UGANDA/DRC: ADDRESSING JOINT MILITARY OPERATION'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000094

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM UG SU CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: ADDRESSING JOINT MILITARY OPERATION'S
HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES

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1. (SBU) Summary: Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacks
against Congolese residents in retaliation for joint
Ugandan-Congolese-Sudanese military operations have raised
concerns about the protection of civilians. Several
assessment teams have traveled to the area of operations to
make recommendations on additional protection and
humanitarian assistant measures. Human Rights Watch (HRW)
analysts expressed support for the joint operations and will
advocate for more international assistance to ensure the
operation concludes successfully. HRW will recommend that
more pro-active measures are taken to rescue non-combatants
and protect local villages from the LRA. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM),UNICEF, and the Ugandan
Peoples' Defense Forces (UPDF),conducted a joint assessment
to make recommendations to the UPDF high command on
protection issues. End Summary.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (SBU) International and non-governmental organizations
assessments of the humanitarian and human rights situation on
the ground in eastern Democracy Republic of Congo (DRC) give
a picture of the current status of operations. UN
organizations, led by the Office of the Coordinator of
Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights Watch, and IOM/UNICEF/UPDF
visited the affected areas over the past month. Their
assessments track closely with one another. Post debriefed
the HRW analysts and the IOM/UNICEF/UPDF team.

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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
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3. (SBU) On January 20, P/E Chief and DATT met with HRW
analysts who had just returned from eastern DRC after three
weeks in Doruma, Duru, Dungu, and Faradje. Their mission was
to examine the humanitarian and human rights situation in DRC
in the wake of Operation Lightening Thunder, the code name
for the joint military operations launched by Ugandan, DRC,
and southern Sudan. HRW interviewed escapees, defectors,
local community leaders, UPDF, and Congolese units. The
analysts traveled with missionaries to Doruma, Duru, and
Faradje. They said there was dried blood everywhere and
bloodied clubs left behind. Local residents who were not in
the villages at the time of the attacks had to bury the dead.
In many cases, only one or two village residents remain
alive.


4. (SBU) HRW reported that the LRA killed 800 and abducted
460 Congolese citizens between September and early November

2008. Debriefs of two LRA sergeants that were in Camp
Kiswahili during the initial attack confirm that on the day
of the attack, all activities were normal. The women and
children had gone out to the fields at 0630 and the LRA
fighters were awaiting their daily "parade." LRA leader
Joseph Kony left to hunt for the Christmas feast at 0900 with
a number of his "concubines." The sergeants said the first
"bombs" hit at around 0910. End Note.) Many people fled the
camp. Most of the non-combatants who fled feared leaving the
safety of the forests, according to the two sergeants.


5. (SBU) According to HRW, Kony,s rampage that started in
September was a deliberate strategy to discourage defectors
by turning local communities against them. HRW found that
the LRA attacks were a direct response to the LRA defections
in August and aimed at penalizing and discouraging local
communities that had helped escapees. HRW views this wave of
attacks as setting the stage for current LRA tactics being
used against local populations. HRW estimates that at least
135 were killed and 300 abducted between September and
November.


6. (SBU) LRA attacks from December 24-27 were coordinated,
simultaneous, and particularly brutal, according to HRW.
Three distinct LRA groups carried out attacks at Doruma,
Duru, and Faradje. HRW estimates that there are about eight
groups of LRA operating, but that only three or four of them
containing high command elements are killing in a coordinated
manner. Local residents and UPDF officers told HRW that the
roaming LRA groups have GPS, Thurayas, and Motorolas for
communication, which had been retrieved after LRA members
went back into the destroyed camps before the arrival of
Ugandan ground troops. The LRA often subdivides into small
groups and then reconstitute themselves after missions,
according to eye witness reports. HRW provided the following
information about LRA configurations:


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--Group 1: LRA Deputy Okot Odhiambo (ICC indictee) is with
about 100 combatants in the forests near Gangala, Gamaya, and
Nawaku, which the UPDF says it has surrounded. Local
residents say that this group is carrying a man on a
stretcher who has some kind of leg injuries (Note: UPDF
commanders believe this is Odhiambo, who was reportedly
injured on the first day of attacks. End Note.)

--Group 2: A group "managed" by ICC indictee Dominic Ongwen
or members of his team, who killed 23 in Dijabe. This group,
according to locals, had left Garamba National Park, killed
people in Duru and Bitima, and then was pushed back when they
attempted to go north to Yambio, southern Sudan. HRW said
that local residents and UPDF believe this group is trying to
link up with Odhiambo near Doruma.

--Group 3: Lt. Col. Charles Arop and a group of 70 carried
out the attack on Faradje and four villages to the southwest.
UPDF believes this group is carrying out diversionary
attacks that would allow Kony to rejoin Odhiambo or escape
DRC.

--Group 4: General Joseph Kony and his bodyguards. HRW had
no information on where this group is located, but surmised
he remained in DRC, possibly near Duru.


7. (SBU) The pattern of the LRA attacks was to begin with a
few members wandering into the towns, in some cases scouting
out the presence of Congolese and Ugandan troops. They
sought out churches and other places where villagers had
gathered for Christmas services and then called in waiting
LRA attackers. Men and boys were lined up face down on the
ground and clubbed to death with axes and clubs. Women and
girls were raped and then suffered the same fate. In
Faradje, there was a bit more use of automatic weapons but
followed the same pattern. Children between ages 10-15 were
abducted, children under 10 were used to carry things and
then killed. On the way out of Faradje, hundreds of homes
were burned to the ground. After the mass killings, the LRA
ate the Christmas feasts that had been prepared and slept in
the villages among the dead bodies. HRW puts the numbers
killed in Faradje at 143 with 160 abducted.


8. (SBU) Local communities formed self-defense units, which
are working with the allied forces. The Congolese Republican
Guard units in the area are getting high marks from the local
community leaders, according to HRW. These units have
engaged the LRA without hesitation and have established good
relations with community leaders.

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HRW RECOMMENDATIONS
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9. (SBU) HRW said it is supportive of the military operation
against the LRA, but is looking for ways to enhance the
protection of civilians and rescue ex-combatants, women, and
children from LRA hands. Some of HRW proposed
recommendations may include:

--The international community should call for more
MONUC-provided logistics support to the allied forces and
provide financial assistance to protection efforts.

--Allied forces should be more pro-active in search and
rescue operations and place reception centers closer to LRA
locations, such as Gangala which is on the outskirts of the
forest in which the LRA is hiding. New messaging should go
out to those who want to escape about the locations of
reception areas.

--LRA supporters in the Diaspora and in Khartoum should be
isolated and prevented from giving Kony a lifeline.

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IOM/UNICEF ASSESSMENT
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10. (SBU) Kampala-based IOM and UNICEF offices are the lead
humanitarian agencies for the protection and repatriation
part of the operation. From January 6-14, IOM, UNICEF, and
the UPDF conducted a joint assessment mission to Dungu to
make recommendations to the UPDF high command about rescue of
non-combatants and other protection issues. The assessment
team found that there may be hundreds of escaped
non-combatants hiding in the bush because they fear attacks
by local Congolese communities. Kony has been effective in
countering leaflet drops. Kony said that the leaflets have
been printed with poison ink and that anyone who touches one

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will die. The team also found that LRA attacks on local
communities were designed to punish those who have helped
defectors and to pit the local communities against those who
seek refuge.


11. (SBU) IOM, UNICEF, and the UPDF are recommending
reception centers at Dungu, Kiliwa, and Rikwangba.
Discussions are underway between the UPDF, Congolese
military, and local community leaders on the best ways to
help fleeing LRA and non-combatants. Those who have made it
to Dungu say it is important to get word out via radio and
other means about the locations of UPDF units. The fleeing
LRA are afraid of local communities and now only trust the
UPDF to protect them. The UPDF is considering incentive
packages for local communities that protect fleeing
non-combatants. Coordination between the UPDF and Congolese
is very close, according to IOM. There are daily briefings
in the morning and sharing of reports. Currently, rescued
Congolese abductees are being handed over to COPI, an Italian
non-governmental organization, which provides foster family
care while family tracing is done.

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COMMENT
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12. (SBU) Ugandan military officials are acutely aware of
the need to provide protection for civilians and take
additional steps to aid escaping LRA members. Ugandan forces
are concentrating on capturing or killing key LRA leaders,
and could use additional logistics support to move Congolese
troops around to provide protection for local residents. The
operation has been extended for an additional 21 days. Post
is waiting for the IOM's final report, which will outline the
plans for stepping up protection activities.
BROWNING