NEPAL: TERRORIST BENCHMARKS PASSED TO PRACHANDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001174

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: TERRORIST BENCHMARKS PASSED TO PRACHANDA

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Randy W. Berry. Reasons 1.4 (b
/d).


1. (C) Summary: In a December 29 meeting with Maoist leader
Pushpa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda," Charge presented the
Embassy's benchmarks for removing the Maoists from the two
U.S. terrorist lists. Prachanda said the Maoists were
considering moving from street protests to debate within
Parliament. He expressed concern that the other political
parties did not want to see progress on the peace process or
constitution drafting because they were outnumbered in the
Constituent Assembly and out-organized by the Maoists.
Prachanda claimed India also opposed progress on the
constitution and peace process. In a separate meeting held
immediately after the one-on-one with Prachanda, the British
Ambassador and French Charge joined and inquired about the
Maoist's opinions on UNMIN expansion, which Prachanda
requested be extended for six months. End Summary.

Terrorist Benchmarks Accepted
--------------

2. (C) Charge told Prachanda the United States wanted to
engage further with the United Communist Party of
Nepal-Maoist, but that their continued placement on the U.S.
terrorist designation lists was an impediment. Charge noted
that the requirements for being taken off the list had been
presented numerous times by A/S Blake and Boucher and
Ambassador Powell. Since the Maoists had yet to take
significant action, the Embassy was presenting a written list
of the benchmarks (in both Nepali and English) and wanted to
arrange for regular meetings to discuss progress on the
action items. Prachanda said he appreciated the
clarification and recommended the party's foreign affairs
chief, and regular Embassy contact, Krishna Bahadur Mahara
work directly with the Embassy. (Note: Post is arranging a
meeting with Mahara to follow up.)

Shifting Debate into Parliament, Want International Help
-------------- --------------

3. (C) Prachanda said that the Maoists were in the midst of
a politburo meeting and were rethinking their overall
strategy. The first several phases of protest against the
government had been successful, he claimed, but had focused
on "street protests." Prachanda said they were trying to
"change the direction of the party" and "shift the debate to
inside Parliament," which would bring "more effective
exposure of our demands." (Note: The Maoists unilaterally
ended their obstruction of Parliament on December 23.) He
intimated that the politburo would make a decision in next
several days.


4. (C) The Maoist leader complained that anti-Maoist,
hard-line factions in the Communist Party of Nepal-United
Marxist Leninists (UML) and the Nepali Congress (NC) had
taken a more active role in their parties and were not
looking for consensus. These parties were stalling on both
the peace process and constitution drafting because they
realize the Maoists have an upper hand in both. Prachanda
said India had historically played a role in pushing the
parties forward at times like this, but India has become
"cold," and regretted bringing the Maoists into mainstream.
Prachanda claimed India also opposes drafting a constitution
while the Maoists are in a position of political power.


5. (C) Prachanda asked the international community to push
all sides, including India, to stay engaged in the peace
process and constitution. Without help from "the West,"
consensus would be impossible. Extremists and hardliners
within his party would gain the upper hand. Prachanda
admitted his party "has shortcomings," but said the Maoist
party members wanted a constitution completed.

Constitution Deadline Likely to be Extended
--------------

6. (C) The Maoist leader reported the party has been active
in drafting the new constitution. Even if the Constituent
Assembly cannot finish by the May 28 deadline, it could amend

KATHMANDU 00001174 002 OF 002


the Interim Constitution to extend the process by six months
if they have a rough draft document to present to the people.
The public would support an additional six months for
"finalizing the document," and taking public input, he
claimed.

Asking for UNMIN Six Month Extension
--------------

7. (C) U.K. Ambassador Andrew Hall informed Prachanda that
the British were tired of UNMIN being renewed in perpetuity,
and asked whether the Maoists would support the government's
recent request for a four month extension, instead of the
usual six months. Prachanda strongly disagreed with a four
month extension, and said the country needed UNMIN's presence
for at least six more months. UNMIN "must be kept until the
stagnated debate on the integration and rehabilitation of the
19,000 Maoist combatants can be resolved." Hall suggested
the indefinite withdrawal date would be a difficult sell in
London. Without UNMIN's presence, the atmosphere surrounding
negotiations would become poisoned, Prachanda said, noting
that the next six months is "especially crucial." If the
constitution drafting process crumbles in the final days -
mid-May - then UNMIN's presence will be absolutely essential
to keep the peace. This is not the time for UNMIN to pack up.


8. (C) Ambassador Hall suggested Prachanda work with the
Prime Minister to develop a timetable for UNMIN's departure.
If the Maoists could agree with the government on a
timetable, it would go a long way towards satisfying the UNSC
that a six month extension would be the last extension.
Prachanda agreed in principle, and noted that once a decision
on integration and rehabilitation was made, the process could
be largely completed within five months. He later admitted
that the actual integration and rehabilitation process would
likely take longer than five months, but that "just getting
started is enough to create a conducive atmosphere, at which
point UNMIN can leave."

Comment
--------------

9. (C) By presenting the Maoists with a written list of
benchmarks, we now have a shared reference point on terrorist
delisting. The document will help disseminate information
among Maoist leadership, something it appears had not been
happening before. We are encouraged with Mahara's
designation as a point of contact. He is someone Post has
worked with before, and we have had positive and constructive
interactions with him. We are also encouraged with the
possibility that the Maoists might end their shutdowns and
violent demonstrations, and begin negotiating in Parliament.
However, time will tell whether the Maoists will carry
through on this plan. Prachanda clearly feels that India is
the largest impediment to their current agenda, and is
frustrated by its perceived (or actual) resistance to greater
Maoist involvement in the political process.
BERRY