NEPAL: PM NEPAL'S NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001112

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM NEPAL'S NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PEACE
PROCESS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1102

B. STATE 119813

C. KATHMANDU 1079

D. KATHMANDU 1090

E. 12/1/09 OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

F. KATHMANDU 1105

G. KATHMANDU 1079 AND PREVIOUS

H. KATHMANDU 1109

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Randy W. Berry. Reasons 1.4 (b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a December 4 meeting, Prime Minister
M.K. Nepal took a hard-line on the Maoists, showing little
flexibility on reenergizing the peace process. The
"ultra-left" and "untrustworthy" Maoists will be allowed to
come into government only after their combatants leave the
cantonments. The PM wants to move 4,000-6,000 Maoist
combatants into "new security institutions," like a border
security or forest guard, with only a handful integrated into
the Nepal Army -- a proposal the Maoists would strongly
resist. UNMIN is not helping the peace process due to its
bias in favor of the Maoists. The PM said UNMIN should not
have an expanded political mandate, and he refrained from
confirming the GON would request a mandate extension at all.
The PM strongly hinted that he would promote Toran Singh to
Lieutenant General after an "investigation," despite concerns
about his human rights record. END SUMMARY.

"Maoists Cannot be Trusted"
--------------

2. (C) Charge met Prime Minister M.K. Nepal at his residence
the evening of December 4 for one and half hours, following
the PM's return from Mount Everest base camp, where he led a
cabinet meeting focused on climate change (ref A). Charge
urged the Prime Minister to demonstrate maximum flexibility
in reaching a political agreement with the Maoists. Per ref
B instructions, Charge said that the United States remained
committed to helping the people of Nepal to complete the
peace process, but there is urgent need for all the parties
to work together to make progress. Charge noted that he
delivered a similar message to Maoist leader Prachanda (ref
C) and Nepali Congress leaders (refs D and E).


3. (C) The Prime Minister took a tough line on the Maoists,
saying they "cannot be trusted." The Maoists have a "an
extreme left mindset" that has not changed. The GON's
21-party coalition has told the Maoists that they will never
return to government until they "dismantle their private
army." According to Nepal, closing the Maoist cantonments
must precede the approval of a new constitution (scheduled to
be completed in May 2010). The international community
should be "very specific and concrete" about its demands on
the Maoists -- insisting they get rid of their arms, army,
and paramilitary organization -- not simply calling for
respect for abstract ideas like "the rule of law" or
"democracy." The PM specifically referred to the usefulness
of the United States "tagging" the Maoists as terrorists;
Charge assured the PM that the U.S. Government has demanded
that the Maoists make concrete progress on ending violence,
respecting human rights, promoting the peace process, and
others issues before we would consider removing them from the
terrorist list.

Integration Possible, but Not into the Army
--------------

4. (C) On the integration of Maoist combatants, PM Nepal
suggested that a deal with the Maoists is possible. He
unrealistically predicted that the process could move quickly
if there is flexibility (complete in "even one month"). On
the numbers for integration, Prachanda told the PM and Nepali
Congress leader G.P. Koirala that the Maoists would be
satisfied with the integration of 4,000 - 6,000 combatants,
with the rest rehabilitated. Instead of the Army, Nepal said
the Maoists should be integrated into new "security
institutions," like a forest guard, industrial sector guard,
border security guard, or Armed Police Force. (Note: the

KATHMANDU 00001112 002 OF 003


Maoists want to be integrated into the Army. End Note.) A
"few" Maoists who "meet standards" could join the army, but
"you must not allow the Maoists to contaminate" the
institution of the Army, which must remain apolitical and
neutral, Nepal said. Any integrated Maoist combatants must
sever his or her ties to the party structures and reverse the
"indoctrination" and "brainwashing" from his or her People's
Liberation Army service.


5. (C) Nepal also suggested that he was considering a plan to
induce Maoist combatants out of the cantonments with promises
of cash and jobs, tossing out a figure of 200,000 - 500,000
rupee per combatant (USD 2,500 - 7,000). In his view, many
Maoist combatants are unhappy and would "defect" if "we could
assure them of their safety, training and a job." Such an
exodus would be a "big problem for the Maoists, and big
solution for the country." Pressed by Charge whether such an
initiative would violate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement or
be perceived as provocative, PM Nepal slightly backed off,
noting that the combatants were Nepali citizens; if they
"happened to walk out of the camps," the government would
have an obligation to assist them.

"What's the Use of UNMIN?"
--------------

6. (C) Asked about the upcoming UNSC decision on UNMIN's
future, PM Nepal sharply criticized UNMIN as biased in favor
of the Maoists, asking rhetorically "what is the use of
UNMIN; has their presence helped?" According to Nepal, the
Maoists "do whatever they want," and yet UNMIN only speaks in
favor of the Maoists. He cited two incidents where police
stopped armed Maoists, in Kapilvastu and more recently in
Banke, where UNMIN "sided with" the Maoists and urged the
police to release the armed combatants. (Note: UNMIN claims
the Kapilvastu incident as one of their recent successes,
saying it played the key role in diffusing tensions. End
Note.) The PM said that UNMIN's efforts to "upgrade itself"
would be a "big mistake," referring to the U.K. proposal to
expand UNMIN's political mandate (ref F). UNMIN is nothing
more than a "spokesman for the Maoists." The PM said he was
planning to call a meeting of the P-5 to discuss the GON's
views on UNMIN's extension, a proposal the Charge encouraged.

Committed to Human Rights, but Toran Singh Likely Innocent
-------------- --------------

7. (C) Bringing up the controversial case of Toran Singh (ref
G),the Prime Minister said he has "taken seriously" the
concerns of the international community about the promotion
of General Singh to Lieutenant General. A committee of three
cabinet secretaries is investigating his case, and Nepal will
respond to "objective facts," not "subjective" impressions.
If guilty, Singh should be punished, but if innocent, he
"should not suffer." The "morale of the Nepal Army" is at
stake with the Singh promotion, the PM claimed, and therefore
he must be "very careful." The Maoists have "penetrated"
many of the country's security institutions, even the police
and Armed Police Force. The Nepal Army is the "last
institution" the Maoists are trying to capture, and they will
"not be satisfied" until they do. It was the Maoist "bad
luck" that they resigned -- due to their "own internal
conflicts and wrong calculations" -- otherwise, they would
have tightened their grip even more.


8. (C) Charge repeated U.S. concerns about Singh's promotion,
stressing the need for a credible investigation of the
Maharajgunj incident which assigned blame. Absent such an
investigation, the promotion could affect U.S. military
cooperation. (Note: the Nepal Army is accused of allegedly
torturing suspected Maoists at Maharajgunj Barracks and
executing 49. End Note.) In response, the PM suggested that
the Maharajgunj incident may require the formation of another
committee for "further investigation" but that should not
hold up Singh's promotion. He admitted that it "may be
difficult" to find out what really happened. The PM held up
Singh's promotion for some six months because of the concerns
from the international community. He wanted to find out the
facts and "create the environment" for Singh's promotion

KATHMANDU 00001112 003 OF 003


(comment: leaving the strong impression that he plans to
promote Singh soon). Charge again stressed that an
investigation that exonerates Singh and vaguely promised
future investigation would not be viewed as a credible
response to the situation.


9. (C) The Prime Minister reiterated his personal commitment
to human rights and ending of the culture of impunity. He
said he plans to prosecute emblematic human rights cases,
involving both the Army and Maoist, mentioning by name the
Maina Sunuwar case. (Charge noted that the deployment of
Major Basnet, who was indicted in the Sunuwar case, has sent
a negative signal about Nepal's commitment to human rights to
the international community, a charge to which Nepal did not
reply (ref H).) Nepal also complained that the international
community always highlights the Army's human rights record,
and never about Maoist human rights abuses, noting that the
Maoist "extortion" in villages and the border is "rampant."

Comment: Long Road Ahead
--------------

10. (C) The Prime Minister's aggressive tone on the Maoists,
integration, and Toran Singh does not bode well for the peace
process or human rights. Despite the weakness of his
21-party coalition, Nepal and his government appear
increasingly hard-line on the peace process -- perhaps due to
the perception that Maoist political support is waning or
Indian support for Nepal's government is increasing. Nepal's
suspicions about the Maoist intentions are valid, but his
position does little to build confidence or encourage
consensus on the peace process. Following the delivery of
demarches over the past two weeks to Maoist leader Prachanda,
Nepali Congress leaders, and now the Prime Minister, we are
skeptical about the prospects for political progress in the
short term. The interests of the parties diverge
significantly, each is maneuvering for advantage, and there
is little incentive to compromise. Post will continue to
look for opportunities for press for flexibility and
consensus, but believe we may be in for a rough few months in
Nepal's never-ending peace process.
BERRY