Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KAMPALA1095
2009-09-22 16:10:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kampala
Cable title:  

UGANDA OUTLINES AMISOM REQUIREMENTS AFTER SUICIDE

Tags:  PREL MASS MCAP AU UG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1509 
PP RUEHRN RUEHROV 
DE RUEHKM #1095/01 2651610 
ZNY CCCCC ZZH 
P 221610Z SEP 09 
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1794 
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE 
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE 
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE 
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001095 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS MCAP AU UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA OUTLINES AMISOM REQUIREMENTS AFTER SUICIDE
BOMBING

Classified By: Political Officer Tim Manarin
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001095

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS MCAP AU UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA OUTLINES AMISOM REQUIREMENTS AFTER SUICIDE
BOMBING

Classified By: Political Officer Tim Manarin
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met Maj. General Nathan
Mugisha, the force commander of the African Union
peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM),on September 22 to
discuss U.S. support for Uganda's contribution to AMISOM.
Mugisha listed armored personnel carriers, IED detection
capability, boats, and training for the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) forces as AMISOM's most pressing
requirements. Mugisha also cited the need for African Muslim
nations to contribute forces to counter al-Shabaab
propaganda. End Summary.

--------------
AMISOM Wish List
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador met with Mugisha on September 22 to
convey condolences for the deaths of four Uganda military
personnel killed during the September 17 bombing of AMISOM
headquarters in Mogadishu by al-Shabaab. Also present were
the DCM, the DATT, and Poloff. The Ambassador stressed our
continued support for Uganda's participation in AMISOM and
asked Mugisha how the U.S. could further assist Ugandan
forces in Somalia.


3. (C) Mugisha, who was slightly wounded in the September 17
bombing, reported that Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF)
morale remained high although Mogadishu was as tense as ever.
He said there was a stalemate between al-Shabaab and TFG
forces in Mogadishu as each was too weak to dislodge the
other. He said the African Union (AU) was still able to
protect key installations and was providing medical services
for an estimated 300,000 civilians in Mogadishu, and that
AMISOM was also providing clean water and food. He
appreciated U.S. assistance and said AMISOM's presence in
Somalia would not be possible without support from the U.S.
and the international community.


4. (C) The General said the 5,000 AMISOM troops in Mogadishu
was enough to guard key installations and maintain a balance
between the TFG and al-Shabaab standoff, but that more were
needed to tip this balance in the TFG's favor. Mugisha
estimated that AMISOM forces could take the city in two days
with an extra 5,000 troops.


5. (C) First on Mugisha's list of needs were additional

armored personnel carriers to protect TFG officials and allow
AMISOM members increased movement throughout the city. He
said AMISOM's current vehicles were completely worn out and
degraded by IED attacks. AMISOM also needs to enhance force
protection including fortified medical facilities to protect
personnel from mortars. In addition, improved maritime
security capacity is necessary. He said AMISOM currently has
only one small boat which is used to protect sea lanes coming
in and out of the port of Mogadishu.


6. (C) Mugisha said AMISOM needed considerably greater
capacity to counter IEDs and suggested basic measures like
paving city streets to prevent extremists from planting IEDs
in potholes and obtaining night vision capacity because
al-Shabaab plants IEDs at night. Additional capacity to
detect and disarm IEDs is also required. Mugisha also
requested a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation
(DDR) program to counter al-Shabaab's ability to recruit
unemployed youth. Salary money for TFG soldiers is also
needed as Mugisha noted that the TFG does not have the
ability to pay its troops while al-Shabaab does.


7. (C) General Mugisha said AMISOM desperately needs Muslim
peace keeping forces to counter al-Shabaab propaganda
regarding infidel troops in Somalia. He noted that
al-Shabaab is already trying to intimidate Djibouti into
reconsidering its pledge to provide AMISOM with 470 troops.
Mugisha estimated that 3 battalions of Muslim troops would be
ideal. He also inquired about the status of a radio station
promised to AMISOM to help diffuse TFG messages throughout
the city. DATT responded that the concrete pad for the radio
stations was recently completed.


8. (C) The Ambassador said AMISOM forces are confronted with
many of the same challenges currently confronting U.S. forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan. He reiterated U.S. appreciation for
Uganda's contribution to Somalia and said both the U.S. and
Uganda shared an interest in ensuring that Somalia does not
become a haven for terrorists.

--------------
Training, Training, Training
--------------


9. (C) Mugisha said additional, accelerated training for TFG
troops was essential in order to provide Somalia with a
professional army that cut across clan lines. He stressed the
need for basic training for TFG forces and complained that
TFG currently has nothing more than a militia. Mugisha
recommended 6 months of training for platoon level officers
and said 4,000 trained TFG troops would make an enormous
difference. He cited lack of education as the biggest
problem hindering current training of Somali forces and
suggested educated Somalis from the Somalia Diaspora be
recruited to support the TFG. He lamented the fact that
without training, equipment given to the TFG ends up in the
hands of al-Shabaab. He said Uganda has already trained 800
TFG troops and is in the process of training 700 more. He
claimed that Tanzania was able to train TFG troops but lacked
the funds to do so. He stressed the need to ensure that
trained TFG forces remain together as a unit upon their
return to Mogadishu as many of these units are broken apart
to provide personal security for TFG officials.


10. (C) DATT said France was considering moving its training
of TFG troops from Djibouti to Uganda. The Ambassador said
the U.S. was committed to additional funding for AMISOM.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) General Mugisha is clearly interested in giving his
men a fighting chance in a difficult situation. Intelligent,
dedicated, and professional, his appeal for help was
dignified and logical. He made it clear that Uganda would
not cut and run and appreciated the assistance AMISOM had
already received. One gets the sense that assistance with
his very reasonable request could make the difference between
success and failure in Somalia.


LANIER