
educational certificates, common FPU discoveries included inflated
employment qualifications, in which the applicant did not have
genuine qualifying experience, and outright false claims of work
experience. In one recent example, the applicant claimed to be the
chief accountant in the Nepali company but was actually a staff
member in the marketing division.


11. During the past fiscal year, the number of applicants for H2B
visas reached a plateau and then declined as Nepal was not included
on the list of countries from which H2B workers could be recruited.
Common problems in H2B cases have been fraudulent experience letters
and educational documents submitted during interviews. Even though
these documents may not have been material to the adjudication of
the visa, their presence raised concern about the true intent of the
applicant. Validation studies carried out by FPU confirmed that a
high percentage of H2B workers issued visas the previous year had
not returned from the U.S. upon completion of their contract.


12. Post's greatest concern about the H2B visa class in Nepal had
been the vulnerability of applicants to unscrupulous middlemen who
charged large amounts of money just for the opportunity to apply.
These recruiters coached the applicants and gave them fraudulent
documents for their visa interviews. In a case of 250 H2B workers
who went to work in a compact disc packing plant, within four months
of starting their work, more than 75 percent of them had left their
jobs at the plant and have not been heard from since. One of the
workers with whom post was able to contact reported that the company
declined to pay the wage specified in his contract. The same worker
confided that nearly all the workers he knew had paid money under
the table in order to be included in the group applying for the
visa. He claimed that applicants from the group had admitted paying
between $10,000 and $24,000 to the recruiters. These revelations
raised serious suspicions about the recruitment of H2B applicants
and forced post to examine these applicants very closely.


13. In September 2008, the Consular Section Chief received the
first of a series of phone text messages offering $10,000 per
applicant for helping to facilitate visas for up to ten H2B workers.
The Section Chief immediately notified the RSO, who continued the
communication in order to learn more about the sender's intent and
plans. After several text message exchanges, the RSO set up a
meeting with the sender to confront him. After talking with the
individual, the RSO provided the information collected to the local
authorities. Post has entered a lookout on the individual in INK in
order to maintain a record of the incident and preserve the
information so that it can be considered should the individual apply
for a visa in the future.

L Visas
--------------


14. Post's number of L visa applicants continues to be low, but the
number doubled from 42 in FY 2008 to 88 in FY 2009. One Nepali
company has established itself as reputable and has been granted a
blanket L petition by USCIS. Much of the fraud seen in L cases
stems from the inability of Nepali citizens to apply for E (treaty
trader) visas. Applicants that in other countries might be typical
applicants for E visas attempt to apply for L visas but may not
satisfy all criteria for an L visa. Misrepresentation of the nature
of the company and its business to DHS in the petition process is
the most common type of fraud seen in L visa cases.


C. IV Fraud
--------------


15. Post processed 796 applicants and 620 cases immigrant visa
cases during FY 2009. The FPU investigated a total of 1 159IV cases
during this time. Post's IV fraud primarily consists of fictitious
marriages and/or divorces and false family relationships. 'Love
marriages' are increasing in Nepal. However, Nepali society is
still one in which parents and other family members arrange a

KATHMANDU 00000910 004 OF 008


majority of the marriages. In these marriages, the prospective
husband and wife do not meet until only weeks, or even days, prior
to the wedding ceremony. Often, one partner's U.S. citizenship or
LPR status is viewed as a desirable attribute as a potential
arranged spouse, just as a higher education or better job prospects
would. Post does not necessarily take this as fraudulent intent to
use the citizen's/LPR's status to immigrate, but uses it as a factor
in judging the legitimacy of the relationship.

16. For the above-mentioned reasons, adjudication of IR and CR
cases is sometimes problematic, as it is sometimes difficult to
determine whether the marriage relationship is genuine. In some
cases, American citizens, usually of Nepali origin, fly directly to
Nepal from the United States, come to the Embassy within a day or
two of arrival to obtain an affidavit of eligibility to marry
(required by the GON to officially register a marriage),and marry
someone whom they have only just met. Often they have communicated
by phone prior to their arrival in Nepal, but they have not
physically met each other. At the time of processing the affidavit
of eligibility to marry, ACS staff members try to obtain as much
information from the American citizen as possible about the
spouse-to-be, in an attempt to identify immigration smuggling
rings.


17. Other commonly-observed fraud attempts are carried out by
families trying to pass off children of siblings as their own. Of
late, post has increasingly used DNA testing to verify relationships
in which there is suspicion and in which the applicant has not
presented sufficient evidence to reasonably establish the
relationship. Post has had cases in which the family has agreed to
go through DNA testing, but the results revealed that the child is
not the biological child of the applicant.


18. Post sees a high level of fraud in employment-based petitions,
primarily in the E3 category. Misrepresentation of employment
history, and thereby knowledge of the required skills, is common in
employment-based visa cases. The availability of counterfeit
documents and genuine documents obtained fraudulently creates the
opportunity for applicants to change personal and family details,
including date of birth, date of marriage, and the number of
children. In one follow-to-join case, the principal beneficiary
came back to Nepal and into the Embassy to assist with his family's
application. A consular officer took the opportunity to speak with
him and discovered that he had no prior work experience but rather
had submitted a fake work experience letter in the U.S. to get his
ETA-750 processed. FPU has discovered that nearly 50 percent of
work experience documents submitted with ETA-750 forms were
fraudulent.


D. Diversity Visa Fraud
--------------


19. The Diversity Visa (DV) program in Nepal has maintained a high
level of popularity. Among countries in which the DV program is
available, Nepal has the 17th highest number of diversity visas. In
FY 2009, post issued 1,544 visas under the DV program. The FPU
investigated a total of 155 DV cases during this time. Weak
economic and societal incentives to complete a 12th grade education
and the l lack of trained and skilled workers contribute to a
moderate DV refusal rate, based on an inability to reach either the
educational or work experience qualifications. Some DV winners who
cannot qualify based on their education bring counterfeit
educational certificates. FPU works with universities and
educational boards to verify the integrity of educational documents,
whereby post is confidentthat nearly all counterfeit educational
certificates presented by applicants are uncovered. Indian
educational certificates are also verified with the assistance of
the American Embassy and Consulates in India. Post is grateful for
close cooperation with the FPU's in India for this assistance.


20. Visa consultants and document vendors continue to try to take
advantage of DV applicants. They provide fake documents and
sometimes unscrupulous advice about how to fill out forms for a fee.
During the annual EDV application season, streets are full of
banners, signs and fliers from consultants offering services to
hopeful DV applicants. Each year, some DV winners who might
otherwise have qualified are disqualified because they failed to

KATHMANDU 00000910 005 OF 008


include family members in the initial entry. Post has had moderate
success at getting out the message that it is critical to follow the
program guidelines carefully and that it is difficult in Nepal to
qualify based on work experience alone. On the opening day of last
year's EDV application season, two consular officers were guests on
a call-in radio program about the DV program. In order to maximize
the effect of this opportunity and attempt to reach the
non-English-speaking population, from whom a high percentage of DV
applicants come, the officers conducted the conversation entirely in
the Nepali language. Post program feedback throughout the year
provided some indication that the program had substantial impact on
its audience. In post's most recent public outreach initiative for
applicants to avoid becoming fraud victims, a contract has just been
signed with a local production company to produce a short film
educating potential applicants about this issue.


E. ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud
--------------


21. Post sees relatively little ACS and U.S. passport fraud. In FY
2009, airport officials at Kathmandu's Tribhuvan International
Airport detained a Nigerian national traveling on a passport that
had been reported stolen in Nigeria. The individual used the
passport to travel from Kathmandu to Bangkok, where immigration
officials recognized he was not the same person as in the passport
photo and deported him back to Nepal. The subject claimed to be
fleeing from religious killings in Nigeria and requested post
contact UNHCR on his behalf for assistance. Post's concern with lax
security at Tribhuvan Airport prompted the consular section chief to
conduct training for immigration officials on detecting imposters
and false U.S. visas and passports for Nepal.


F. Adoption Fraud
--------------


22. Post processed 53 adoption cases in FY 2008. These were
pipeline cases approved prior to the suspension on intercountry
adoptions in 2007. An agreement of resumption of intercountry
adoptions was signed by the GON in January 2009. However, no cases
were finalized, due to a change in government and bureaucratic
disputes within the GON, the Ministry of Women, Children and Social
Organization, and other organizations working on adoptions. In the
last weeks of FY 2009, the Ministry resumed signing final adoption
decrees.


23. Post reviewed and processed several cases, and significant fraud
concerns were seen. In one case, two children were found together.
The father came to claim one of the children, but not the other.
Lack of record keeping by the police stations and orphanages, and
large financial incentives to complete international adoptions make
these cases highly susceptible to fraud and difficult to determine
if the child is truly an orphan. A great deal more adoption cases
are expected to follow in the coming weeks and months. The GON has
also taken steps to establish a central adoption authority, but work
remains to complete this goal. The government has newly registered
38 local agencies and nearly 60 international agencies, 33 of which
are U.S.-based, through which international adoptions can be carried
out.


24. Because adoptions in Nepal are vulnerable to fraud, each case
is scrutinized carefully for fraud indicators and inquiries are made
with the orphanage and police station. In the past, adoption fees
have varied widely. Under the regulations, fees are set at $8,000,
of which $5,000 goes to the orphanage and $3,000 to the Ministry of
Women, Children and Social Welfare. In the past, adoptive parents
have reported paying between $5,000 and $25,000, and many parents
complained that there are often unexpected fees added to finalize
the adoption once they are in Nepal. Post remains concerned that
the lucrative nature of international adoptions could encourage
child trafficking. Field visits and detailed interviews with
caregivers, orphanage directors, government officials and others are
often required. Adoptive parents, meanwhile, usually have no
incentive to share information with post officials, recognizing that
discrepancies in information will be carefully investigated by
consular staff during and after the visa interview.


KATHMANDU 00000910 006 OF 008



G. Use of DNA Testing
--------------


25. Post recommends DNA testing in family-based cases, primarily IV
and asylum, in which there is insufficient evidence to establish the
blood relationship to the satisfaction of the consular officer, and
all other avenues to establish the relationship have been exhausted.
Nearly all DNA samples are taken using a buccal swab, under the
observation of a cleared consular officer. Post is currently
implementing new procedures whereby all samples will be taken in the
consular waiting room by medical staff of the panel physicians.
These samples are then forwarded to the U.S. for analysis. Nepal
does not have an internationally-accredited lab that can perform DNA
testing. Through DNA results, post has been able to catch several
individuals having no genuine relationship to the petitioner and
these petitions have been returned to DHS for revocation.


H. Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud
--------------


26. During FY 2009, post issued 830 asylum follow-to-join (FTJ)
cases, more than doubling FY 2008's 343 cases. With recent waves of
asylum FTJ case files that post has received, FY 2010 will likely
continue the trend of caseload increases seen over the past several
years. With the recently-begun resettlement of thousands of
Bhutanese refugees in the United States, post anticipates facing an
substantial increase in refugee follow-to-join cases, as well. In
FY 2009, post processed just two refugee follow-to-join cases.
Confirmed cases of relationship fraud have been detected over the
last fiscal year through DNA testing, including in asylum FTJ cases.
FPU investigated 19 cases and confirmed a few cases in which
dependents presented false documents and claimed to be much younger
than they actually were, in order to qualify to follow their asylee
parent. In these cases, post returned the petition to DHS.


27. Post has an increase in the number what appear to be Nepalese
economic migrants who have used the political asylum program as a
means to emigrate to the U.S. In addition, post has seen cases in
which non-Tibetans Nepalis applied for asylum in the U.S., claiming
to be Tibetans who have been persecuted by the Chinese government.

28. Post does not process many cases of reported lost or stolen
I-551 cards. Normally, card-holders are issued a transportation
letter after verification is made through the Regional DHS office in
New Delhi, and the validity of the letter is limited to one month
both to prevent any possible fraudulent use by the recipient and to
prevent the letter from being recycled.


I. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime,
Terrorist Travel
-------------- --------------


29. There is alien smuggling in Nepal. There is a growing body of
evidence that consultants and other groups, offer to bolster an
individual's visa application portfolio in exchange for money.
Individuals applying for B1/B2 visas to participate in conferences
and trade shows, and those applying for H and L visas are the
primary participants in this type of alien smuggling. Post has
noticed occasional attempts by persons with prior travel to the U.S.
to take unrelated (and usually unqualified) persons with them to the
U.S. This pattern indicates an attempt to peddle their 'visa
credibility' for a fee.


30. In one such case a well-known Nepali actor who had previous
U.S. travel applied to renew his visa along with a supposed employee
of his movie production company. Although the employee had not
traveled to the U.S. before, he had traveled in the region. The
consular officer deemed the travel purpose credible, and both
qualified for visas. It was only discovered later that the supposed
employee had not returned from his trip to the U.S. When FPU
contacted his home, a member of his family said that the individual
was in the U.S. and did not have immediate plans to return to
Nepal.


31. Low levels of competent entry screening, coupled with
corruption at entry points, has contributed to a growth in alien
smuggling from and through Nepal. Immigration officials report a

KATHMANDU 00000910 007 OF 008


small increase in the movement of third-country nationals -- mainly
Chinese, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and occasionally Afghanis,
Somalis and Nigerians -- transiting Kathmandu with counterfeit
documents. The majority of them are heading for Europe or the
United States. Post works closely with immigration and police
officials, in addition to Australian, Canadian, British, German and
other European embassy and consulate officials based in Kathmandu,
to identify and prevent smuggling attempts.


32. Nepal has long remained a source country for trafficked men,
women and children. Many young women are trafficked into India and
to the Middle East for prostitution. A large number of young women
are also trafficked within Nepal to 'cabin' restaurants, dance bars
and massage parlors that offer prostitution services. Men are
trafficked to India, the Middle East and other Asian countries and
are exploited for labor purposes. Children are sometimes trafficked
to India for labor or to participate in circus acts. In recent
years there has been increasing evidence of individuals who have
been trafficked to India for the harvesting of their organs to be
used in organ transplants.


J. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations
--------------


33. Consular Section and RSO staff members collaborate in efforts
to combat fraud. Post is anticipating the arrival in 2010 of an
ARSO-I position. This position will be highly valuable to the
section in law enforcement liaison and fraud investigation. In
September 2008, FPU heard that a Nepali Congress-affiliated
informant wanted to talk about consultants selling fraudulent
documents to applicants. FPU coordinated with the RSO and set an
appointment. The informant came with fake blank documents from
various banks in Nepal, educational documents, land documents,
property evaluation documents prepared by the fake chartered
accountant and a fake government rubber stamp. The informant has
been giving information to various diplomatic agencies to help stop
fraud and stop consultants who extort money from Nepalis.


34. In August 2009, the same informant brought a newspaper
advertisement with published photos of students who had been issued
U.S. visas. According to the informant, those students paid
30-60,000 Nepalese rupees (400-800 USD) to a consultant for fake
documents. In addition, he raised the new issue of a government
entity issuing passports and citizenship documents to non-Nepalese
for 30-35,000 (400 USD)Nepalese rupees.


35. In March 2009, two applicants for visas to the United States on
the same day to take their USMLE exams. Consular Officers noticed
the USMLE Step I and Step II score reports looked suspicious: both
applicants earned the same marks in both tests. FPU confirmed with
USMLE that the documents were fake. FPU also confirmed educational
and job experience letters were also fake. FPU then worked with the
Crime Investigation Department (CID) with the information given by
the applicant to arrest the person who sold them the documents for
80,000 Nepalese rupees (1,030 USD). The vendor was an Indian
National, so CID was unable to trace him but did arrest one of the
applicants and some people involved in the case. Later, they were
released on bail.


36. In another case, an Indian National applied for a tourist visa,
posing as a Nepali Citizen. He fraudulently obtained a Nepali
passport and citizenship from the District Administration office.
FPU contacted the CID and the suspect was taken to the Police
station for questioning. Police learned that he was a Nepali citizen
but fraudulently obtained an Indian passport and applied for U.S.
visa from India in 2008. He was later released by the CID.


K. Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry
-------------- --------------


37. The level of passport fraud in Nepal is a concern for post.
Genuine passports can be obtained fraudulently for a price. Post
occasionally sees photo-substituted Nepali passports, chiefly used
by non-Nepalis, to apply for U.S. visas. Recently, post was
contacted by an individual who claimed to be able to obtain
authentic but blank Nepali passport books. Nepal has stated a goal

KATHMANDU 00000910 008 OF 008


of converting to Machine Readable Passports by April 2010, but post
is not confident that the government will be able to meet this goal
on time.


38. Fraudulent civil documentation -- counterfeit documents or
genuine documents issued by GON officials with counterfeit
information -- is common in Nepal. Birth certificates, police
certificates, death certificates, and marriage registration
documents can all be purchased from corrupt officials at local
government offices. Visa applicants submit fake civil registry
documents, employment letters, sponsorship and financial documents
and educational certificates. Applicants are even able to purchase
counterfeit Nepali entry and exit stamps falsify re-entry to Nepal
and to avoid detection of overstays in other countries. Access to
DHS' Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS) has been vital in
assisted the detection of counterfeit immigration stamps in at least
three cases.


L. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities
-------------- ---


39. Post enjoys very good relationships with officers of the
Special Branch and the Criminal Investigation Division of the
Police, resulting in past arrests of document vendors and corrupt
government officials sold genuine passports and Nepali citizenship
documents to non-Nepali citizens. Post has also nurtured very close
working relationships with the Nepalese Department of Immigration
(DOI). In order to maintain our working relationship with Nepalese
officials, we hold periodic representational functions for our key
contacts. Our experience shows that functions with smaller groups
of individuals are more effective than hosting one large group of
all our working contacts.


M. Areas of Particular Concern
--------------


40. Given the level of corruption in the country and the porous
border with India, criminal movement in and out of Nepal is easy. A
third-country national with ill-intent could potentially buy
fraudulent Nepalese documents and attempt to travel from Nepal to
the United States, pretending to be a Nepali citizen. Post is
concerned about the potential for terrorists to use Nepal as a
transit point for entry into the United States. One opportunity
post has to stop this kind of attempt is during document intake at
visa interviews. Since our LES staff members collect documents from
all visa applicants, they have an opportunity to identify a third
country national posing fraudulently as a Nepali citizen by
determining whether an applicant is a native Nepali speaker or not.


41. Whenever possible, post holds anti-fraud trainings for
immigration, police, and airline officials to familiarize them with
U.S. travel documents, basic document security features, and
imposter recognition. Additionally, post uses the opportunity to
highlight their role and importance in curbing alien smuggling,
trafficking and other visa-related fraud.


N. Staffing and Training
--------------


42. Embassy Kathmandu's FPU is composed of senior fraud prevention
LES Sashi Limbu and fraud prevention FSN Nandini Pradhan. Fraud
Prevention Manager Tack Lim recently arrived September 29, 2009.


43. Our senior fraud prevention FSN attended fraud prevention
training held by the Foreign Service Institute in March 2008. The
second fraud prevention LES has recently been hired and has not yet
had an opportunity to attend any training.

MOON