UGANDA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001275

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM ASEC PINS UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON'S MEETING WITH
OPPOSITION AND CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERS

REF: A. KAMPALA 1055

B. KAMPALA 01074

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Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Aaron Sampson for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Opposition and civil society leaders told
Assistant Secretary Carson that President Museveni's
consolidation of power, closure of political space, and
reliance on the military have negated any hope for free and
fair elections in February 2011. Concerned that Uganda is
slipping toward a potentially violent electoral
confrontation, participants urged the U.S. to pressure
Museveni to respect democratic norms. Assistant Secretary
Carson stressed the importance of constructive and
non-violent opposition, reassured participants of the
importance of Ugandan democracy to the U.S., and said the
U.S. has an obligation to speak out if Uganda strays off
course. End Summary.

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Decision 2011: "Uganda is in Trouble"
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2. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson and Ambassador Lanier
discussed the 2011 presidential election with leaders of six
opposition political parties and two civil society groups on
October 25 at the Ambassador's residence. Opposition party
representatives included four individuals with presidential
ambitions: Jimmy Obote Akena, son of former President Milton
Obote and a key member of the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC)
party; John Ssebaana Kizito, president of the Democratic
Party (DP); Ken Lukyamuzi, president of the Conservative
Party (CP); and Bidandi Ssali, president of the Peoples
Progressive Party (PPP).


3. (C) Former DP president and ex-presidential candidate Paul
Ssemogerere said the preconditions for free and fair
elections in February 2011 are not in place. He said
Museveni's abolition of presidential term limits, the fusion
of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) with state
structures and the military, the partisan Electoral
Commission, and Museveni's contempt for opposition political
parties suggested that he will do anything to subvert the
electoral process. Ssemogerere accused Museveni of using his
position as President, NRM Chairman, and Commander in Chief
to ensure victory though intimidation, patronage, and
manipulation of the electoral process.


4. (C) Referring to the Ugandan Supreme Court decision that
declared the 2006 presidential election neither free nor
fair, CP president Ken Lukyamuzi said opposition parties
could not participate in elections administered by the same
Electoral Commission responsible for the failures of 2006.
He cited the recent closing of radio stations, intimidation
of journalists (refs. A and B),and police orders requiring
prior approval for any political gathering larger than 20
individuals as evidence of curtailed freedoms of expression
and assembly. "Uganda is in trouble," said Lukyamuzi,
"something must be done to avoid bloodshed."

5 (C) Jimmy Obote Akena said the elections will be
"incredibly difficult" because Museveni is no longer assured
a first-round victory. He said violence was likely as one
cannot predict how Museveni will handle a situation where
defeat is possible. "I fear what he will do under these
circumstances," said Akena. Describing Uganda as a military
dictatorship, current DP president John Ssebaana Kizito
complained that the Ugandan military (UPDF) permeates all
aspects of civilian life. FDC vice president for eastern
Uganda, Proscovia Salaamu Musumba, said Museveni is
"hell-bent" on staying in power and that the opposition has
done what it can to promote positive change. Musumba listed
an impartial Electoral Commission as a minimum requirement
for credible elections, along with an overhauled electoral
register and the reinstatement of presidential term limits.

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U.S. Influence and Interests
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6. (C) Several participants discussed U.S. interest in the
2011 election, with some portraying the U.S. as a potential
positive influence while others saw the U.S. as part of the
problem. Musumba asked the U.S. to use its leverage to avoid
violence, noting that "bush wars" and bloodshed are Uganda's
only means of resolving political conflict. Former NRM
Minister turned PPP president Bidandi Ssali said the
international community arrived too late in Kenya, and that

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now is the time to prevent bloodshed in Uganda. Describing
his own personal sense of hopelessness and impending doom,
Ssali said "we are sitting on a time bomb which will flare
like what happened in Rwanda because the people of Uganda
have lost hope."


7. (C) Ssali and civil society leader Livingston Ssewanyana
said Museveni uses Ugandan support for counter-terrorism and
the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to boost his
standing with the U.S. Ssali wondered whether Museveni's
stance on terrorism absolved Uganda of its democratic
shortcomings. Ssewanyana said the Ugandan people get "a very
raw deal" on terrorism because Museveni believes that as long
as he is the "blue eyed boy" for counter terrorism, he can
ignore or suppress internal voices of dissent.


8. (C) Another former NRM Minister turned vocal Museveni
critic, Miriam Matembe, predicted that the international
community would do nothing and questioned whether it was
worth so much money and so many lives to hold an election she
regards as already decided. The Secretary of the CP party
wondered if the U.S. would step in, after the results are
tallied and violence has flared, to broker a power sharing
government similar to those in Kenya and Zimbabwe.

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Museveni's Base: Military and Economic Might
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9. (C) Ssewanyana said Museveni regularly canvasses the
country and is aware of popular discontent, but that the UPDF
and NRM long ago replaced the Ugandan people as Museveni's
real power base. Ssewanyana said Museveni uses these
institutions to instill fear to influence electoral outcomes,
and that the real challenge for opposition parties and others
is demilitarizing Ugandan politics. He warned that the
moment Uganda's oil reserves start flowing, Museveni will no
longer need democracy or the international community because
economic growth trumps human rights and democracy. The FDC's
vice president for western Uganda, Amanya Mushega, agreed
that Museveni is cognizant of popular sentiment in Uganda,
but questioned whether the military would accept serving as a
force for violent repression for any extended period of time.

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Moving Uganda Forward
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10. (C) Drawing on his own experience as Ambassador to Uganda
from 1991 to 1994, and Uganda's tragic history during the
Amin and Obote II regimes, Assistant Secretary Carson
encouraged participants to strive to move Uganda forward
toward greater peace and democracy. He said that no one
wants to revisit the disasters of the 1970s and 80s, and that
neither Africa nor Uganda needs more conflict or violence.
Assistant Secretary Carson encouraged opposition leaders to
ensure that their political disagreements with Museveni
remained civil and non-violent. Responding to questions
about the U.S. response to potential violations of democratic
norms, Assistant Secretary Carson referred to President
Obama's speech in Ghana, saying the U.S. has an obligation to
speak out in defense of key principles like democracy, human
rights, openness, and tolerance and will do so if Uganda
begins to drift off course.

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Comment: Fear and Foreboding
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11. (C) The fear and frustration expressed by opposition and
civil society leaders about the 2011 electoral process is
genuine. Perhaps of greater concern, however, is a growing
sense among many opposition leaders that violence is coming
and that it is neither in their power nor their interest to
prevent it. Some opposition parties, like the CP, may be
banking on enough election related strife to force a power
sharing agreement brokered by international actors. After 23
years under Museveni, others may be gambling that the army or
massive popular unrest will sweep Museveni from power.
Barring a negotiated settlement between Museveni and the
opposition over the Electoral Commission and related
electoral reforms, the level of eventual confrontation may
hinge on Museveni's ability to use his political experience,
patronage, intimidation, and force to defeat the opposition.
The prospects for credible and peaceful elections under any
of these scenarios are very uncertain.
LANIER