Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KAMPALA380
2009-04-15 13:18:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kampala
Cable title:  

UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION RUDIA II UPDATE (APRIL 15,

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PREF UG CG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0380/01 1051318
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R 151318Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1321
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000380 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/19
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF UG CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION RUDIA II UPDATE (APRIL 15,
2009)

REF: A. KAMPALA 311

B. KAMPALA IIR 6 913 0093 09

C. KAMPALA 341

D. KAMPALA IIR 6 913 0164 09

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000380

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/19
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF UG CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION RUDIA II UPDATE (APRIL 15,
2009)

REF: A. KAMPALA 311

B. KAMPALA IIR 6 913 0093 09

C. KAMPALA 341

D. KAMPALA IIR 6 913 0164 09

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (SBU) Summary: This cable is a periodic update on the
regional military operation against the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) previously known as Operation Lightning Thunder
(OLT). Now under Congolese command, it is known as "Rudia
II." This report is not meant to provide an overarching
narrative or polished analysis of Rudia II, but rather offers
spot information gleaned in Uganda only, from credible U.S.
Mission sources here. We recognize the regional scope of the
operation and the fact that our sources may be limited in
their knowledge and perspectives. End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
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2. (C) President Museveni and Chief of Defense Forces Aronda
Nyakairima met with Ambassador Browning on April 10.
Museveni gave some details of the understanding he had
reached in early March with Congolese President Kabila (refs
A and B). Uganda, he said, had shifted command over the
operation to the DRC and moved Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces
(UPDF) operational headquarters to southern Sudan in
political deference to DRC President Kabila while the latter
dealt with the challenge presented by Speaker of Parliament
Vitale Kamerhe. Kabila, however, signed off on an "elastic"
definition of what constitutes an intelligence squad and did
not want the rest of the Ugandan troops to return to Uganda,
but to remain nearby, according to Museveni. As a result,
some Ugandan units stayed behind in the guise of intelligence
squads while others repositioned nearby in southern Sudan on
the border.


3. (C) General Aronda said that 2,000 Ugandan troops remain
in DRC, with 800 of these in intelligence squads and others
located in Suke, Doruma, and Bitima. The forces can call in
attack helicopters at any time. Aronda said their biggest
concern is an LRA group numbering 160 fighters near Faradje.

(Note: This is the most dangerous LRA group and is headed by
Lt. Col. Charles Arop. However, it is located south of the
agreed-upon line demarcating the areas of responsibility
between the UPDF and Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC). The
UPDF is operating north of Faradje and the FARDC is operating
south of the town. End Note.) According to Aronda, Uganda
wants a "no-objection" statement from the FARDC to cross the
demarcation line and go after this high value LRA group.
FARDC is not capable of taking on this group and is showing
no will to engage Arop, according to Aronda. An expanded
mandate that would allow Ugandan troops to go anywhere in
pursuit of the LRA would be useful. The Ugandans fear
replicating the "red line" agreement with Sudan during
Operation Iron First (2002-2006) which allowed the LRA to
escape into areas in southern Sudan in which the UPDF could
not operate.


4. (C) On civilian protection issues, Museveni stated that
the LRA massacres of Congolese civilians happened before
Ugandan troops were deployed in those areas. Museveni said
that there have been no such incidents in areas where the
Ugandans are now deployed.


5. (C) Museveni said UN Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas
Chissano had raised the issue of a potential three-day
cease-fire in order for Kony to make it to Rikwangba to call
him (Chissano) from a safe area where he will not be come
under attack while making the telephone call. Chissano
relayed the request to Museveni, who said he would "consider
it" and get back to Chissano in two weeks. Museveni told
Ambassador Browning that if the four coalition countries
agree to a cease-fire and Kony does not show up, military
operations would resume. As of April 14, Museveni had not
replied to Chissano, according to Nuno Tomas, Chissano's
assistant.


6. (C) Comment: The cease-fire issue arose during
self-appointed LRA Spokesman David Matsanga's visit to Maputo
on March 28 (ref C). Matsanga came to Maputo to put Kony on
the line directly with Chissano to discuss a cease-fire.
After a number of uncomfortable hours sitting face-to-face
with Chissano, Matsanga failed to get any member of the LRA
on the telephone, according to Tomas. Matsanga returned to
his room and then claimed that Kony had changed his mind and

KAMPALA 00000380 002 OF 002


needed the cease-fire before the LRA leader would call
Chissano. Matsanga claimed this would allegedly enable Kony
to make a telephone call from a safe location without being
attacked. Tomas said it was clear that Matsanga was not in
touch with Kony. Nonetheless, Chissano passed the
information to Museveni. We doubt the idea of a cease-fire
will be pursued given its dubious origin: Matsanga. If a
cease-fire is called, however, there is no reason to believe
that Kony would surrender since he has had been given
multiple opportunities over the past three years. End
Comment.

- - - - - - - - - -
MILITARY SITUATION
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7. (S NF) Uganda's Commander of Land Forces, Lt. Gen. Edward
Katumba Wamala, told the Defense Attache on April 9 that
Ugandan troops are consolidating their forces in and around
the suspected locations of Kony's main group (ref D). The
UPDF has changed tactics from dispersing its forces across
northern DRC to concentrating combat power against the LRA
leadership groups. The LRA appears to be consolidating its
forces into larger groups, according to Wamala. The UPDF's
new tactics appear to be paying off. Between April 9 and 13,
14 LRA fighters were killed, including a senior commander and
a captain.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
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8. (C) We are hearing a number of unconfirmed stories about
non-governmental and humanitarian organizations possibly
re-supplying the LRA. On March 28, the Sudan Peoples
Liberation Army (SPLA) stopped thirteen trucks operated by
CARITAS Catholic Charities near Yambio. The SPLA believes
the trucks contained food and equipment for the LRA. Post is
endeavoring to confirm or dismiss the veracity of this
information.


9. (C) We are also working with a range of UN agencies to
confirm whether or not airdrops are being made in the Faradje
area. The UPDF reported an airdrop by a UN-marked plane
south of Faradje about ten days ago.
BROWNING