Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KAMPALA116
2009-01-30 12:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kampala
Cable title:  

UGANDA/DRC: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST LRA

Tags:  PGOV PHUM UG SU CG 
pdf how-to read a cable
R 301202Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1087
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
RWANDA COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KAMPALA 000116 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM UG SU CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST LRA
CONTINUE

REF: A. KAMPALA 94

B. KINSHASA 81

Classified By: Ambassador Steven A. Browning for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L KAMPALA 000116


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM UG SU CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST LRA
CONTINUE

REF: A. KAMPALA 94

B. KINSHASA 81

Classified By: Ambassador Steven A. Browning for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Joint military operations against the
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) are picking up momentum. The operation was
extended on January 22 for another three weeks. Military and
political coordination among Uganda, DRC, and southern Sudan
remain strong. Senior Ugandan military officials have
appealed to the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) to provide
additional logistics assistance to facilitate the rapid
deployment of Congolese troops to protect civilians. The
deployment of ground troops has tightened the cordon around
the LRA and has led to increased engagements between the LRA
and the allied forces. The UPDF reports that 100 LRA members
have been killed and 45 non-combatants rescued. Some LRA
commanders have contacted the UPDF and an international
organization to discuss potential defection. The UPDF is
proceeding cautiously, but has expressed willingness to
assist potential surrenders of LRA fighters. The operation's
progress has been slow, but deliberate. Deployments of
ground troops near LRA locations and along borders of DRC so
far appear to be preventing the LRA from escaping into Sudan.
The USG should continue to support OLT. End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - -
ALLIANCE HOLDS FIRM
- - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) On January 23, Ugandan Chief of Defense Forces,
General Aronda Nyakairima, and Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa
briefed the diplomatic corps on the extension of Operation
Lightening Thunder (OLT) for three additional weeks. Aronda
met with his Congolese counterpart in Dungu from January
18-19. They agreed to review the operation's progress in 21
days, i.e. by February 6. General Aronda advised us that he
plans to meet individually with his Congolese Armed Forces
(FARDC) and Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA)
counterparts on February 4. Military and political
cooperation between the Ugandan Peoples' Defense Forces
(UPDF),FARDC, and SPLA has been close and is coordinated at
the Chief of Defense Staff level. The military operation
represents the culmination of two years of regular meetings
between the three armies. During an assessment mission to

Dungu January 6-12, Kampala-based international organizations
reported that the UPDF and FARDC commanders have joint
morning briefings, share reports throughout the day, and plan
unit movements together. The UPDF and SPLA continue working
closely together along the border. Politically, President
Museveni has taken the lead to keep Congolese President
Kabila and President of Southern Sudan Salva Kiir informed on
a regular basis. In addition, Minister of Security Amama
Mbabazi also facilitates communications with DRC, southern
Sudan, and Central African Republic (CAR) security officials.


3. (C) The LRA atrocities against civilians in DRC and
reported attacks in southern Sudan have not weakened the
resolve of Kampala, Kinshasa, or Juba to complete the
operation, according to Minister of State for International
Relations Henry Okello Oryem. He told P/E Chief on January
21 that the LRA massacres have demonstrated the dangerous
nature of the LRA and underscored the importance of capturing
or killing the LRA leadership. A Congolese Embassy civilian
official in Kampala, Katoko Christian, and the Congolese
Defense Attache told P/E Chief in early January that General
Aronda, who is a close personal friend of President Kabila,
provides regular briefings to both his counterpart and
Kabila, in person and by phone. Combined with daily
collaboration at Dungu, Uganda has built confidence among the
allies in the purpose and duration of the mission that was
unthinkable one year ago, according to Oryem.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
APPEAL FOR MORE HELP FROM MONUC
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) Aronda has appealed to MONUC to provide more
logistics support to the operation, particularly to move
FARDC units quickly to prevent and deter LRA attacks on
civilians. International Organization for Migration (IOM)
and UNICEF also are reporting their disappointment with the
minimal assistance provided by MONUC. Jeremy Haslam, IOM's
Chief of Mission in Kampala, returned early from a trip to
Dungu due to lack of cooperation from MONUC's Moroccan
commander at Dungu. Haslam, charged with organizing the
rescue and repatriation of non-combatants, stated that "it
appears that MONUC is trying to make it as uncomfortable as
possible at Dungu for agencies assisting the operation in
order to deter them from staying too long." He also left
because information about his movements was leaking to LRA
leader Kony, which jeopardized attempts to rescue a group of
30-40 non-combatants that LRA second-in-command Okot
Odhiambo's group had tried to send to safety.

- - - - - - - - - - -
TIGHTENING THE NOOSE
- - - - - - - - - - -


5. (C) After the initial attack on December 14, delays in
putting ground troops in and around the LRA camps prevented
the allied forces from containing the LRA leadership
elements. However, over the past three weeks, UPDF, FARDC,
SPLA, and Central African Republic (CAR) units have been
positioned along the borders with CAR, southern Sudan, and
Uganda. In addition, UPDF troops have moved into ambush
positions around the key LRA leadership groups.


6. (U) OLT's spokesman, Major Deo Aliki, said that these
ground deployments have led to growing momentum in the
operation. He reported that over 100 LRA fighters have been
killed and 45 non-combatants rescued, 18 of which were
Ugandan. The others are from DRC and CAR. He also said that
in any single engagement with the LRA, ten are killed and
others are captured alive. Thus far, the UPDF has lost a MiG
pilot to an accident, two soldiers have been killed, and
three injured.


7. (C) The UPDF reports that LRA patrols continue attempting
to cross the border into southern Sudan and most have been
repulsed. Human Rights Watch reported that one of the LRA
groups believed to be led by Okot Odhiambo, an International
Criminal Court (ICC) indictee, turned back from its attempts
to reach CAR after two Congolese Republican Guard and UPDF
units near Doruma repeatedly ambushed the group. The UPDF
successfully engaged ICC indictee Dominic Ongwen on January
23, killing at least ten of his men, capturing two, rescuing
12 non-combatants, and recovering inflatable rafts used for
river crossings, and solar panels used to charge satellite
telephones.


8. (C) The UPDF reports that the LRA attacks on civilian
populations in late December were diversionary in nature,
aimed at pulling UPDF troops off the LRA leadership groups to
allow them to escape into southern Sudan. The allied forces
did not move, which may have caused LRA leader Joseph Kony to
change tactics, according to Army Spokesman Felix Kulayigye.
Thus far, the UPDF, FARDC, and SPLA have prevented the key
LRA leaders from entering southern Sudan. However, there is
an unconfirmed press report that an LRA group, possibly an
LRA patrol, killed a chief in southern Sudan on January 19.


9. (U) The LRA appears to be saving its ammunition and its
communications capacity is much diminished, according to
Human Rights Watch analysts (reftels). LRA carried out
attacks on civilians using axes and clubs. In Doruma and
Duru, there were no shots fired during the LRA massacre of
300 civilians during Christmas festivities. In the ambush of
Ongwen's group, only two of the fighters had automatic
weapons. The only reports of the LRA using automatic weapons
were during the attack on Faradje, and only then, they were
used sparingly. HRW interviews of Congolese villagers
corroborate UPDF assertions that the LRA is low on ammunition
and supplies. Some LRA commanders are using local commercial
cellphone networks because they lack satellite telephones.

- - - - - - - - - - -
POTENTIAL DEFECTIONS
- - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) Aliki also reported contact between some LRA
commanders and the UPDF. These LRA commanders allegedly want
to surrender. Senior Ugandan military commanders, including
Aronda, BG James Mugira, and BG Patrick Kankihiro have said
the UPDF would assist surrendering LRA elements. Emboffs
have been following the negotiations between Odhiambo and
IOM's Haslam. Odhiambo first made contact with Haslam on
January 21. Haslam and the UPDF believe the caller is
Odhiambo. The UPDF provided potential extraction locations
and are working through a number of scenarios, including the
possibility that the defection story could be a trap to allow
the LRA to ambush Ugandan forces. Odhiambo told Haslam that
he sustained severe stomach and leg injuries and is being
carried around on a stretcher. Odhiambo claimed to Haslam
that he had defied LRA leader Joseph Kony's order to come to
a gathering of commanders on January 22. Odhiambo informed
Haslam on January 27 that he had told an Agence France Presse
(AFP) reporter about his intention to surrender. AFP later
reported that Odhiambo said that "I am defecting. We have
requested a safe corridor. I want to come out. I am tired
of going up and down all the time." The UPDF and IOM are
proceeding cautiously, but with the intention of facilitating
Odhiambo's surrender, if it is genuine.


- - - - -
COMMENT
- - - - -


11. (C) The mission statement for Operation Lightening
Thunder is to capture or kill the LRA leadership and render
the LRA ineffective. By that measure after six weeks, OLT
has not achieved full success. The three ICC-indicted
leaders (Kony, Odhiambo and Ongwen) remain, as far as we
know, alive and free. Nevertheless, after an initial slow
start, OLT has picked up momentum with the deployment of
ground forces and increasing engagement with LRA groups. A
number of fighters have been killed and the LRA has
metastasized into seven to eleven groups which have been on
the run since OLT commenced on December 14. The LRA has been
deprived of the large and numerous caches of food and
supplies it had accumulated during the two year-long peace
talks. Communications capabilities have been reduced. The
ability of senior leadership to exercise command and control
of the LRA has been greatly diminished. Several defectors
have reported that multiple LRA groups are hungry, thirsty,
low on supplies and demoralized. The effectiveness of the
LRA as an integrated, purposeful fighting force has been
seriously diminished.


12. (C) The impact on civilians in LRA territory remains
grave. As reflected in reftels, accurate counts of killings
and abductions of civilians is impossible, but certainly in
the hundreds. Between September, 2008, and the beginning of
OLT, the LRA had been killing and abducting in DRC at a
significant rate, in part to turn villagers hostile toward
any potential LRA defectors. When OLT began, there was a
significant spike in killings and abductions, culminating in
the horrible Christmas slaughter of hundreds, a tactic used
by the LRA in the past to intimidate villagers. In the weeks
since Christmas, however, the reports of killings and
abductions have significantly diminished. We have not seen
the large numbers of abductees escaping from or being freed
by the LRA that we had hoped and planned for. Nevertheless,
dozens of formerly abducted women and children have been
freed by OLT forces, escaped or been released by the LRA and
are being processed for return to their homes.


13. (C) One significant achievement of OLT has been the
cooperation among the four governments and their militaries.
Despite the inevitable occasional bruised ego, by all
accounts the OLT coalition has effectively coordinated their
activities, communicated their needs and exploited their
relative strengths in the campaign against the LRA. There
have been no reports of human rights abuses by OLT forces.
We have seen no sign that the resolve or cooperation among
the allied governments will weaken, although it is clear that
President Kabila cannot welcome UPDF forces on his territory
for an extended, indefinite period.


14. (C) Our assessment is that a fully successful OLT is
obtainable given sufficient time and support, both of which
are in short supply. UPDF requests for logistics and lift
support from MONUC have not been met and Kabila most likely
is unwilling to grant too many more extensions. Support
among the international community will likely remain as long
as the capture of the indictees and their subsequent release
into the custody of the ICC remains viable and as long as
there is a steady stream of successful encounters against the
LRA regardless of how modest they may be. Another round of
LRA atrocities will likely result in calls by advocacy NGOs
for increased protection of civilians, which the three
militaries cannot always provide. The troops are simply not
available to ensure protection of every vulnerable village in
DRC, southern Sudan, and CAR.


15. (C) The USG can play a positive role by continuing to
press MONUC to be more supportive, by encouraging patience
from Kabila, and by explaining to anxious outside observers
that Operation Lightening Thunder has in fact been more
effective than many perceive after its slow start. In any
event, it is the best opportunity the region has had in years
to eliminate the LRA threat and the USG should be as
supportive as possible.


BROWNING