Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KAMPALA289
2009-03-18 12:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kampala
Cable title:  

UGANDA/DRC/SUDAN: UN SPECIAL ENVOY DISCUSSES OLT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM UG CG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHRN RUEHROV
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R 181244Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1248
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000289 
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retransmitting all sections of this cable
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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/19
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UG CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC/SUDAN: UN SPECIAL ENVOY DISCUSSES OLT
WITH MUSEVENI

KAMPALA 00000289 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000289
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retransmitting all sections of this cable
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/19
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UG CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC/SUDAN: UN SPECIAL ENVOY DISCUSSES OLT
WITH MUSEVENI

KAMPALA 00000289 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (SBU) Summary: President Museveni and UN Special Envoy
for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano discussed the ongoing
military operations against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
on March 16. Chissano also met with Government of Southern
Sudan (GOSS) President Salva Kiir, who was in Kampala on
March 12-13. Chissano described the Ugandan "withdrawal" in
veiled terms, but his understanding is that some Ugandan
troops remain in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He
briefed donors on LRA spokesman David Matsanga's proposal for
a cease-fire and stakeholder's conference. Chissano insisted
that LRA leader Joseph Kony must call him directly and
maintain sustained contact to be taken seriously. End
Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHISSANO RELAYS MATSANGA'S PROPOSAL TO DONORS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (SBU) UN Special Envoy Chissano visited Kampala based on
an invitation he received from Museveni on March 3. Museveni
reportedly invited Chissano to be briefed on OLT because
Museveni thought the UN Special Envoy might be needed to talk
to Kabila about the continuation of the military operation.
After his meeting with President Museveni, Chissano briefed
the donors on March 16. Chissano reported that Museveni was
pleased with the outcome of Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT)
even if it was not "a spectacular success." Museveni said
that the objective was to deny Kony comfort, which OLT has
done, and to harass the LRA into signing the peace agreement.
Museveni told Chissano that Kabila explained his domestic
problems, particularly his wrangling to impeach the Speaker
of Parliament, Vitale Kamerhe. Museveni told Chissano that
he agreed to help Kabila's public image by staging a
withdrawal of forces. Museveni said that OLT would end
when/if the LRA assembles at Rikwangba.


3. (SBU) Chissano said he briefed Museveni on Matsanga's
proposal to revive the peace process, which included a
cease-fire, assembly, and stakeholder's meeting. Chissano
reported that he had told Matsanga that the proposal is too
expensive and not necessary. Kony insists, according to
Matsanga, that a battalion of troops from the four guarantor
countries provide protection for the LRA. (Note: This is an
old proposal for 200 troops each from South Africa, Kenya,
Tanzania, and Mozambique to serve as a protection force for
Kony and the LRA in the assembly area. Matsanga said that
troops from the fifth observer country, DRC, were
unacceptable due to their participation in OLT. End Note.)


4. (SBU) Chissano told the donors that the GOSS still agreed
to host the LRA assembly area and to allow Ugandan troops to
remain. (Note: Chissano spoke with GOSS President Salva
Kiir, who also was in Kampala on March 12 and 13. End note.)
Chissano said that if the GOSS agreed to this arrangement in
principle, then an approach would be made to donors to fund
the costs and logistics of a stakeholder's conference as a
confidence-building mechanism.


5. (SBU) Museveni told Chissano that there would be no
cease-fire, but that if Kony followed steps laid out by
Chissano, the Government would go along. Chissano also
informed Museveni that he made it clear to Matsanga that he
required direct discussions with Kony. Chissano also urged
Matsanga that Kony speak directly to Museveni.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHISSANO SPEAKS ON UGANDAN "WITHDRAWAL"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) In a private meeting on March 16, Chissano told
Ambassador Browning and P/E Chief that the Ugandans are not
pulling out of DRC, but the "withdrawal" was designed to make
it look that way. (Note: Chissano and his assistant, Nuno
Tomas, made quotation mark hand gestures whenever they
mentioned the Ugandan withdrawal. Chissano's information
came from Museveni and MONUC sources, according to Tomas.
End Note.) Chissano stated that the military operations
within the DRC are now under Congolese control. Tomas has
since told us that up to 3,000 Ugandan troops would remain in
so-called "intelligence and reconnaissance squads."


7. (C) On March 18, Tomas told P/E Chief that Museveni and
Chissano spoke a second time via telephone. Both Chissano
and Tomas were comfortable with the information that they
received from Museveni, Kiir, and MONUC regarding the
continuation of the military operation. Museveni told
Chissano that he (Museveni) was satisfied with his

KAMPALA 00000289 002 OF 002


arrangement with Kabila regarding the continuation of OLT.
Therefore, Museveni told Chissano it would not be necessary
for Chissano to call and lobby Kabila as planned.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MORE ON MATSANGA'S MANUEVERING
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


8. (SBU) Matsanga calls Chissano and Tomas incessantly.
Chissano wondered how much longer he should "entertain"
Matsanga. Chissano said that Matsanga claims that Kony is
not in DRC but in southern Sudan. He knows this because Kony
is using a Zain cellphone number. Matsanga claimed to have
talked to Kony at 0400 on March 15 and that he has spoken to
Kony signaler Michael Epedu. Matsanga then said that Kony is
so afraid of being detected that he will not call Chissano
directly. The call has to come from Kony to Matsanga and
then Matsanga will hand Chissano the telephone (as he did at
the airport on November 5 in advance of the stakeholder's
meeting.) Matsanga proposed that he travel to Maputo and
then put Chissano on the telephone with Kony.


9. (SBU) Kony allegedly gave Matsanga until March 10 to get
Chissano to hold a stakeholder's conference in Dar es Salaam
to establish a ceasefire and assembly at Owiny Kibul.
Matsanga said that Kony extended the deadline to March 18.
Kony allegedly wants a protection battalion of 200 troops
each from Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa, and Mozambique to
escort him to the former assembly area at Owiny Kibul.
(Note: This assembly area is closer to the Ugandan border and
the LRA rejected it because it was surrounded by Ugandan
troops. Rikwangba became the only assembly area. End Note.)
Chissano told Matsanga that there was no need for a
stakeholder's conference for Kony to assemble because there
were provisions for that in the operation.

- - - - - - - - - - -
OLT PROGRESS REPORT
- - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) Chissano asked Ambassador Browning for his
assessment of OLT. The Ambassador described the LRA as being
disrupted, less coordinated, and lacking in food and
supplies. In addition, he said that there are almost daily
encounters in which the LRA loses personnel and equipment as
the UPDF hunts them down. Chissano described this dynamic as
good progress and noted that the UPDF needed to keep Kony on
the run in the same manner as the Angolans hunted Jonas
Savimbi until they killed him.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


11. (C) We fear that Chissano's meeting with the donors may
have left the wrong impression that there was hope for a
revived peace process. He told us privately that he keeps
confidential some information that Museveni tells him and
must maintain a delicate balance with the donors. We are
concerned that some of the donors, who are starved for
information and desperate to be players, may misinterpret his
willingness to listen to Matsanga as support for revived
talks. We also expressed our concern that Matsanga's
machinations could gain traction, given his excellent access
to the international press. We do not believe Matsanga has
the level of access to Kony he claims he does, but it is
worth watching him closely to find out who is behind him.
BROWNING