Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KATHMANDU377
2009-05-06 11:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

MEETINGS WITH PM DAHAL AND UML LEADER KHANAL:

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL NP 
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O 061115Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0138
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000377 


DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NP
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH PM DAHAL AND UML LEADER KHANAL:
CURRENT IMPASSE FAR FROM OVER

REF: A. KATHMANDU 376

B. KATHMANDU 366

C. KATHMANDU 365

D. KATHMANDU 364

E. AND PREVIOUS


Classified By: AMBASSADOR NANCY J. POWELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000377


DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NP
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH PM DAHAL AND UML LEADER KHANAL:
CURRENT IMPASSE FAR FROM OVER

REF: A. KATHMANDU 376

B. KATHMANDU 366

C. KATHMANDU 365

D. KATHMANDU 364

E. AND PREVIOUS


Classified By: AMBASSADOR NANCY J. POWELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador joined like-minded heads of
mission in separate meetings with Prime Minister Dahal and
UML leader Jhalanath Khanal. Dahal was especially emphatic
in his defense of civilian supremacy and the need to have the
principle fully recognized in Nepal. He called the
President,s action in reinstating COAS Katawal a
&surprise8 and &sad, unfortunate8. He hoped his
resignation would lead to formation of a national unity
government, but then listed a series of conditions which will
make it difficult to achieve, including Maoist leadership as
the largest party and reversal of the President,s actions
concerning General Katawal. He rejected calls by several of
the participants not to hold urgent governance and peace
issues hostage to resolution of issues surrounding the
President,s actions. The PM said orders issued by local
Maoist officers in several places directing other parties to
close their offices and leave were not party policy. UML
leader Jhalanath Khanal shared Dahal,s view that the
resignation had created a new situation in Nepal. He said
all parties recognize the need for a government of national
unity, which includes at least the four major parties.
Khanal described the Maoists as very upset by the
President,s actions and noted that the UML had reservations,
adding that the &President had traveled the extra mile8.
He said this issue appeared to be the most serious one for
the Maoists. The UML is ready to assume leadership of a
national unity government, but would not insist on it.
Ambassador delivered letters to Dahal and Khanal from
Assistant Secretary Boucher at the conclusion of each meeting.


2. (C) Ambassador joined like-minded heads of mission from
Finland (local EU chairman),UK, Germany, Denmark,
Netherlands, EU and France in separate meetings with Prime
Minister Dahal and UML leader Jhalanath Khanal. Dahal was
accompanied by Finance Minister Bhattarai and Foreign Policy
Advisor Thapa; Khanal was unaccompanied.


3. (C) Dahal was composed and articulate, speaking without

notes in making his case that the Maoists were the most
democratic of the parties given their support for the
elections, republic, and now civilian supremacy over the
military. He characterized his resignation as proof of the
party,s democratic credentials. He was especially emphatic
in his defense of civilian supremacy and the need to have the
principle fully recognized in Nepal. He noted that he had
had the support of all five coalition parties before seeking
clarification from the Army Chief on three issues and could
still not understand why four of the parties had changed
their minds. He called the President,s action in
reinstating Katawal a &surprise8 and &sad, unfortunate8.


4. (C) Referring to a January 2008 tape which has aired on
Nepali television and the internet in which he is addressing
PLA forces, he said his remarks on the actual number of
fighters, the objective of taking over the Nepal Army and a
plan to skim payments meant for PLA combatants had been taken
out of context. He defended the speech as one to convince
skeptical cadre of the need to pursue democratic elections.
He announced he would address these issues in a press
conference (septel).


5. (C) Dahal said that he hoped his resignation would lead
to formation of a national unity government, but then listed
a series of conditions which will make it difficult to
achieve, including Maoist leadership as the largest party and
reversal of the President,s actions concerning General
Katawal. He indicated the party had taken no decision on
what to do if another party insisted on leading a new
government. He rejected calls by several of the participants
not to hold urgent governance and peace issues hostage to
resolution of issues surrounding the President,s actions.


6. (C) The PM said orders issued by local Maoist leaders in
several locales directing other parties to close their
offices and leave were not party policy. He was urged by
Ambassador Powell to include a clear public message to that
effect. (Note: He answered a press conference question, but
had not included it in his prepared remarks.)


7. (C) With the exception of the Danish Ambassador (who had
met Khanal earlier in the day),the same group met UML leader
Jhalanath Khanal, who shared Dahal,s view that the
resignation had created a new situation in Nepal. He said it
could turn out to be a crisis or an opportunity depending on
how the Nepalis handled it. He said all parties recognize
the need for a government of national unity, which includes
at least the four major parties, but that the means to
achieve that goal were not clear. In an effort to start
consensus building, he invited the PM to his home early May

6. He described the PM as &very angry8, &very unstable8,
and &very unfriendly toward the UML8 at the beginning of
the session, but calmer and more reasonable by the end.
Dahal moved from saying he looked forward to being in the
opposition where they could agitate on issues to agreement on
the need to achieve consensus on the way forward. They had
discussed the Maoist decisions to create street disturbances
and the local orders against other parties. Dahal said the
latter were not sanctioned and would be stopped.


8. (C) Khanal described the Maoists as very upset by the
President,s actions and noted that the UML had reservations,
adding that the &President had traveled the extra mile8.
He recommended to the PM that they allow the court to decide
whether the President acted constitutionally, but admitted
that he had not convinced Dahal. He said this issue appeared
to be the most serious one for the Maoists and one that would
require considerable work to achieve common ground.


9. (C) The UML is ready to assume leadership of a national
unity government, but would not insist on it and did not
think in the end, that the Maoists would insist on leading if
other issues could be worked out. UML is talking to the NC
and to the Madheshi Forum. Khanal believes the Maoists are
encouraging the two largest Madheshi parties to unite and to
support the Maoists which would give them a majority in the
assembly and the right to form the government. He was not
optimistic that a new government could be formed by anyone
quickly.


10. (C) Comment: The PM,s attempt at spin control was
much better than his session with the diplomatic community
ten days ago, but still leaves much skepticism among the more
thoughtful members. His conditions for joining a national
unity government will at best considerably slow the process
and run the risk of completely tanking it. Khanal noted that
Dahal has shown himself to be flexible and that will most
certainly be required if the Maoists are to be part of the
government. There was no threat to leave the current
assembly or abandon the peace process, which were hopeful
signs, but the decisions to prevent the assembly from meeting
and to maintain constant pressure through small
demonstrations show little desire to move the process forward.


POWELL