Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KATHMANDU841
2009-09-11 12:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: MAOISTS' SHORT AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES IN

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000841 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS' SHORT AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES IN
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

REF: A. KTM 00813

B. KTM 00756

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000841

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS' SHORT AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES IN
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

REF: A. KTM 00813

B. KTM 00756

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).


1. (SBU) Summary: Nepal's Maoists continue to pursue short-
and long-term strategies for returning to power in the
Constituent Assembly. In the short term, they are working to
persuade disaffected Madhesi parties to give them the 30
seats they need to gain a working majority. Over the long
term, however, the Maoists recognize the limitations of
temporary alliances and hope to lead a stable, "consensus"
government that includes all major parties. The Maoists
recognize that discharging "disqualified" Maoist combatants
is the first step toward achieving a lasting peace, but
accuse India of unspecified interference in the peace
process. Extremists in each of the major parties are further
complicating the process by preventing consensus on key
issues. End Summary.


2. (C) The following report is based on Charge's September 9
meeting with Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Politburo member of the
Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist and Constituent
Assembly (CA) member. Mahara leads the Maoist party's
Foreign Affairs and Organization Department. He was the
party's chief peace negotiator during the insurgency.

SHORT-TERM COALITION BUILDING
--------------

3. (C) Mahara said the Maoists want back in the government
and are well aware of the votes they need to take control of
the CA. The Maoists, with 240 CA members, need the support
of only 61 non-Maoist CA members to bring down the
government. They already have 20 votes from a faction of the
Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF),and are confident that
10-12 members from the small parties would support a
Maoist-led government. This leaves them roughly 30 votes
short. If the other three Madhesi parties switched sides,
the Maoists would pick up 62 additional votes, giving them
the majority. Mahara said this scenario could play out if
Vice President Jha, who is ethnically Madhesi, resigns his
position over a long-simmering oath-taking controversy (ref
A). The three Madhesi parties have implied that they will
withdraw their support for the government if VP Jha quits.
Mahara even suggested that the Maoists might agree to let

another party take the Prime Minister position.


4. (C) The Maoists would prefer to lead a consensus
government including both the Nepali Congress and the
Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (UML). The
NC and UML are fractured internally, Mahara said, with half
of the UML Central Committee members pushing to support the
Maoists. NC leader G.P. Koirala's intense pressure to have
his daughter, FM Sujata Koirala, appointed Deputy Prime
Minister is causing open dissent in the NC. Mahara said the
Maoist leadership is undecided on cutting a deal to bring the
NC into a potential coalition. He opined that media rumors
of Sujata being given a leadership position in a Maoist-NC
coalition government in exchange for NC support were
unfounded. He said such a decision would anger and divide
NC's senior leadership and cause revolt in the Maoist rank
and file.

LONG-TERM PEACE PROCESS
--------------

5. (C) Mahara said the "first task" in the peace process is
the discharge of the 4,008 disqualified persons in Maoist
cantonments. He commented the current instability in the
ruling coalition has caused the discharge process to be put
on the back burner, but it will fall into place after the
government situation is resolved. The Maoists were concerned
that the rehabilitation program to provide skills-training
and financial assistance to disqualified persons, though
well-coordinated by the UNDP, was being poorly managed by the
Peace and Reconstruction Ministry. He worried that a badly

KATHMANDU 00000841 002 OF 002


managed discharge process could be counterproductive and end
with the disqualified joining insurgency groups, particularly
those in the Terai.


6. (C) Mahara thanked the international community for
playing a positive role in the peace process, but said
certain countries are now interfering in the process. He
said India has become particularly biased against the
Maoists. He suggested an objective third-party mediator
could be helpful, perhaps from Norway, Switzerland, or
Ireland. Although the Maoists appreciate UNMIN's
involvement, according to Mahara, it cannot play the mediator
role because the NC and UNMIN do not have a good relationship.

CONSTITUTION WON'T BE LATE
--------------

7. (C) Government instability has stalled the constitution
drafting process, but Mahara insisted the process would be
completed by the May 28, 2010 deadline. The Maoists are
looking for a new system of government that would work for
Nepal and sees neither India nor China as an appropriate
model. He reiterated the Maoist proposal that future
governments should be "consensus governments" (i.e. no
opposition parties) in a multiparty state (ref B). He
observed that ruling coalitions not based on consensus have
historically been short-lived in Nepal.


8. (C) Mahara's personal view was that all the parties,
including the Maoists, were being pushed by their extremist
elements and that the parties were focused only on their
self-interest. He hoped the parties would soon understand
the need for a more pragmatic approach.


9. (C) Mahara asked the Charge for his view of the current
situation. The Charge agreed that it was a national
imperative for Nepal to develop consensus on the peace
process and constitution. The Charge urged the Maoists to
discharge disqualified combatants from the cantonments,
especially minors. Charge noted American and international
efforts to support the peace process, including the
USAID-funded Nepal Transition To Peace Forum (NTTP),and
offered continued U.S. support for facilitation initiatives.


10. (C) Comment: Madhesis and other minorities have
complained to the embassy that the Maoists promised to
enhance minority rights during the war, but took no action
when they subsequently came to power. It is thus unclear
whether they will be able to attract sufficient Madhesi
support to regain a majority in the Constituent Assembly, but
most observers believe that the earliest the government
leadership might change will be after holidays in late
September. End Comment.
MOON