Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KARACHI398
2009-12-31 02:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Karachi
Cable title:  

BALOCHISTAN - CONFLICT BETWEEN BALOCH SEPARTISTS AND

Tags:  PGOV PTER KCRM KCRS PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KARACHI 000398 

SIPDIS

REF: KARACHI 330

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER KCRM KCRS PK

SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN - CONFLICT BETWEEN BALOCH SEPARTISTS AND
GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUES TO THREATEN STABILITY OF PROVINCE

Classified by: Acting Consul General Mary Elizabeth Madden, Reasons
1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KARACHI 000398

SIPDIS

REF: KARACHI 330

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER KCRM KCRS PK

SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN - CONFLICT BETWEEN BALOCH SEPARTISTS AND
GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUES TO THREATEN STABILITY OF PROVINCE

Classified by: Acting Consul General Mary Elizabeth Madden, Reasons
1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary. The 25 October assassination of Balochistan
Education Minister Shafiq Ahmed Khan and the 18 October grenade
attack upon Provincial Information Minister Yonous Mullahzai
represent the continuation of an ongoing Baloch separatist campaign
of intimidation and targeted killings. These separatists hope to
reduce the writ of the Government of Pakistan in Balochistan and to
exploit a widening rift between the Government and the people. Far
from satisfied with government reconciliation efforts, these groups
have been systematically broadening their list of targets, and
sources warn that violence will continue to escalate for the
foreseeable future. The ongoing conflict has had a noticeable effect
on the quality of life for the people of Balochistan and has created
an opportunity for third parties, especially the Pashtun, to exploit
the situation for property and business gains. End Summary.


2. (C) The 25 October assassination of Balochistan Education Minister
Shafiq Ahmed Khan is another example of Baloch Separatist's ongoing
campaign of targeted killings against government officials and
Punjabi "settlers." Khan was known throughout Balochistan as a vocal
supporter of the Government of Pakistan and was responsible for
several educational initiatives that were perceived as anti-Baloch.
Individuals associated with the separatist groups openly cited his
"anti-Baloch" policies, including the closure of colleges throughout
Balochistan and the relocation of all Punjabi teachers to Quetta, as
the rationale for his assassination.


3. (C) Although tensions have historically been high in Balochistan,
the current wave of violence can be differentiated from previous
insurgencies by the participation and leadership of the Bugti tribe,
a numerically significant and politically influential tribe that has
historically avoided armed conflict with the Pakistani Government.
The Bugtis were drawn into the current conflict when widespread
unrest over the exploitation of the Sui Gas fields in Dera Bugti was

met by a staunch crack down at the hands of security forces.
Initially targeted killings were mainly directed against security,
police, and intelligence forces. After the killing of Akbar Bugti in
2006, the separatists began targeting settlers or non-Baloch who were
believed to be directly associated with the Government, such as
teachers, as well as groups believed to support the Intelligence
Services, notably barbers who are believed to be the eyes and ears of
the GoP in Balochistan. (Note: Post's FSNI media analysis indicates
that there have been at least six people killed in attacks against
professors and school administers since September.)


4. (C) Sadiq Raisani, Spokesman for the separatist Baloch Nationalist
Front, said that these attacks are part of an ongoing strategy of
Baloch separatist groups to retaliate against increased Government
operations in Balochistan and continued dissatisfaction with the GoP.
This strategy is intended to bring international attention to the
Baloch separatist movement and to isolate individuals who support or
otherwise sympathize with the Government of Pakistan. He claimed
that these groups have been gradually escalating their use of
violence in Balochistan and that the Baloch separatist groups are
positioning themselves to enter a third, more deadly phase of this
operation. This phase will expand the pool of targets to include
anyone associated with the government establishment. There have been
some indications that this new phase of the operation is underway and
that separatist groups are beginning to target Pashtun and even
Baloch citizens who are either pro-government or unwilling to support
separatist causes. A recent example is the October 15 grenade attack
against Younous Mullahzai, the Provincial Information Minister and a
Baloch. However, Mullahzai told PolStaff that the police were still
investigating the incident and that it was too early to determine who
was ultimately responsible for the attack.


5. (C) University campuses have become ground zero in the conflict
between the GoP and Baloch separatists groups. Student groups are
widely believed to support militant organizations and the current
insurgency has its roots in social unrest at educational
institutions. In response to this ongoing unrest, security forces
have begun routinely shutting down educational institutions and have
been arbitrarily singling out groups of students for arrest and
interrogation. Unrest has resulted in most colleges and universities

KARACHI 00000398 002 OF 002


being shut down over the past seven months, effectively crippling the
higher education system in Balochistan.


6. (C) Meanwhile, this conflict has had a significant effect on the
day to day life of the citizens of Balochistan. Native Baloch
residents have begun to disassociate themselves from non-Baloch
groups and from being affiliated with government forces for fear of
being targeted. At the same time, Punjabi and other "settler" groups
have begun to migrate away from Balochistan while Pashtun groups have
been purchasing the property and businesses they leave behind. There
have also been reports that certain Pashtun elements have started to
exacerbate the situation by threatening settlers themselves and
attributing these threats to Baloch nationalist groups (Reftel).


7. (C) The Government of Pakistan has focused its efforts on
addressing Baloch complaints of socio-economic inequality, while
ignoring demands for greater political autonomy or independence. The
recently announced Balochistan package and increased National Finance
Commission (NFC) award for the province are seen by the federal
government as attempts to address socio-economic inequalities.
Baloch, particularly those with separatist leanings or those involved
in the insurgency, see the government's financial incentives as "too
little, too late," and fear that much of the increased assistance
will benefit a handful of individuals in the provincial government -
and the leaders of the tribes allied with it - rather than the
citizenry at large. In the past, the government has generally
resolved issues in Balochistan through increasing payments to tribal
leaders in exchange for cooperation with the government. The current
insurgency and separatist sympathies, however, appear to have spread
to urban areas and middle-class students and professionals that are
only tangentially affiliated with tribal leaders, making the
government's traditional approach largely futile.


8. (C) Comment: Post continues to monitor the deteriorating security
situation in Balochistan with concern. While outside support to the
Baloch insurgency from Indian intelligence and its agents in southern
Afghanistan is plausible, the escalation of violence in Balochistan
can be chiefly attributed to indigenous separatist elements. If the
federal government is unsuccessful in addressing the economic and
political concerns of the Baloch middle class, the insurgency
threatens to further alienate the GoP from the people of Balochistan,
eroding the GoP's writ in the province. Of additional concern is
that this conflict has created ungoverned space that outside
elements, such as militant forces fleeing ongoing operations in
Afghanistan and Waziristan, are capable of exploiting. To date, the
Baloch insurgency remains a secular movement vigorously opposed to
the religious ideology of Taliban/al-Qaeda elements and has not found
common cause with that movement. However, as the conflict with the
government goes forward, it is possible that approaches by
Taliban/al-Qaeda for safehaven may become more attractive to Baloch
insurgents.

MADDEN