Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KAMPALA241
2009-03-05 13:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kampala
Cable title:  

UGANDA/DRC: MUSEVENI AND KABILA DISCUSS OLT AND OIL

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM UG CG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0696
RR RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0241/01 0641329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051329Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1195
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000241 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UG CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: MUSEVENI AND KABILA DISCUSS OLT AND OIL

REF: 07 KAMPALA 1429

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000241

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UG CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: MUSEVENI AND KABILA DISCUSS OLT AND OIL

REF: 07 KAMPALA 1429

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: In a March 4 private meeting on their
common border, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and
Congolese President Joseph Kabila agreed to strengthen
bilateral relations in accordance with the Ngurdoto Accord
reached in Tanzania in September 2007. We do not yet have
the details of this private discussion, but Ugandan officials
report that Kabila agreed to continue with Operation
Lightening Thunder (OLT) against the Lord,s Resistance Army
(LRA) in northeast Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There
will be no public discussion of OLT deadlines in the future,
but the heads of state will confer regularly. OLT is not
mentioned in the communique, but the document underscores the
need by both sides to maintain peace, security, and stability
in the Great Lakes Region. Museveni updated Kabila on the
status of Ugandan oil exploration and proposed joint oil
exploitation on Lake Albert. The presidents then jointly
addressed crowds that had gathered at the border to see them.
The atmospherics were described as "excellent". It appears
that both sides emerged from the meeting with what they
needed for their domestic audiences, but we will wait to see
if they follow through with implementation. End Summary.

- - - - - -
BACKGROUND
- - - - - -


2. (C) The highly anticipated meeting between the two
presidents comes after weeks of speculation that President
Kabila, for domestic purposes, would put an end to OLT. The
speculation was spurred by Kabila's remarks in early February
that foreign forces needed to leave DRC by the end of month.
In mid-February, Ugandan Security Minister Amama Mbabazi and
Chief of Defense Forces Aronda Nyariakima met with Kabila.
They came away from the meeting believing that Kabila was
supportive of OLT, but that he needed more assurances from
the Government of Uganda (GOU) to dampen domestic criticism.


3. (C) GOU military, security, and foreign affairs officials
expressed their concern that OLT was becoming hostage to
Kabila's domestic problems and the rivalry between France and

Belgium in Kinshasa. Museveni decided that it was important
to find ways to help Kabila, particularly on the public
relations front. The summit was one aspect of this. The GOU
plans to put more information out in the public realm about
the military operation to be publicized in Kinshasa and Juba.
In addition, the Ugandan Peoples' Defense Forces (UPDF) has
stepped up the pace of OLT operations, giving orders to
commanders to actively engage LRA elements. UPDF units are
near the two key leaderships groups and captured a senior
commander on March 3.


4. (C) Ambassador Kangumba, Director for Ring States at the
Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and who worked on the
communiqu, told P/E Chief that the Ugandans approached this
meeting with Kabila in the same way it handled the meeting in
Arusha, Tanzania in September 2007 (ref A). In Arusha,
Museveni emphasized the interconnected relationship between
stability and economic development on both sides of the
Ugandan-Congolese border. Museveni did not place emphasis on
the LRA issue, but Kabila came to Arusha prepared to discuss
the LRA and volunteered that he had plans to go after the
"negative forces." Thus began the year-long dance which
resulted in Kabila's agreement on the joint operations in
November 2008. Based on this previous experience, Museveni
decided that for this meeting, the best way to give Kabila
political cover for OLT was to again focus on the importance
of strengthening the bilateral relationship and the benefits
for the Congolese of enhanced diplomatic, economic, and
military cooperation.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
KABILA RECEIVES WARM WELCOME
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (C) By all accounts, Kabila's arrival at the
Ugandan-Congolese border excited the crowds that had gathered
to see the two presidents. Museveni and Kabila met alone in
a tent pitched in the "no-man's land" between the borders for
approximately one hour. (Note: Congolese security officials
insisted that the meeting could not be in Uganda. End Note.)
The two presidents emerged to jointly address the crowds on
both sides of the border, with Kabila entering Uganda to do
so. Museveni and Kabila told the crowds that they had
pledged to deepen political, economic, and military ties, but
that they were keeping the private discussions private. The
atmospherics were "excellent" and both presidents were happy
with the meeting, according to Kangumba. Kabila invited

KAMPALA 00000241 002 OF 003


Museveni to visit Kinshasa and Museveni accepted.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
OLT TO CONTINUE, OIL ISSUES DISCUSSED
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) Ambassador Kangumba gave the following read-out of
the issues discussed. The communique re-commits Uganda and
the DRC to strengthen bilateral cooperation diplomatically,
economically, and militarily. The lack of mention of OLT was
deliberate. The GOU felt that Kabila was under fire from his
enemies for the secrecy around his decision to agree to joint
operations, according to Kangumba. As a result, the
communique says that Uganda and the DRC remain committed to
the ensuring regional peace and security in accordance with
the Great Lakes Security Pact (December 2006). (Note: The
security pact commits neighboring countries to assist each
other in eliminating negative forces. End Note.) The actual
agreement on timelines for OLT would remain a private matter
between Kabila and Museveni. LRA escapees and defectors
report that LRA leader Joseph Kony adjusts his tactics based
on approaching "deadlines." Discussing OLT's extension every
three weeks was detrimental to the operation, not practical,
and created unnecessary and damaging press speculation about
OLT's progress, according to Kagumba.


7. (C) Museveni and Kabila agreed to place oil experts in
their respective missions in Kampala and Kinshasa to
facilitate the exchange of accurate information about the oil
discoveries and production. Museveni had heard a number of
rumors coming from the DRC on the status of Uganda's oil
production and Ugandan intentions to "steal" Congolese oil.
Museveni shared with Kabila the most recent information on
Uganda's new oil finds, which exceeded previous expectations,
and explained that they were made possible by stability on
the Ugandan side of the border. Moreover, Museveni explained
that the new finds were far inside Uganda's border making it
unnecessary for Uganda to pump oil from underneath Lake
Albert right away. Museveni felt it necessary to explain
this because the Congolese advance team expressed fears that
Uganda was far ahead of DRC on oil exploitation and could
pump Congolese oil out from under the lake.


8. (C) Kangumba said that the Congolese officials left with
a better understanding of Uganda's planned oil production.
Museveni asked Kabila to consider joint exploitation of the
oil in the lake to expedite progress on the Congolese side.
He also reiterated Uganda's intention to sell excess
electricity to eastern Congo once Ugandan production begins
in 2010/2011.


9. (C) Both sides agreed to upgrade their diplomatic
missions to full ambassadorial rank in one month, though
Kangumba is skeptical and said he would wait and see if the
Congolese follow through. (Note: In September 2007, the DRC
agreed to approve Uganda's ambassadorial nominee by July
2008, which did not happen. Uganda's candidate has been
waiting for approval since April 2008. End Note.)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FRENCH ANNOY MUSEVENI; U.S. GETS KUDOS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) The GOU was gripped with concerns that Kabila had
developed cold feet in the days prior to the meeting. These
fears were deepened when on March 3, French embassy officials
in Kampala called Emmy Allio, the Deputy Director of the
External Security Organization (ESO) and Museveni's point
person on the LRA, and informed him that Kabila would not/not
agree to an extension of OLT. As a result, the French
officials said they would no longer share intelligence with
the Ugandans if Kabila withdraws his support, according to
Allio. The Ugandans went to the Belgian Defense Attache,
Laurent Michaux, who reported just the opposite. Michaux
reportedly told Allio that Kabila did support a continuation
of the joint military operation and that the French had made
the calculation that Kabila was on his way out and were
supporting his enemies. These positions were reported up the
chain to Museveni later in the day. Museveni reportedly said
that the French could not be trusted and that the GOU did not
need their information or "help" against the LRA, according
to Allio. Emboffs contacted French Embassy officials after
the meeting to find out if they will still work with the
Ugandans. They French officials said they did not yet have a
position.


11. (C) The French misstep highlights the positive role that
the U.S. continues to play in the region. The USG, through
Kampala, Kinshasa, and Washington worked with the GOU, GDRC,
and UN Special Envoy Joachim Chissano's office to shore up
Kabila's confidence in the operation in advance of the
meeting. Allio passed us a message from Museveni saying that

KAMPALA 00000241 003 OF 003


the latter appreciates "the Ambassador and his staff for all
they are doing to go after the LRA and forge close ties
between Kabila and Uganda."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SENIOR LRA COMMANDER RETURNED TO UGANDA
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


12. (C) In other news, the UPDF flew captured LRA commander,
Colonel Thomas Kwoyelo, back to Uganda. Kwoyelo, a top LRA
commander, was injured in the stomach during a skirmish
between the UPDF and LRA on March 3 north of Duru, DRC.
Kwoyelo was in a small group conducting a patrol. He is
receiving medical attention in a Kampala hospital. Initial
news reports indicated that he would be tried for treason.
However, we have since learned that President Museveni is
adverse to keeping prisoners of war and is inclined to offer
Kwoyelo amnesty to encourage other disgruntled senior
commanders to surrender. Allio said that Kwoyelo will likely
be treated well.


13. (C) Kwoyelo was serving in a position that will allow
him to provide significant operational information to the
Ugandans. Our DATT is in contact with the Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence (CMI),who is debriefing Kwoyelo, who
was a protege of executed LRA deputy leader Vincent Otti.
After Otti's execution, Kwoyelo was one of several senior
officers who were put under "house arrest," demoted, stripped
of their weapons and satellite telephones, and placed under
the command of officers less senior. He is known to the
Ugandan services as being part of a "clique" of disgruntled
senior officers. However, it appears that after the December
14 first strike, several of these officers were
"rehabilitated" and given more responsibility.


14. (C) OLT Statistics to Date: UPDF reports that following
casualties and rescuees since December 14, 2008: 346
Congolese, Ugandans, and southern Sudanese rescued.
Sixty-seven LRA killed in action. Seven UPDF killed in
action. Sixteen LRA characterized as prisoners of war. LRA
spokesman David Matsanga's claims that the LRA holds 76 UPDF,
Congolese, and southern Sudanese soldiers as prisoners of war
are false. The UPDF challenged the LRA to produce them in
public.

- - - - -
COMMENT
- - - - -


15. (C) On this side of the border, Ugandan officials are
pleased with the results of the meeting between the two
presidents on the issues of OLT and oil. The devil is always
in the details and we will seek further information on the
understanding reached on OLT between Museveni and Kabila.
The GOU is less optimistic that there will be significant
progress on other fronts, such as regular meetings of the
Joint Permanent Commission working groups or the
normalization of diplomatic relations. English text of the
communique follow septel.
BROWNING