UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION RUDIA II UPDATE (JULY 31,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000830

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/19
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS MARR UG CG SU
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION RUDIA II UPDATE (JULY 31,
2009)

Classified By: Acting P/E Chief Jarahn Hillsman for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (SBU) Background: This cable is a periodic update on the
regional military operation against the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) known as Operation Rudia II. This report is not
meant to provide an overarching narrative or polished
analysis of the operation, but rather offers spot information
gleaned in Uganda only, from U.S. Mission sources. We
recognize the regional scope of the operation and the fact
that our sources may be limited in their knowledge and
perspective on Rudia II. This update has been cleared by
Embassy Kinshasa, but not by Embassy Bangui due to the
absence of classified communications there. End background.

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MILITARY UPDATE
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2. (S NF) The Latest Numbers: The Uganda Peoples' Defense
Forces (UPDF) continue to make progress in tracking and
destroying small LRA elements throughout eastern areas of the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African
Republic (CAR). According to reporting from the Kampala
Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell (KCIFC),the UPDF has
killed 31 LRA rebels, captured 11 LRA rebels, rescued two
abductees, and recovered four weapons and 110 rounds of
ammunition in various engagements with the LRA since July 15.


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Violence Increases in the Central African Republic
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3. (S NF) KCIFC confirms that LRA elements have crossed the
border and are moving deeper into CAR, with two independent
sources reporting recent LRA rebel attacks as far west as
Mboki on or about July 22. (Note: The UPDF reports that an
attack on Mboki occurred on July 22, while other reports
indicate that an attack occurred on July 24; DAO is working
to confirm whether these were two separate attacks or one and
the same. End Note.) These reports are particularly
troubling because they appear to indicate the LRA is
operating much further west into CAR than was previously
thought. The CAR armed forces (FACA) killed two LRA rebels,
recovered one LRA rifle, and reported three civilian deaths
in Mboki (killed by LRA).


4. (C) Recent independent reports passed to us by Embassy
Bangui from an American citizen (Amcit) in Zemio, CAR and
from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) in CAR also describe a July 21 attack on the
town of Ligoua, located approximately 20 kilometers east of
Obo. The Amcit said the LRA stole food supplies that had
been distributed to local populations by the UN World Food
Program (WFP),and that this was the second such attack
targeting WFP food supplies in Ligoua. According to UN
reports, the other occurred on June 20.


5. (S NF) On July 16, UPDF engaged with an LRA element
approximately 60 kilometers north of the "no penetration
line" (a line that stretches along the road from Obo to
Bambouti, and which the UPDF and FACA troops had tried to
prevent the LRA from crossing). The engagement occurred
northeast of Obo, CAR and approximately 80 kilometers from
the last known LRA element in CAR. The UPDF killed five LRA
rebels in this fight, including officers John Ogenga and
Obong Angeki. They also recovered two rifles and 89 rounds
of ammunition. The UPDF estimates that approximately 100-150
people (both combatants and non-combatants) were in the area
of this engagement. The UPDF also confronted the LRA in
Basigbiri on July 15, rescuing two LRA abductees. Despite
the LRA's deep infiltration into CAR, the UPDF continues to
pursue and engage LRA elements with the permission of the CAR
government. Additionally, the UPDF and FACA continue to
conduct joint patrols along the "no penetration" line.

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UPDF Continues Pursuit of LRA in DRC; MONUC to Increase Troops
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6. (S NF) Since the July 15 update, UN associates in Kampala
report and Ugandan government officials confirm LRA attacks
in the following areas of the DRC: Ferry area; Kaki village
(Faradje area); road to Duru between Kiliwa and Baika (60km
northeast of Dungu center); Bangalu village (Niangara area);
and Mbiangu (between Bangadi and Kapili). Although the

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majority of the known LRA elements are located in CAR, east
of Bitima and the Faradje area, splinter groups continue to
conduct attacks and operations in the Banda, Niangara, and
Dungu areas. KCIFC estimates there are between 40-60 LRA
fighters operating in these areas. According to UN Mission
to the Congo (MONUC) political officers in Kampala, MONUC
plans to increase its force strength from 600 troops,
currently stationed in Dungu, Duru, and Faradje, to 1,000
troops, to include a contingent in Dingira. It is unclear at
this point when this will happen.

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POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
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7. (SBU) PolOff and Defense Resource Management Initiative
(DRMI) Officer met with MONUC Political Officer and former
International Criminal Court (ICC) investigator Matt
Brubacher in Kampala on July 27 to discuss a new MONUC radio
initiative that will target LRA defectors in the DRC. MONUC
officers spent last weekend in Gulu working with the Acholi
MEGA-FM radio station to develop broadcast capabilities that
can reach LRA audiences in northeastern DRC. Brubacher is
working with MEGA-FM to develop mobile transmitter capability
for the Dungu area, and to schedule the radio show for the
early morning hours, when the LRA reportedly listen to their
shortwave radios. MONUC also plans to drop information
pamphlets in conjunction with the radio broadcasts,
encouraging defectors to seek amnesty and repatriation
assistance. The radio program is scheduled to launch the
week of August 3.


8. (C) While in Gulu, Brubacher interviewed two
recently-released LRA combatants who were kidnapped eight
years ago and sent "to abduct and kill" under the command of
LRA senior leader Charles Arop near Faradje, DRC. The former
combatants said the LRA is currently in a defensive, "kill
and survive" mode - trying to evade UPDF pursuit and inflict
maximum military and humanitarian costs. They also provided
insight into Kony's Acholi assimilation procedures, which
include teaching all abductees and combatants Acholi language
and maintaining Acholi religious and cultural practices.
Brubacher noted that the LRA's senior leaders are all Acholi
and that Kony is not promoting any of the abductees into
leadership positions to replenish his ranks; he sees this as
a major vulnerability for the LRA. Based on interviews with
these and other abductees, Brubacher estimates there are
approximately 44 LRA leaders left and around 200-300 Ugandan
fighters still with the LRA.


9. (C) Brubacher believes that recent LRA attacks in eastern
DRC and southern Sudan are intended to distract and disperse
the UPDF while LRA leader Joseph Kony moves further west to
evade UPDF pursuit and find sanctuary in ungoverned areas of
CAR. Released abductees say Kony has moved most of his
dependents into CAR as well.


10. (SBU) Former UN Special Envoy for the LRA-affected Region
of the Great Lakes Joaquim Chissano officially ended his term
and delivered a final briefing to the UN Security Council on
July 15, which received little attention in the local Ugandan
press. In one article, northern Acholi religious leaders
criticized Chissano's recommendation that military options
should be pursued alongside diplomatic options. The leaders
cautioned that military action would further destabilize the
peace they are experiencing in northern Uganda and would
endanger the lives of civilians abducted in Uganda, Sudan,
DRC, and CAR. On the other hand, the Kampala-based MONUC
poloffs said the DRC's Catholic leaders tend to support the
idea of a military solution. (Note from Embassy Kinshasa:
We are not aware of anything that would substantiate this
assertion. End note.) Moreover, most northern Ugandans,
both political leaders and the public, recognize, if only
tacitly, the need to maintain military pressure on the LRA as
the only viable means to get Kony to end his brutal
insurgency by assembling and surrendering his forces as
called for in the 2008 Final Peace Agreement negotiated with
the Government of Uganda.

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HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
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11. (C) The WFP office in Bunia, DRC confirms that WFP is
presently providing food assistance to displaced people in
the Dungu and Aru areas (Ituri District, targeting displaced
people from the Faradje area in Haut Uele). Poor access,
insecurity, and lack of on-the-ground partners have prevented
WFP from expanding operations beyond these areas. However

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WFP plans to begin food assistance activities in Doruma and
Faradje in August. WFP also plans to begin providing air
drops to areas that are impassable by road, including Dingila
and Niangara. Although the original plan was to start in
Niangara, due to limited MONUC personnel transport resources,
MONUC is only offering passage and on-the-ground protection
to Dingila at this point; drops are scheduled to begin in
Dingila as soon as this week, before 1 August. Airdrops to
Niangara may not happen until the end of August, when a
scheduled military rotation is complete.


12. (SBU) Regarding security, WFP Program Officer Peter
Transberg told PolOff that "to date, there have been no
confirmed incidents of LRA diverting WFP food, either before
or after distributions, or of any LRA attacks linked to
recent distribution of humanitarian assistance (food or
other)." WFP recently established a "Do No Harm" action plan
in DRC, which evaluates the potential impact and risks of
providing humanitarian assistance in insecure areas. The
Protection Cluster evaluates potential sites for humanitarian
assistance, which a provincial-level inter-agency committee
(CPIA) then reviews and validates. WFP believes this
security assessment mechanism will further reduce the risk of
post-distribution reprisal attacks. Niangara and Dingila
have both been assessed by the inter-agency teams; decisions
to approve assistance to these areas are expected this week
from the CPIA in Bunia. WFP assures us that it will only do
airdrops in locations where MONUC and FARDC protection is
"guaranteed."


13. (C) According to information provided by the MONUC Head
of Office in Kampala, the former UN administrative head of
Dingila post believes the presence of MONUC troops (from
Guatemala) is highly reassuring for the local population.
They reportedly established good relationships with the
population through their interpreter, and are conducting day
and night patrols along the road between Buta and Dingila.
The MONUC presence in Dingila is considered as protection
against LRA incursions.

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Comment
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10. (S NF) The UPDF appears to be making steady ) but slow -
progress in pursuing and eliminating LRA elements in DRC.
The UPDF is recovering weapons and ammunition from LRA
fighters regularly, effectively weakening the LRA's strength
and forcing the LRA into an evasive and defensive posture.
But the vastness and remoteness of the terrain continue to
make it very difficult for Rudia II coalition forces to
strike a decisive blow and finish off the LRA once and for
all. And, ironically, the operation's success in harassing
LRA elements appears to be pushing the LRA leadership deeper
into CAR, lengthening UPDF supply lines. A greater irony is
that despite good cooperation from the FACA and the CAR
government, this westward movement further reduces the
chances of successfully eliminating the LRA leadership,
absent the application of more troops, greater troop
mobility, luck, or some combination of all three. End
Comment.
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