UNMIN PESSIMISTIC ON NEPAL PEACE PROCESS PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000748

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER KDEM UNSC IN NP
SUBJECT: UNMIN PESSIMISTIC ON NEPAL PEACE PROCESS PROSPECTS
OVER SHORT TERM

REF: A. KATHMANDU 737

B. KATHMANDU 732

C. USUN NEW YORK 712

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).


1. (C) Summary: The UN Secretary General's representative
in Nepal, Karin Landgren, told P-5 missions on August 11 that
prospects for Nepal's peace process over the next six to
eight weeks are "slim." Obstacles include the failure of
political leaders to develop a "high-level mechanism" for
resolving ongoing disputes and Maoist refusal to engage in
substantive discussions until the current controversy over
"civilian supremacy" is resolved. Landgren recommended that
P-5 governments encourage India to support formation of a
unity government and to discourage the Indians from providing
military aid -- especially lethal assistance -- to Nepal.
Landgren also stated that, according to Maoist sources,
Maoist leader Prachanda was not reappointed People's
Liberation Army Supreme Commander during recent Politburo
meetings. End Summary.


2. (C) On August 11, Karin Landgren, the Representative of
the Secretary General at the United Nations Mission in Nepal
(UNMIN),provided the following update on the Nepal peace
process and related political issues for the heads of P-5
missions (except China, which did not attend). Landgren's
overall assessment was that prospects for progress over the
next six to eight weeks would be "slim."

Security Council Resolution
--------------

3. (SBU) Landgren noted that the July 23 United Nations
Security Council resolution on Nepal expressed concern about
deteriorating relations and lack of trust among the political
parties and encouraged movement on the peace process through
a high-level mechanism. The UNSCR urged the early
reconstitution of the special and technical committees and
called for the implementation of a plan to discharge and
rehabilitate the 4,008 disqualified Maoist combatants in the
cantonments monitored by UNMIN. The UNSCR encouraged the
Government of Nepal (GON) to commit to action on a plan to
discharge and rehabilitate the disqualified and to begin the
integration process for the other former combatants. The
resolution, which for the first time in a UNSCR made
reference to human rights concerns in Nepal, also encouraged
UNMIN to assist with the process while the players considered
alternatives to UNMIN monitoring. The next report to the
Secretary General is due on October 30.

Political Progress Stalled
--------------

4. (C) Landgren's update focused on the three weeks since
the UNSCR. She was concerned by the lack of progress towards
creating a multi-party high-level political mechanism to work
through the thorniest issues of the peace process and
constitution drafting. UNMIN has advised the high-level
mechanism to focus on core issues, stick to core people,
prepare a work plan, and create a sub-structure for managing
issues. UNMIN believes the four core tasks of the high-level
mechanism are to decide terms of reference, reach an
agreement regarding the issue of civilian supremacy, agree on
the composition of the special committee, and address the
issue of federalism in the new constitution. UNMIN has
called for a return to the constitution drafting process and
rejects as an empty argument the public discussion of whether
constitution drafting or rehabilitation and integration
should happen first. According to UNMIN, the GON should work
on both concurrently.

Maoists Fail To Prove Commitment
--------------

5. (C) All of the parties claim they are committed to the
process, but the Maoists say they cannot move forward on
either constitution drafting or rehabilitation and

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integration until the GON addresses the issue of civilian
supremacy over the Nepal Army. The Maoists have promised to
continue dialogue at the top level and -- responding to
UNMIN's concerns about their protest program (Refs A and B)
-- offered reassurances that they would "calibrate" the
program. Landgren told the P-5 group that although the
Maoists intend to increase protests gradually, there is no
guarantee that the situation will not get out of hand. UNMIN
is calling for all parties to exercise restraint and stick to
the peace agreements. Landgren also mentioned that,
according to Maoist sources, Prachanda was not reappointed as
Supreme Commander of the People's Liberation Army.

Discharge of the Disqualified
--------------

6. (C) Minister of Peace and Reconstruction Rakam Chemjong
and the Maoist leadership held several meetings on July 25
and 29 to discuss the discharge of 4,008 disqualified persons
from the cantonments. Talks included ideas for a transit
center planning group and a higher committee to coordinate.
Landgren said the process has been stalled because the Peace
and Reconstruction Ministry lacks capacity and the Maoists
lack the will to participate. UNMIN thinks that planning is
the most important step the parties can take. Landgren
implied that the new Peace Secretary, who begins next week,
would help push things forward.


7. (C) UNMIN wants the Maoists to agree on providing three
options for disqualified individuals: skills and training,
microenterprises, and education. The Maoists failed to issue
a press statement in mid-July agreeing to the discharge
process, although both the GON and UNMIN released their own
statements. Prachanda personally promised Landgren that the
Maoists would release a paper committing to the discharge
process at the conclusion of the party's Politburo meetings.
The Maoists failed to do so.

Special and Technical Committees
--------------

8. (C) The technical committee "continues to meet but not
work," according to Landgren. UNMIN has provided the
committee with a non-paper describing its options for a
mandate extension and political direction. Separately, the
composition of the special committee remains a sticking
point. It is unclear whether the Maoists will insist on
chairing the committee. The allocation of two Madhesi seats
on the committee is particularly controversial. The two
seats have been allocated to Deputy Prime Minister Bijay
Gachhadar's breakaway faction of the Madhesi People's Rights
Forum (MPRF) and to the Terai-Madhes Democratic Party.
Upendra Yadav's MPRF has been left out but demand a seat.
The Maoists claim the decision was made without full
consultation, but whether the Maoists truly place much
importance on this is also unclear.

Constitutional Drafting
--------------

9. (C) UNMIN does not know what can be done to satisfy the
Maoists' insistence that constitution drafting cannot proceed
before civilian supremacy issues are resolved. Possibilities
include an amendment to the Military Act or to the Interim
Constitution. UNMIN also is unclear as to whether the
Maoists are serious about addressing this issue or are using
this as a smokescreen to delay the peace process. (Note:
Local observers have suggested that the Maoists are delaying
the peace process until they can lead a new government. End
note.) What is clear is that the text of the agreement in
July that promised a resolution within one month of the
civilian supremacy issue is very vague: the parties agreed
to "initiate measures to form a consensus." The RSG also
noted the constitutional concept papers that have been
finalized do not actually reflect consensus; parties are
being pushed to move the papers forward with dissent
attached. (Note: Navodita Chaudhary, a Constituent Assembly
member from the Rastriya Prajatantra Party, separately told
Charge the same story on August 11. End note.)

KATHMANDU 00000748 003.2 OF 004



India's Role
--------------

10. (C) UNMIN wrote to the Minister of Defense on August 10
to express concerns about Nepal Army recruitment and the
possibility that India would provide lethal and non-lethal
assistance. The Government of India (GOI) has confirmed to
UNMIN that the GON made a request but the Indians declined to
specify the details. The GOI has "informally" conveyed to
UNMIN that New Delhi did not think the GON had made an
"unreasonable" request. The GOI has asked for GON's request
in writing. UNMIN is concerned that this request --
especially lethal assistance -- would breach several
provisions of the peace agreements. Landgren told the P-5
group that she recommended communicating to the GOI
opposition to lethal assistance.


11. (C) Landgren emphasized that dealing with New Delhi is
"critical" and making the Maoists feel less isolated is
important. The Maoists suspect that India is keeping them
out of the government and have moderated their anti-India
rhetoric over the past month to prevent any further
deterioration in relations. Regarding upcoming high-level
GON visits to New Delhi, the RSG said having the GOI develop
an action strategy would be useful. Landgren wondered what
would persuade the GOI to encourage a unity government. The
RSG posited the Maoists would not join a unity government
under Prime Minister M.K. Nepal, but she continues to hear
speculation that Baburam Bhattarai might be acceptable to the
GOI as a potential Prime Minister.

Positive Developments
--------------

12. (C) Landgren described a handful of positive
developments worth noting. She was pleased that the various
players have been willing to put numbers on the table
regarding integration -- discussions have settled on
approximately 5,000 persons. Additionally, there are
indications that various parts of the GON, including even the
Department of Forestry, would be willing to accept former
Maoist combatants into their ranks.

Speculation on GON's Future
--------------

13. (C) Speculation about the fate of the current government
is widespread. Landgren shared a wildcard scenario that
could force the formation of a new government: she heard
that the Madhesis might resign if the Vice President is
required to retake his oath in Nepali, causing the government
to lose its majority and thereby to fall. Rumors that UNMIN
has heard about an inevitable unity government after the
Dashain holidays in late September have quieted down. One
rumor that persists, based on the positive relationship
between Maoist leader Prachanda and Nepali Congress leader
G.P. Koirala (and on Koirala's notorious reluctance to give
up power) is a government that includes the Maoists with
Koirala as Prime Minister.

Options for Moving Peace Process Forward
--------------

14. (C) The P-5 heads of mission discussed options for
moving the peace process forward:

- a UNSC visit to Nepal in October;
- a collective visit of diplomats in Kathmandu to a
cantonment;
- high-level visitors from foreign capitals;
- high-level UN visitors;
- a European Union troika visit at the director level,
possibly in October;
- P-5 call on the new Chief of Army Staff after he is sworn
in on September 10;
- joint press releases

Comment
--------------

KATHMANDU 00000748 004 OF 004



15. (C) Landgren painted a realistic view of the short-term
prospects for the peace process and development of a new
constitution. The Prime Minister is on the defensive, and
any progress on the peace process and constitution drafting
seems unlikely under his leadership so long as the Maoists
refuse to participate.
MOON