UGANDA/DRC/SUDAN: OPERATION LIGHTENING THUNDER

S E C R E T KAMPALA 000279

NOFORN
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/17
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MASS MOPS UG CG SU
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC/SUDAN: OPERATION LIGHTENING THUNDER
ROLLING ALONG

REF: A. 08 KAMPALA 521

B. 08 KAMPALA 674

C. 08 KAMPALA 552

D. KAMPALA 94

E. 08 KAMPALA 1579

F. 08 KAMPALA 1561

G. KAMPALA 116

Classified By: Ambassador Steven A. Browning for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (S NF) Summary: Joint military operations against the
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),codenamed Operation Lightening
Thunder (OLT),now entering their fourth month, have gained
significant momentum after initially stumbling out of the
gate. The Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) and Armed
Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) now have
7,500 troops in the area of operation and plan to saturate
the area even further. Since mid-January, allied forces have
successfully engaged LRA elements, capturing or killing LRA
combatants, seizing equipment, supplies, and weapons, and
rescuing abductees. Escapees and defectors report that if
military pressure is lifted off the LRA, Joseph Kony will
retaliate against civilian populations. There is broad
support for the operation to achieve its objective of killing
or capturing the LRA leadership, including from UN Special
Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano, but Congolese
President Kabila's domestic political problems threaten the
continuation of the operation. End Summary.

- - - - - -
BACKGROUND
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2. (SBU) OLT is the result of over two years of failed peace
negotiations. The LRA used the peace process as a way to buy
time to rebuild its forces, all the while continuing to
terrorize civilians in the area around its redoubt in the
Congo,s Garamba National Park (Ref A). Regional discussions
about military operations against the LRA began two years
ago, but intensified in May 2008 as it became clear that Kony
would not sign a peace agreement. The discussions took on
many forms and were conducted at many levels: quarterly
military exchanges between the UPDF, FARDC, Sudan Peoples
Liberation Army (SPLA),and the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC);
quarterly Tripartite Plus meetings and quarterly Chief of
Defense Forces (CHOD) meetings, and at the head of state
summits. Key players continue to credit the U.S.-facilitated
Tripartite Plus process for helping to build confidence
between the Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).


3. (S NF) One key turning point in the decision-making
process was the summit meeting between Museveni and Kabila in
Arusha, Tanzania in May 2008 (Ref B). For the first time,
Kabila did not express opposition to operations against the
LRA, primarily because of Kony's failure to sign the Final
Peace Agreement (FPA) and reports of LRA abductions in DRC
between February and April 2008, according to Andre Kapanga,
Kabila's advisor on the LRA. Kapanga said that Kabila was
never happy with the LRA presence in Garamba National Park
and had only agreed to allow Kony to stay, unmolested, as
long as the LRA did not abduct or loot local residents and
remained at the negotiating table.


4. (SBU) The LRA, however, did not respect this agreement
and went on several killing and kidnapping sprees from
February to April, abducting 157 in Central African Republic.
At least 200 individuals were abducted in DRC, which
recorded a significant increase in LRA activity in the Dungu
area during this period (Ref C). Defectors reported that
Kony was reconstituting his force with non-Acholis, his
northern Ugandan tribesmen whom he felt had betrayed him. In
the first half of 2008 as the peace agreement was being
concluded, the LRA abducted 95 Sudanese, killed 31 SPLA
during an inexplicable attack on the assembly area at
Nabanga, and killed 26 civilians. From September to November
2008, the LRA rampaged through the area of Dungu, killing
167, abducting 316 children, and displacing some 35,000. The
LRA's brutal abductions from Congolese schools caught
international attention. Human Rights Watch reports that
these attacks were aimed at punishing the civilian population
for assisting LRA defectors and escapees (Ref D).


5. (S NF) At Arusha, Kabila informed Museveni about his plan
for FARDC, backed by MONUC, known as Operation Rudia, to

counter the LRA. Kabila's plan focused on pushing the LRA
out of Garamba, while Museveni's plan was to eliminate the
LRA altogether. Kabila asked Museveni for details of
Uganda's plan. Some Ugandan officers interpreted Kabila's
response as a delaying tactic, but Kapanga insisted that for
Kabila to agree to Ugandan troops on Congolese soil, he had
to know every detail to justify it. A skeptical, but willing
Ugandan Chief of Defense Forces, General Aronda Nyakairima,
shuttled between Kabila and Museveni with the operational
details. By early November, in the wake of the LRA's brutal
abduction and killing spree in Dungu and internal and
international pressure to do something to protect Congolese
citizens, Kabila agreed to President Museveni's request to
conduct joint military operations against the LRA. With
Kabila's permission, the preparations for OLT kicked into
high gear.

6. (U) Meanwhile, Kony's failure to show up six times for
meetings arranged for him to meet his own negotiating team
and sign the peace deal sealed the fate of the 2.5 year Juba
Peace Process (Ref E). The talks were undermined by LRA
complaints over allowances and deliveries of donor-provided
food. Kony did not send military leaders to the table to
negotiate and was represented by self-serving members of the
diaspora. Kony finally did meet with his delegation and
Acholi religious leaders from November 29-30, but only after
forcing the mediator to deliver food to his combatants first.
Kony badly mistreated the delegation, refused to sign the
FPA, and did not call the mediator, Riek Machar, or UN
Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano, who
were waiting in the assembly area for him. On December 1,
the peace process was formally declared over. During his
March 12, 2009 visit to Uganda, Government of Southern Sudan
President Salva Kiir stated that "When Kony decided not to
sign the agreed document on November 29, 2008, he opted for
the military option."


7. (C) Museveni decided to launch OLT two weeks after Kony
failed to sign the FPA and the peace process formally ended.
Museveni reiterated that Kony could call him personally, but
the call never came. Chissano met with President Museveni on
December 3 and told him that only military pressure could
change the negative dynamic that had emerged and force Kony
to sign the FPA (Ref F). Museveni told Chissano of his
intentions, which Chissano supported. He told the UN
Security Council on December 17 that military operations
needed to be "decisive" or they could have devastating
effects on the region.


8. (S NF) Once Kabila agreed to the military action,
Washington-based discussions focused on the level of support
the USG would or would not provide to the operation. It was
decided early on in the process that there would be no/no
U.S. boots on-the-ground nor a U.S. air strike against Kony,
who had been designated by Executive Order as an individual
on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list on August 22,

2008. Through the interagency process, it was decided that
the USG would provide intelligence, cover fuel costs, and
send a military planning team to review the Ugandan plans.
U.S. military planners worked with the UPDF and pointed out
weaknesses in its plan and suggested ways in which to
strengthen it.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
OFF TO A STUMBLING START
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9. (S NF) OLT's objectives were to destroy and occupy LRA
camps, search for and destroy LRA forces, rescue persons
abducted by the LRA, and to capture or kill LRA leaders.
Museveni wanted OLT to begin on December 13. However, bad
weather, Kabila's last minute hesitation, and the refusal of
the contract pilots to fly to Dungu combined to delay the
attack by one day. This prevented the forward location of
air assets and insertion of ground troops prior to the air
attacks on the LRA's main camps. Meanwhile, on December 13,
the Ugandans received information that Kony was preparing to
depart Camp Kiswahili, possibly for good, the following day.
Given this information, the Ugandan Government decided to go
ahead with the aerial bombardment using attack helicopters
rather than their MiG fighters, which could not be inserted
due to bad weather. This meant that the helicopters they had
planned to use to ferry in troops were needed to bring in
ammunition, rockets, and fuel to support the helicopters
rather than to put troops in to surround the main camps.



10. (C) Another complicating factor for the insertion of
ground troops was the need to maintain secrecy in order to
surprise the LRA leaders. This required that only a few
individuals in each government knew about the operations,
preventing them from deploying blocking troops. Kabila also
insisted that MONUC could not be informed and that once the
operation kicked off, the UPDF had to go through FARDC to
talk to MONUC. These factors hampered the operation in its
first two months.


11. (S NF) The initial attack on December 14 appeared to go
well, surprising a group of LRA commanders who were in the
middle of a meeting out in the open. Women and children had
gone out to work the fields earlier. There is conflicting
information on Kony's whereabouts at the time of the attack
on Camp Kiswahili. Kony had left the camp 15 minutes before
the attack to go hunting, according to LRA defectors who fled
during the assault. President Museveni claims that Kony had
been tipped off. He stated that Kony had been given
equipment to detect the chatter of the pilots of the incoming
helicopters. Other information suggests that despite
extremely tight intelligence systems, Kony received a call
warning him of the attack. The initial attacks scattered the
LRA leadership, which disrupted command and control and
resulted in the loss of food and ammunition supplies.
Because of the aforementioned confluence of bad luck with the
weather and logistics, there were no troops around the main
camp to prevent the LRA from escaping. The UPDF later
airlifted in about 200 commandos, who occupied the abandoned
LRA camps to destroy food and supplies.


12. (S NF) After the attack, the slow build-up of Ugandan
troops in the area began, with some 2,000 UPDF soldiers on
the ground in late December. Their objective was to establish
a cordon around the main LRA groups which had scattered after
the attack. At the time of the LRA massacres at Doruma,
Duru, and Faradje, there were no UPDF or FARDC troops in
those areas. The LRA, according to eyewitness accounts from
HRW, pretended to be defectors or escapees when they entered
the three towns. They checked to see if there was any
visible security presence before calling in other LRA
members. The LRA then bludgeoned to death all the men,
women, and children. The exception was Faradje, where 160
children were abducted to porter away supplies.


13. (S NF) HRW reported that the LRA attacks were intended
to scare local communities from helping any escapees. The
UPDF said the attacks were also meant to divert the UPDF's
attention and resources away from Kony and other senior
leaders. The UPDF did not take its troops off its key
target, the LRA leadership, and relied on FARDC to protect
Congolese civilian populations. Senior Uganda security
officials told us that the military would not repeat the
mistakes it made in Operation Iron Fist, waged in northern
Uganda and southern Sudan from 2002-2004, including being
tricked to respond to LRA diversionary attacks on civilians
in order to facilitate Kony's escape to Sudan.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
- - - - - - - - - - - -


14. (S NF) Since mid-January, the UPDF has rapidly stepped
up its offensive operations against LRA elements. The UPDF,
FARDC, and SPLA are regularly engaging LRA patrols and groups
trying to escape north into Sudan or west into CAR. These
engagements are causing LRA losses of equipment, personnel,
and degradation of communications capacity. The LRA appears
to be split into two groups. We estimate that there are
approximately 350-400 LRA left, with the bulk of those
remaining with Kony and senior LRA officers. This group is
hiding while it waits for the UPDF operation to end,
according to defectors and escapees. (Note: The LRA learned
during Operation Iron Fist that the UPDF modus operandi was
to attack, linger a bit, then rush off to respond, after the
fact, to another LRA diversionary attack. End Note.) The
members of the other, more active group tend to be less
senior, newly-promoted officers. The relationship between
these two groups is uncoordinated. There does not seem to be
any guidance from the senior group to the junior group.
Instead, there is bickering between the junior group
commanders and games of one-upmanship between them. The LRA
appears to have no clear direction, battle plan, or strategy
to achieve an objective such as relocating out of DRC or

setting up new bases.


15. (C) A positive trend in OLT is the absence thus far of
verified reports of human rights abuses by the UPDF or FARDC
and their cooperation with village and local leaders, who
voice their support for the operation. The UPDF has
undergone a significant professionalization program over the
past five years. UNICEF Uganda reports that Dungu-based
non-governmental organizations expressed shock at how open
and helpful the UPDF commanders were when addressing
humanitarian and human rights issues. These organizations
asked for the protocols Ugandan-based organizations have with
the UPDF, particularly in the treatment of women and
children, to replicate them. President Museveni reportedly
made good behavior and proper treatment of civilians a top
priority as part of the confidence building with Kabila.
Museveni also is fixated on ensuring that his enemies in the
diaspora do not try to have him charged with war crimes by
the International Criminal Court, according to Hussein
Kashilingi, a Museveni family member and the President's
former legal advisor.


16. (U) In January, HRW praised the performance of the two
FARDC Republican Guard units at Doruma, particularly their
professionalism, competence, and positive interactions with
local leaders. This unit twice repelled LRA deputy leader
Okot Odhiambo. MONUC quickly credits its logistics support
and sustenance for the lack of looting and civilian abuses by
FARDC. The FARDC and UPDF have forged good cooperation with
local leaders, who provide information on LRA sightings. The
civilian leaders in Haut Uele have pressed the government to
stay the course and finish off the LRA.

- - - - - - - -
OLT IN NUMBERS
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17. (U) Our most current numbers of casualties, abductions,
and displaced persons during OLT as of March 9 are:

-- Killed or Captured. The UPDF reports 86 LRA fighters
killed and 16 captured. Seven UPDF soldiers have been killed
in engagements with the LRA.

-- Rescued. The UPDF reports that it has documented the
rescue of 365 adults and children. UNICEF reports that of
that number, 127 Congolese, Ugandan, and Sudanese children
have been rescued. UNICEF's protection officer, Cornelius
Williams, tells us that many Congolese children who escape
are returning directly to their villages and are not counted.

-- Killed By LRA. UN Office of the Coordinator for
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and HRW put the numbers killed
by the LRA at 620 between December 24, 2008 and January 13,

2009. The LRA attack on Tora on January 16 killed 100
civilians. Both HRW and UNOCHA agree that the LRA killed and
abducted hundreds of people throughout 2008. UNOCHA reports
that between December 2007 and January 2009, 900 civilians
were killed and 711 were abducted in DRC and Central African
Republic. This includes those killed and abducted between
LRA killing and kidnapping sprees in February-March 2008,
from September to November 2008, and December 2008. In
southern Sudan, UNOCHA reports 127 LRA-related deaths and 66
abductions throughout 2008 and 2009.

-- Displaced. Some 160,000 Congolese are displaced,
including 30,000 that were displaced during the
September-November 2008 LRA attacks on Dungu residents.
Humanitarian organizations report that it is difficult to get
accurate figures because many Congolese are moving into
larger towns with relatives for added protection. As a
result, these individuals are not working the fields and
their presence is expected to strain family resources.

- - - - - - - - - -
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES
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18. (S NF) There have been no large-scale massacres by the
LRA of civilians since January 16 at Tora, where 100
civilians were killed. Humanitarian organizations and MONUC
are reporting that LRA attacks against civilians have dropped
off dramatically since early January. Those that do occur
are sporadic and involve one to two individuals only. The
large influx of Ugandan and Congolese troops into the area of

operation, a change in LRA tactics, and increased cooperation
between the allied forces and local defense units have
contributed to decreased civilian casualties. MONUC and
humanitarian organizations report only sporadic LRA attacks
by elements searching for food. Currently, there are 4,000
Ugandan troops, including 200 commandos, and 3,500 Congolese
troops in the area of operation. One thousand SPLA and 150
Armed Forces of Central African Republic (FACA) troops are
deployed along the Sudanese and Central African borders as
blocking forces. Both SPLA and FACA have successfully
engaged the LRA, preventing them from crossing the borders.
Museveni and Kabila have agreed to send more troops to
"saturate" the area. We have heard that 5,000 additional
UPDF troops will enter through southern Sudan and that Kabila
has committed three additional brigades (5,000). Congo has
given southern Sudan permission for hot pursuit of LRA up to
15 kilometers inside DRC.

- - - - - - - - -
COALITION POLIICS
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19. (C) OLT remains an African operation and the presidents
appear committed to seeing the operation through until it
achieves its objective: the capture or death of the LRA
leadership. Congolese President Kabila remains the wild
card. He reportedly agreed for OLT to continue despite
public pronouncements to the contrary ) presumably made for
domestic purposes. Museveni understands Kabila's domestic
political situation and agreed that Kabila could make any
public statements about the operation's end date he needed to
for domestic consumption. Ugandan officials tell us that
Kabila does not share information with his advisors, which
makes it difficult to coordinate OLT's public face and causes
confusion, particularly when his military hierarchy take
actions that do not coincide with what he has told the
Ugandan Government. The Ugandans are keeping Kabila informed.


20. (S NF) On March 12, Kabila began meeting with Ugandan
CHOD Aronda in Goma to plan a withdrawal of UPDF headquarters
elements. A hand-over ceremony was held on March 15, which
UPDF spokesman Felix Kulayigye told us was purely symbolic
and designed to lower the Ugandan footprint to help Kabila in
his struggle against his opponents. Kulayigye said UPDF
operational elements would remain and that Uganda would use
southern Sudan to move troops in and out. We do not have
details yet on how many UPDF will remain and where. However,
there appears to be some confusion within the UPDF. At least
two operational elements pulled back from a planned attack of
a meeting of top LRA leaders on March 15.


21. (S NF) GOSS Defense Attache Lt. Col. Majier Abudulla in
Kampala reports that GOSS President Salva Kiir is satisfied
that the alliance is working well. The operation has strong
support in Western Equatoria, which bore the brunt of LRA
attacks over the past year. He cautioned that only a few
military officers are "in-the-know" because of potential
leaks to Khartoum, which he believes still wants to rescue
Joseph Kony. Sudan's ambassador to Uganda was removed in
February for failing to inform Khartoum of OLT, according to
Majier. He also told us that OLT has left GOSS Vice
President Riek Machar, who facilitated the peace talks, "out
in the cold." Southern Sudanese local residents are
assisting the SPLA and have wreaked vigilante justice on LRA
elements foraging for supplies. GOSS President Salva Kiir,
during a visit to Museveni on March 12, expressed his
continued support for OLT, according to Majier.


22. (C) CAR is a latecomer to OLT, but appears ready to stay
the course until the operation is finished.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
MONUC: SPLIT PERSONALITY
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23. (C) MONUC personnel in Kampala report that there is a
division between MONUC's Force Commander, who believes MONUC
can do more to assist the operation against the LRA, and the
UN's politicos in New York and Kinshasa, who fear being too
closely associated with it in the event there are more
civilian casualties. MONUC appears to have been rattled by
MSF-Switzerland's press conference in early February that
placed the blame on MONUC for the lack of protection of
civilian populations. UN Special Representative for
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) John Holmes said during his

trip that there was no doubt that the LRA needed to be dealt
with and urged that the protection of civilian populations be
a central part of planned operations.


24. (C) The Ugandans requested MONUC's assistance with
logistics in early February, but MONUC said its mandate would
have to be expanded to allow it to transport Ugandan troops.
It can only provide logistics support for FARDC, according to
Slobodan Kotevski Didi, the head of MONUC's Kampala office.
At a minimum, the Ugandans need MONUC to ferry FARDC troops
to provide protection for civilian populations in its area of
operations (i.e. south of Faradje) and to take the burden off
its limited helicopter assets. MONUC is working on the roads
around Duru to facilitate humanitarian and military
operations and is providing transport and sustenance for
FARDC troops. On March 11, UN Special Representative Alan
Doss announced that MONUC is "progressively reinforcing our
modest capacity in Haut Uele to support the FARDC. We are
also reinforcing our coordination with the FARDC and the
UPDF." However, we have seen no active effort by any member
of the UN Security Council, including Uganda, for MONUC's
mandate to be expanded to provide direct assistance to the
Ugandans.


25. (S NF) We do not expect the Ugandan military to share
sensitive operational information with MONUC in order to
prevent leaks of information to the LRA. As a result, few
MONUC personnel are privy to tactical information, which
limits MONUC's effectiveness.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
WHERE IS IT GOING? RECOMMENDATIONS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


26. (C) We recommend continued support for OLT (Ref G). The
regional cooperation that has been established to fight the
LRA and other negative forces is unprecedented. And, if
sustained and expanded, could significantly advance regional
stability. The joint action has picked up momentum and the
LRA is suffering losses of personnel and equipment in every
engagement. OLT has destroyed all LRA bases, which are now
occupied by Ugandan forces. The LRA's command and control
and food and ammunition supplies are low. Top LRA leaders
have been forced out of their camps and into hiding. The
LRA,s communications ability has been severely degraded,
which has also cut them off from their external collaborators.

--We consistently hear from ex-LRA combatants that the best
way to protect civilians from the LRA is to maintain military
pressure on the LRA. They say that Kony's current strategy
is to wait out the operation (as he has successfully done
during the past 23 years) and that Kony plans his actions
around the possibility that the UPDF--the only force he
fears--will be forced to leave. If the UPDF leaves, the
remaining LRA elements will undertake retributive attacks on
local populations and begin to rebuild themselves, as they
have done in the past through raids on towns, and villages,
and kidnappings of porters, child soldiers, and sex slaves.

--We expect the operation to continue degrading LRA
capabilities, to regularly engage LRA elements. This is a
slow process, which could be stepped up with an increase in
UPDF mobility (i.e. more helicopter support) and logistics
support.


27. (S NF) We are concerned, however, that Kabila's weak
position domestically could cause him to end his support for
the operation prematurely. This would have serious
consequences for Congolese civilians. For this reason, we
believe it is imperative that we shore up Kabila's confidence
to allow the operation to achieve its objectives. We also
should be concerned that international opinion could shift
from its current tepid support for OLT toward calls for its
pre-mature termination. That would be the worst of all
possible outcomes as it would preclude the elimination once
and for all of the LRA threat to the region.


28. (U) Kinshasa has cleared this cable.
BROWNING