NEPAL: POST RECOMMENDS NARROW UNMIN EXTENSION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001105

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/UNP, USUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: PREL KPKO UN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: POST RECOMMENDS NARROW UNMIN EXTENSION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Randy W. Berry. Reasons 1.4 (b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. During the upcoming discussions on UNMIN's
future, Post recommends that the U.S. Government support
another mandate extension, with a focus on its core mission:
the management of arms and armed personnel. UNMIN's current,
wide-ranging political activities, taken without Council
endorsement, are generally not helpful to the peace process.
Similarly, we do not believe that expanding UNMIN's political
mandate -- an idea floated by the U.K. -- would be effective.
The Council should request UNMIN to plan for the end of its
mission by July 2010, including demanding a transition plan
for arms monitoring. Given the Government of India's
critical role in Nepal, we recommend consultations with New
Delhi on UNMIN's future. Core country team has approved this
recommendation. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) This cable presents Post's views on the extension of
UNMIN's mandate, which expires on January 23, 2010. UNMIN
Representative Karin Landgren told Charge that the Secretary
General would present his report on January 11, and that the
Council debate would take place on January 15 or 18. The
Government of Nepal (GON) typically presents its views on
UNMIN extension very late. According to Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Acting Joint Secretary Rudra Nepal, the GON will
likely follow the same pattern and make its request 10-15
days before the Council meeting.

Refocus on Arms Monitoring Role
--------------

3. (C) In the original UNSCR resolution creating UNMIN (UNSCR
1740 (2007)),the Security Council tasked UNMIN with four
narrow tasks: monitoring the management of arms and armed
personnel, assisting the parties through a Joint Monitoring
Coordinating Committee in implementing their agreements on
arms and armed personnel, assisting in monitoring the
ceasefire, and providing technical support for the elections.
The final task -- elections -- were successfully held in
April 2008, and UNMIN continues to do a relatively effective
job on the other three tasks.


4. (C) However, UNMIN has not restricted its activities to
the 1740 mandate, but instead plays a very active role in
larger political issues. UNMIN Representative Karin Landgren
meets regularly with the Prime Minister, Maoist leader Dahal
"Prachanda," and other political leaders, and discusses
larger peace process issues, such as the integration of
Maoist combatants, the creation of a "High-Level Political
Mechanism," and constitution drafting. Landgren is regarded
by some as the "UN Ambassador" in Nepal, similar to the role
an SRSG might play in a larger UN Mission with a robust
political mandate.

UNMIN's Political Role Not Useful
--------------

5. (C) Post's general view is that UNMIN's (and Landgren's)
activist role -- an Indian diplomat called it "mission creep"
-- has not advanced the peace process. UNMIN is perceived as
biased toward the Maoists, a perception that stretches back
to UNMIN's role in the verification of Maoist combatants.
(In a recently-surfaced video, Maoist leader Prachanda brags
about tricking UNMIN into accepting 19,000 Maoist combatants,
when they only had 7,000.) The controversy over the
Secretary General's latest report on Nepal -- which
essentially recommended including the Maoists in government
-- only reinforced this view.


6. (S/NF) UN Representative Landgren is also perceived by
many Nepali actors as pro-Maoist. While we believe her views
have shifted somewhat in recent months following broken
promises by the Maoist leadership, her public statements tend
to favor the Maoists. Even if the UN is given or continues

KATHMANDU 00001105 002 OF 002


to play a political role, Landgren may not be the right
person for the job.


7. (C) The Government of Nepal's ruling coalition, led by the
Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (UML) and
Nepali Congress, does not trust UNMIN and regularly
criticizes Landgren's public statements. We doubt the GON
would ask for or support expanding UNMIN's mandate. Our
Nepali political contacts generally distrust UNMIN, and an
expanded mandate would likely be criticized in the press.

Wider Mandate Not Advisable
--------------

8. (C) Given that UNMIN's current political actions are
largely ineffective or counterproductive, we would caution
against providing UNMIN with an explicit political mandate in
the UNMIN extension, as the U.K. and perhaps the Chinese are
considering. It would be very difficult, probably
impossible, for UNMIN to serve as a credible, neutral
facilitator of political talks. An added UNSC endorsement of
a political role will not repair its credibility.
Furthermore, the main government coalition partners, the
Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist and Nepali
Congress, do not trust UNMIN and would likely resist a
broader mandate. Instead of expanding UNMIN's mandate, we
recommend minimizing UNMIN's current political activities,
such as reducing the budget for the non-core mandate
functions, using the UNSC debate to remind UNMIN about its
mandate, sending a new "neutral" representative, seeking a
specific request for a phase down plan, or other actions.

India's Key Role
--------------

9. (C) The Government of India (GOI) remains the most
important external political factor in Nepal, and played the
critical role in negotiating the 2005-2006 peace agreements.
New Delhi has never warmed to UNMIN, and it is unlikely that
they would support a wider political mandate. In our view,
UNMIN cannot effectively influence the peace process without
active GOI support. Post recommends that USUN, New Delhi and
the Department consult with GOI officials to solicit its
views on UNMIN extension. British Ambassador to Nepal Andrew
Hall, for example, reported that India's envoy to Nepal,
Rakesh Sood, "laughed at him" when Hall raised the idea of a
broader political mandate for UNMIN.

Timing
--------------

10. (C) We do not have a strong view on the length of the
mandate, but believe that three months is a very short amount
of time and would make UNMIN planning challenging. The May
28, 2010 deadline for drafting a new constitution could be a
key date in the peace process, and a six-month extension
would carry UNMIN through that sensitive period.

Credible UNMIN End Date, Request Transition Plan
-------------- ---

11. (C) Post suggests that the Council lay the groundwork for
the end of UNMIN's mandate by July 2010. Given the regular
mandate rollovers, this threat may not be credible, but
perhaps the Council could set concrete benchmarks for
extension, such as progress on integration of Maoist
combatants, or request UNMIN to provide an arms monitoring
transition plan with the interim report. UNMIN's four
international arms monitors in each Maoist cantonment may
offer a "security blanket," but it also allows the parties,
especially the Maoists, to procrastinate on the integration
and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants. We believe that a
credible UNMIN drawdown plan could spur movement on the
Maoist combatant issue.
BERRY